

KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence

DIGEST: Applicant is a native of the Republic of China (Taiwan) who became a naturalized United States citizen in June 1990. He acquired a Taiwanese passport in November 2005 to avoid having to fulfill compulsory military service for Taiwan. He has since destroyed that passport and expressed a willingness to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship. Foreign influence concerns that arise because of his grandmother's Taiwanese residency and citizenship are not sufficient to deny him access, given his limited contact with her, and his significant ties to the United States. Clearance is granted.

CASENO: 06-24367.h1

DATE: 06/21/2007

DATE: June 21, 2007

In re:	)	
	)	
	)	
-----	)	ISCR Case No. 06-24367
SSN: -----	)	
	)	
Applicant for Security Clearance	)	
	)	

**DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE  
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI**

**APPEARANCES**

**FOR GOVERNMENT**

Jeff A. Nagel, Esq., Department Counsel

**FOR APPLICANT**

*Pro Se*

**SYNOPSIS**

Applicant is a native of the Republic of China (Taiwan) who became a naturalized United States citizen in June 1990. He acquired a Taiwanese passport in November 2005 to avoid having to fulfill compulsory military service for Taiwan. He has since destroyed that passport and expressed a willingness to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship. Foreign influence concerns that arise because of his grandmother's Taiwanese residency and citizenship are not sufficient to deny him access, given his limited contact with her, and his significant ties to the United States. Clearance is granted.

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### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

\_\_\_\_\_ The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. As required by Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 ¶ E2.1.2 (Jan. 2, 1992) as amended, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on January 30, 2007, detailing the basis for its decision—security concerns raised under Guideline C (foreign preference) and Guideline B (foreign influence) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on December 29, 2005, and implemented by the Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006. The revised guidelines were provided to Applicant when the SOR was issued.<sup>1</sup>

\_\_\_\_\_ On February 16, 2007, Applicant responded to the SOR and requested a decision based on the written record without a hearing. The government submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM) on March 12, 2007, consisting of four exhibits (Ex. 1-4). Department Counsel also requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts, and submitted 12 documents to support the request, identified in the FORM as I through XII. DOHA forwarded a copy of the FORM to Applicant and instructed him to respond within 30 days of receipt. Applicant filed a timely rebuttal dated March 27, 2007. On review on April 2, 2007, Department Counsel had no objections to Applicant's submission. The case was assigned to me on May 2, 2007, to determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.

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### **RULINGS ON PROCEDURE**

In the FORM, the government requested the administrative judge take administrative notice of several facts concerning Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC or China). Authority to consider the government's request is set forth in ¶ E3.1.10 of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (*The Administrative Judge may rule on questions of procedure, discovery, and evidence and shall conduct all proceedings in a fair, timely, and orderly manner.*). The DOHA Appeal Board has ruled that administrative or official notice in administrative proceedings is broader than judicial notice under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In ISCR Case No. 02-24875 (decided Oct. 12, 2006),

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<sup>1</sup>In its correspondence forwarding the SOR (Ex. 2), DOHA Columbus erroneously informed Applicant that if he did not want a hearing, he would have 20 days in which to respond to the documentary information relied on by the government (*i.e.*, File of Relevant Material). Under ¶ E3.1.7 of the Directive, Department Counsel is required to provide the applicant with a copy "of all relevant and material information that could be adduced at a hearing." Applicant is given 30 days from receipt of this information to submit a documentary response. In his letter forwarding the FORM, Department Counsel correctly informed Applicant he had 30 days from receipt.

the Appeal Board found no error in a DOHA administrative judge taking administrative notice of a U.S. State Department *Country Reports on Human Rights 2000: Laos*, as the document was an official U.S. government report relevant to the issues in the case before him, and it was provided in advance to the applicant who had an opportunity to rebut its contents or to present alternative information for the judge to notice.

Applicant filed no objection to the proposed facts for administrative notice, but this does not relieve me of the responsibility to determine whether the proposed facts are proper for administrative notice in this case, *i.e.*, easily verifiable by an authorized source and relevant and material to the case before me. Concerning the source documentation, the government relied on publications of the Department of State;<sup>2</sup> the Congressional Research Service;<sup>3</sup> the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies;<sup>4</sup> the National Counterintelligence Center, now known as the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive;<sup>5</sup> and a Select Committee of the United States House of Representatives;<sup>6</sup> two press releases reportedly from the U.S. Department of Justice; and records of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. However, source document V, identified as a press release of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia and dated January 22, 2007, was not included in the file sent to me for consideration. The only press release included was from the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York (IV), which has not been demonstrated to be relevant to Applicant. Moreover, the U.S. District Court document (VI) included in the file is a criminal complaint with attached Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant, filed September 15, 2004. It was improperly identified in the FORM as a “Statement of Facts,” dated December 12, 2005, filed with the District Court. Noting that a criminal complaint is a statement of charges and not proof of any misconduct, it also did not pertain to any criminal charge brought against Applicant. In response to the government’s request, I took administrative notice of certain facts as set out below.

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### **FINDINGS OF FACT**

DOHA alleged under Guideline C, foreign preference, that Applicant exercised dual citizenship with the U.S. and Taiwan (SOR ¶ 1.a), and as a U.S. naturalized citizen acquired a Taiwanese passport in November 2005 (¶ 1.c) that was valid as of August 2006 (¶ 1.b). Foreign

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<sup>2</sup>See *Background Note: Taiwan*, dated October 2006 (I), *Background Note: China*, dated April 2006 (VIII), *China: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005*, dated March 8, 2006 (IX), and *Consular Information Sheet on China*, dated September 22, 2006 (XII).

<sup>3</sup>See *Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices*, dated October 9, 2006 (II).

<sup>4</sup>See *Intelligence Threat Handbook*, excerpts, dated June 2004 (IV). The document was prepared for the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff by the Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, a private contractor.

<sup>5</sup>See *Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2000* (VII, page 15 missing from the file copy provided for review) and *Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2005* (XI).

<sup>6</sup>See *U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China*, declassified version dated January 3, 1999 (X).

influence (Guideline B) concerns were alleged related to the Taiwanese citizenship and residency of his grandmother (¶ 2.a) and his travel to Taiwan in November 2005 (¶ 2.b).

In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations, but explained that he acquired his Taiwanese passport so that he could have “Overseas Chinese” status and would not be drafted into compulsory military service on his return to Taiwan to visit his 80-year-old grandmother in November 2005. Told at the time that he was ineligible to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship before age 40, Applicant expressed his willingness to surrender his passport and Taiwanese citizenship since he was now “only a year away from 40 years old.”<sup>7</sup>

After a thorough review of the documents before me for consideration, including Applicant’s rebuttal to the FORM, and having agreed to take administrative notice, I make the following relevant and material findings of fact:

Applicant is a 39-year-old structural engineer. He earned his master of science degree from a public university in the U.S. in about December 1999. Applicant has been employed by a defense contractor since January 1997 and seeks a security clearance for his duties.

#### **Applicant’s background and foreign ties**

Applicant and his immediate family (parents and two siblings) emigrated from their native Taiwan to the U.S. in the early to mid-1980’s.<sup>8</sup> His parents and brother became U.S. citizens in 1989, and his sister in 1992. In September 1986, at age 18, Applicant began college in the U.S. In June 1990, he took the oath of U.S. naturalization, vowing to renounce all foreign allegiances, to support and defend the U.S. Constitution and its laws, and to bear arms or perform noncombatant service or civilian service on behalf of the U.S. if required. Applicant assumed that his acquisition of U.S. citizenship operated to automatically revoke his Taiwanese citizenship.

Planning a trip to Taiwan to see his ill 80-year-old grandmother in November 1995, Applicant checked the U.S. Department of State website for information about travel to Taiwan. He was “shocked” to learn that under Taiwan’s law providing for compulsory military service, men between the ages of 18 and 40 born in Taiwan or who have ever held a Taiwanese passport may be subjected to compulsory military service in Taiwan, even if they are also U.S. citizens and even if they have entered Taiwan on U.S. passports. Potentially affected persons were urged to consult with the nearest office of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) before visiting Taiwan to determine whether they were subjected to that requirement.

Applicant contacted the TECO and explained that he had renounced his Taiwanese citizenship when he became a U.S. citizen in 1990. He was informed that under Taiwanese law he was still a citizen of Taiwan and ineligible to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship until after age 40. He was led to understand that if he returned to Taiwan, he would be liable for compulsory military

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<sup>7</sup>Based on the date of birth listed on his SF 86, Applicant was two months shy of his 39<sup>th</sup> birthday. (*See Ex. 4*).

<sup>8</sup>The date(s) on which Applicant and his family first came to the U.S. is not of record. Applicant indicated in response to the FORM that his only in-person contact with his grandmother was during the two weeks in November 2005 “after been to United State [sic] for 20 some years.”

service unless he fell within an exception for those with “Overseas Chinese” status who departed Taiwan before age 15 and never returned for a visit of more than four months and the total of visits did not exceed a year. To ensure that he would not be drafted into the Taiwanese military when in Taiwan to visit his grandmother, Applicant acquired a Taiwanese passport in about November 2005 to convert to “Overseas Chinese” status. He visited his grandmother in Taiwan for two weeks in November 2005.<sup>9</sup>

On April 3, 2006, Applicant executed a Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (SF 86). He disclosed that he, his parents, and his siblings, had all acquired U.S. citizenship, but that he had obtained a Taiwanese passport in November 2005 to convert to overseas Taiwanese status. He also reported his pleasure trip to Taiwan in November 2005.

On August 22, 2006, Applicant was interviewed by an investigator for the Department of Defense. He acknowledged his possession of a valid Taiwanese passport issued in November 2005.

On receipt of the SOR in February 2007, Applicant learned that his exercise of Taiwanese citizenship, and application for, and possession of, a Taiwanese passport, raised concerns of foreign preference. With the understanding that he had to be at least age 40 to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship, Applicant expressed a willingness to surrender his passport and renounce his foreign citizenship as he was “only a year away from 40 years old.” He questioned the foreign influence implications raised by his travel to Taiwan to see his grandmother in November 2005, and averred that it was not by his choice that she lives in Taiwan.

In response to the FORM, Applicant notified DOHA that he had turned over his Taiwanese passport to his employer’s facility security officer. The passport was shredded on March 27, 2007, as confirmed by the FSO in a letter of that date. Since his immigration to the U.S., Applicant’s in-person contact with his grandmother has been limited to that visit to Taiwan in November 2005.

I take administrative notice of the following adjudicative facts. The government of Taiwan is a multi-party democracy. The United States recognizes that there is only one China, that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and that Taiwan is part of China. Nonetheless, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. conducts unofficial relations with Taiwan. Although the U.S. terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty, it has continued to sell appropriate military defensive material to Taiwan. It is U.S. policy that the resolution of disputes between Taiwan and China be peaceful. Taiwan is a major international trading power and a member of the World Trade Organization. It enjoys normal trade relations with the U.S., and ready access to U.S. markets. The U.S. State Department reports that Taiwan has taken dramatic steps to improve respect for human rights and create a democratic political system since ending martial law. In the past, organizations in Taiwan employed unlawful methods to obtain U.S. economic and intelligence information.

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## **POLICIES**

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<sup>9</sup>It is not clear whether Applicant obtained that Taiwanese passport when he was in Taiwan visiting his grandmother or just shortly before his trip. It was issued that same month of his trip, and he indicated in response to the FORM that he never traveled on that passport. It does not indicate on his SF 86 (Ex. 4) whether he has or had a U.S. passport. If he did not have a U.S. passport, then he would have needed his foreign passport to exit and re-enter the U.S.

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.” *Id.* at 527. The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).

The adjudicative guidelines set forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In evaluating the security worthiness of an applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 of the Directive. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. *See* Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

## CONCLUSIONS

### **Guideline C—Foreign Preference**

*When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.* (AG ¶ 9). A native of Taiwan, Applicant immigrated to the U.S. with his immediate family when he was still a minor. He became a U.S. citizen when he was in college, and assumed at that time that he was no longer a Taiwanese citizen. Shocked to learn that he not only was still a Taiwanese citizen but that he could be conscripted into military service if he went to Taiwan, Applicant acquired a Taiwanese passport to convert to “Overseas Chinese” status so that he could visit his ill grandmother without fear of being forced to remain in Taiwan to fulfill compulsory military service. His voluntary acquisition of a Taiwanese passport is the exercise of a privilege of his Taiwanese citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen and it raises serious foreign preference concerns under AG ¶ 10 (a)(1), *exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport.*

In mitigation of the foreign preference concerns raised by possession of a current foreign passport,<sup>10</sup> Applicant turned in his passport to his employer’s FSO and it has been shredded. His good faith effort to comply with DoD requirements satisfies mitigating condition ¶ 11(e), *the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated.* However, his destruction of this Taiwanese passport, done without the approval or apparent knowledge of Taiwanese authorities, is not sufficient to revoke his dual citizenship. As long as Applicant remains a Taiwanese citizen, he presumably can reapply for a passport. Applicant is not

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<sup>10</sup>The term of his Taiwanese passport is not of record. Given its recent issuance in November 2005, it was likely still valid until its destruction in March 2007.

likely to do so, however. With the exception of his acquisition of the Taiwanese passport to convert to “Overseas Chinese” status, Applicant has not exercised any right, privilege, or obligation of his foreign citizenship as an adult. Indeed, he thought he was no longer a citizen of Taiwan after his naturalization in the U.S. in 1990. It was only because of the operation of Taiwanese law, over which he had no control, that he remained a Taiwanese citizen (*see* ¶ 11(a) *dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country*). He was unaware of his status as a dual citizen until he contacted the TECO in reliance on published advice of the U.S. State Department that he could be subjected to compulsory military service in Taiwan even as a U.S. citizen traveling on a U.S. passport. His subsequent acquisition of his Taiwanese passport was not intended as an act of preference for Taiwan, but rather to make himself eligible for an exemption from compulsory military service available to those “Overseas Chinese” who departed Taiwan before age 15 and never returned for a visit of more than four months and all visits totaled not more than one year. After being given the adjudicative guidelines making clear that his foreign citizenship was a security issue, Applicant indicated, “I’m willing to surrendering [sic] my passport and renounce my Taiwan Citizenship since I’m only a year away from 40 years old.” (*See Answer*). Willingness to renounce dual citizenship is potentially mitigating under ¶ 11(b), *the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship*. His failure to formally file as of late March 2007 is credibly explained by him being currently ineligible for renunciation to be granted.<sup>11</sup> His destruction of his foreign passport is consistent with his U.S. citizenship and telling of his preference for the U.S.

## **Guideline B—Foreign Influence**

*Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties, or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as to whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.* (AG ¶ 6). Applicant’s elderly grandmother is a resident citizen of Taiwan. Under AG ¶ 7(a), foreign influence concerns are raised by *contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion*. Although Applicant chose not to cancel his trip to Taiwan to see his grandmother when he learned he would have to obtain a Taiwanese passport to avoid possible conscription into the Taiwanese military during his visit, he described his contacts with her as infrequent. Their in-person contact has been limited to a brief two-week period in the past 20 some years. The limited contact does not suggest an especially close relationship. Not enough is known about his elderly grandmother’s activities from which one could conclude that there is or is not a heightened risk because of her position or activities.

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<sup>11</sup>Applicant indicated he must be at least 40 years old to formally renounce. According to a March 2001 compilation of citizenship laws by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service titled *Citizenship Laws of the World*, Taiwan does not recognize dual citizenship. Voluntary renunciation of Taiwanese citizenship is permitted for any persons over the age of 20 except for persons of military age who have not yet performed their service, persons who are in active military service, and persons who hold military or civilian office.

The country involved is a relevant consideration, and the government argues for a heightened risk because of Taiwan, a country whose inhabitants share ethnicity and increasing economic ties with the PRC, and one which is an active collector of U.S. economic and proprietary information.<sup>12</sup> Concerns of Taiwan targeting U.S. economic and proprietary interests are counterbalanced by Taiwan's partnership in defense with the U.S. and Taiwan's progress in achieving democratic elections, civil liberties, and stable, viable governmental institutions. As reported by the U.S. State Department, Taiwan has taken dramatic steps to improve respect for human rights and create a democratic political system. Taiwan also has a history of favorable relations with the U.S. While the U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan and is committed to a "one-China" policy, under the Taiwan Relations Act, signed into law on April 10, 1979, the U.S. is obligated to help Taiwan defend itself, including making available defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan. U.S. commercial ties with Taiwan have been maintained and expanded since 1979, and Taiwan is not likely to jeopardize its relationship with the U.S. by overly pressuring its citizens, but even nations with a history of friendly relations do not always have the same interests.

As for the government's concerns that ties between Taiwan and the PRC heighten the risk of undue foreign influence,<sup>13</sup> although Taiwan and the PRC have increased their economic ties, they are not closely aligned politically, and are diametrically opposed in several aspects. The current Taiwanese government has a pro-independence bias. The PRC is seen as the predominant threat by Taiwan, and its military's primary mission is to defend against the PRC.<sup>14</sup> As noted by Department Counsel in the FORM, Taiwan's own national security remains under constant threat from the PRC. Assuming the PRC is engaged in active intelligence gathering against Taiwan within Taiwan's borders, there is no evidence that Applicant's grandmother is in a position where she is likely to be targeted by the PRC, or by Taiwan for that matter. Mitigating condition ¶ 8(a) applies where *the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.*

In the unlikely event that Applicant found himself in a position of being forced to choose between the interests of his grandmother or Taiwan and the interests of the U.S., Applicant can be expected to resolve those interests in favor of the U.S., where he has been exposed to educational, cultural, and peer influences since he was a teenager. Applicant made an affirmative choice in 1990 to acquire U.S. citizenship under a belief (albeit mistaken) that it meant renunciation of his Taiwanese citizenship. His ten years of contributions as a defense contractor employee and his

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<sup>12</sup>Contrary to the government's assertion, in the file copy of the National Counterintelligence Center's *Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2005* (XI), which is missing page 15, there is no list of countries known to aggressively target U.S. economic or intelligence information. In the 2005 report, the PRC and Russia are the only countries listed by name as the most active collectors.

<sup>13</sup>In the FORM, Department Counsel did not expound as to the nature of the "heightened risk" presented by the PRC other than to state, "The facts detailed above in the administrative notice section and those more detailed facts in the administrative notice source documents demonstrate this heightened risk." Among the facts proposed for administrative notice are that China has a poor record with respect to human rights, and that those traveling to China may at times be placed under surveillance by PRC security personnel. Yet, there is no evidence that Applicant has ever been to the PRC, or that he has any tie or connection to the PRC.

<sup>14</sup>See U.S. State Department's *Background Note: Taiwan* (I).

efforts to avoid conscription in the Taiwanese military are objective indicators of his bonds to the U.S., while his expressed willingness to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship reflects the minimal nature of his emotional tie to Taiwan. Applicant satisfies MC ¶ 8(b), *there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.*

### **Whole Person Concept**

*The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. (AG ¶ 2(a)). Applicant's voluntary exercise of his Taiwanese citizenship some 15 years after he had acquired U.S. citizenship would ordinarily raise very serious concern about whether he can be counted on to serve U.S. interests (¶ 2(a)(1), *the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct*). However, his motive was to ensure that he did not have to fulfill military service for Taiwan (¶ 2(a)(7), *the motivation for the conduct*), and he has demonstrated reform in complying with DoD requirements to surrender, destroy, or otherwise invalidate his Taiwanese passport (¶ 2(a)(6), *the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes*). His only ties to Taiwan are a citizenship status by operation of law rather than choice, and an elderly grandmother, with whom he has had limited in-person contact. His substantial ties to the U.S. (citizenship for 17 years, residency for more than 20 years, career) overwhelm those to his native Taiwan such that he can be counted on to fulfill his fiduciary obligations to the United States.*

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### **FORMAL FINDINGS**

The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:

Paragraph 1. Guideline C:	FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a:	For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b:	For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c:	For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline B:	FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a:	For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b:	For Applicant

## **DECISION**

In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.

Elizabeth M. Matchinski  
Administrative Judge