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20 October 2006

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. ~~(S)~~ **SUBJECT:** 21 October POTUS Meeting with SecDef, Military Commanders, and US Ambassador to Iraq.
2. ~~(S)~~ **PURPOSE:** To discuss last 30 days in Iraq, Baghdad Security Plan progress, benchmarks, and possible adjustments to the Iraq strategy.
3. ~~(S)~~ **DESIRED OUTCOME:**
  - POTUS receives updates on casualties, Baghdad Security Plan, benchmarks, and recommended adjustments to the Iraq strategy.
4. ~~(S)~~ **AGENDA:**
  - Last 30 Days Update— (DOD)
  - Baghdad Security— (DOD/State)
  - Benchmarks — (DOD/State)
  - Adjustments — (DOD/State)
5. ~~(S)~~ **ATTENDEES:**
  - POTUS, VP (SVTC), Mr. Hadley (SVTC), Mr. Bolten (SVTC), Dr. Crouch (SVTC), and Ms. O'Sullivan (SVTC)
  - OSD: SecDef (SVTC), USD(P)
  - JCS: CJCS
  - State: Ambassador Khalilzad (SVTC), Ambassador Satterfield (SVTC)
  - Others: GEN Casey (SVTC), GEN Abizaid (SVTC)
6. (U) **TOPICS:**
  - A. ~~(S)~~ Last 30 Days - included in MNF-I's brief

1. **Summary - The following questions were provided for discussion:**

- Do we assess that the rise in casualties is due to increased exposure because of changes in our operational posture? Or is it the result of a concerted effort by the enemy (b)(1) or other players?
- What specific adjustments might we make to bring casualties down? What would be the implications of these changes for our strategy?

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**2. J5 ME Comments**

(b)(1) [redacted] may have contributed to the rise of casualties; however, Ramadan traditionally has seen 15-20% increase in violence over historical levels.

- We concur with MNF-I's conclusions and adjustments.

**3. OSD Position** - Unknown

**4. COCOM Position** - Included in brief

**5. Other Agency Position** - Unknown

**6. Talking Points**

- We concur with MNF-I's conclusions.

**B. (S) Baghdad Security Plan**

**1. Summary:**

- Are we succeeding? If not, why not?
- What adjustments are we making in light of the present levels of violence?
- How much improvement can be achieved through additional forces and how much requires more reconciliation?

(b)(1) [redacted]

- Is the return to violence in certain cleared sectors of Baghdad occurring after security is being handed over to ISF or while MNF-I is still in charge?

(b)(1) [redacted]

- Given the changing nature of the conflict in Iraq generally, are our present force levels sufficient to complete the mission and respond to contingencies? What do we have in reserve, if necessary?

(b)(1) [redacted]

**2. J5 ME Comments**

- Operation Together Forward has made a difference in the focus areas, (b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] Success in the Baghdad Security Plan will be measured in small steps over the long-term. It's too soon to tell if we are succeeding.

(b)(1) [redacted]

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(b)(1)

- ISF have generally acquitted themselves well during combat

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

**3. OSD Position - Unknown.**

**4. COCOM Position -**

**5. Other Agency Position -**

**6. Talking Points**

(b)(1)

- ISF are generally performing well, but their failures are more highly publicized than their successes.
- A pure military solution is not the answer in Baghdad. Political engagement, job creation, and restoration of essential services will, in concert, begin to drive the levels of violence down.

**C. ~~(S)~~ Benchmarks**

**1. Summary - The following questions were provided for discussion.**

- What are the benefits and drawbacks of laying out a timeline for Iraqi assumption of responsibility?
- Does this approach further focus us on transition rather than on security and stabilizing the country?

(b)(1)

**2. J5 ME Comments**

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

- 3. **OSD Position - Unknown.**
- 4. **COCOM Position - Unknown.**
- 5. **Other Agency Position - Unknown.**
- 6. **Talking Points**

(b)(1)

**D. ~~(S)~~ Adjustments**

**1. Summary - the following question was provided for discussion:**

- What adjustments to our tactics in pursuing our strategy have been most significant?

**2. J5 ME Comments**

(b)(1)

- 3. **OSD Position -**
- 4. **COCOM Position -**
- 5. **Other Agency Position -**
- 6. **Talking Points**
- **None.**

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