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DRAFT

MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

MARITIME OPERATIONS

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(b)(1)
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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

MARITIME OPERATIONS

PART I. GENERAL (U)

A. (TS) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
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[redacted]

(b)(1)
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B. (TS) IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLAN -34A

1. (TS) Organization and Control. In January 1964, with expansion of the scope of operations, DOD directed the transfer of responsibility for NVN covert operations to COMUSMACV.** Headquarters control was vested in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Special Operations Group (later changed to the cover name, Studies and Observations Group) with the maritime operations portion of the program under the direct supervision of the Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Danang. To augment the NAD staff personnel and Navy SEAL/Marine Corps reconnaissance advisors, Mobile Support Team (MST), Danang was established,*** constituted from selected members of the US crews who delivered the PTF craft to Danang. Under OPCON of NAD, the MST provided a Boat Training Team (BTT) to continue instruction, training and qualification of VN crews, and a Repair and Maintenance Team (RMT) to service and repair the boats and to assist the VNN toward development of an inherent maintenance capability. Engineering facilities in Vietnam were inadequate, requiring major overhaul of the craft to be done at Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.

* 1. (TS) History, MACSOG, Annex A to 1964 MACV C.H."
[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

** (TS) Msg, Joint State-DOD-CAS, DTG 162220Z Jan 64.
*** (TS) Msg, COMNAVBASESUBIC, DTG 190615Z Dec 63.

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2. (TS) NASTY BOATS CAS had, prior to OPLAN-34A, requested that DOD provide two NASTY-Class PTFs for the program. NASTY PTFs, constructed in Norway and propelled by British-made Napier Deltic engines, were in operation by several European countries and procurement by the US Navy had been negotiated for test and evaluation purposes The NASTY-Class PTF is an 80-foot, 80-ton diesel-powered, mahogony hulled craft capable of speeds up to 40 knots, with cruising range of 860 nm at 38 knots and 1,050 miles at 20 knots. It was believed that this type craft could be operated as non-attributable to the United States, and would greatly improve the capability to conduct covert MAROPS. (See Figure CD-1.)

a. The requirement was reemphasized and approved with eight PTFs to be provided vice two,* for support of the joint MACV/CAS OPLAN-34A for the planned conduct of harassment, punitive and attritional action to be launched from the sea against NVN.

b. To induce the approval and support of the RVN in implementing the planned maritime and over-the-beach actions against NVN by RVN operators, as well as to minimize attributability to US sponsorship,**it was implied that the PTF craft were being turned over to RVN possession for unilateral actions in defense of their coastal waters against infiltration of hostile forces from NVN. Actual leases, Tab 1,**were negotiated with the RVN Joint General Staff representing the Republic of Vietnam and US Navy representing the United States of America. The termination clause could be effected by 30-day notice of the Lessee Government, or national emergency contingencies affecting the Lessor Government. The procedure provided support, at least initially, for the cover story of RVN

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC DTG 210313Z Jan 64.
** 1. (TS) Msg, CNO, DTG 071517Z May 64.
2. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 021013Z Oct 64.

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC DTG 210313Z Jan 64.

FIGURE CD-1 (TS)



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independent retaliatory actions against NVN and the deniability of US sponsorship and direct participation.* Credibility of the leases and ultimate ownership of the craft remained uncertain.

3. (TS) Personnel. At the changeover from CAS to SOG, 45 Vietnamese Navy personnel came under operational control of SOG. An immediate request was submitted to VNN for 100 additional personnel to be trained for the first two boats expected in 1964. Later in January 1964, SOG was informed that six additional PTFs were to be delivered and an additional request for 90 personnel (in 30-man increments) was submitted.

> "On 12 February 1964, General Westmoreland dispatched a letter (MACSOG-0059-64) to General Khiem, Minister of Defense, outlining the same requirements as those forwarded to General Don with the additional requirement for 40 action team personnel... by 1965, an average of 148 Vietnamese military or civilian, and Chinese Landing Team personnel were operationally ready and in a constant state of training throughout the year "**

a. VNN crew personnel for the PTFs were not immediately provided, nor were they quickly responsive to orientation and training. VN leadership during this period has been subject to criticism. Motivation of assigned VN personnel was adversely influenced by variations in background of personnel selected and by the variable pay scales and incentive bonus arrangements that had been introduced during the period of CAS control.***

b. US Navy crews, with engineering personnel, factory trained at D. Napier and Son, Ltd., London, England, brought the PTFs from CONUS to Danang via Subic Bay, Philippine Island where required hull and outfitting modifications were accomplished. Although previously uninformed of the intended advisory task vice operational status, the crews were converted effectively to Boat Training Teams who, man-for-man,

* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 292259Z May 64.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV 1964 C.H."
*** (TS) Report, MST Danang, Beat Training Team Report to COMNAVOPSUPGRUPAC and CINCPACFLT.

trained their VN counterparts in boat operations, gunnery and craft maintenance. Background and adaptability of assigned VN personnel influenced variable periods of basic training with six weeks to three months normally required. The limited practical experience of Oriental seamen with sophisticated engineering and propulsion systems prolonged their assimilation of preventative maintenance and major repair capabilities.

4. (TS) Base Deficiencies. Deficiencies of the Danang base for operations were soon apparent. Pier and maintenance facilities were inadequate, fuel storage was non-existent; training and operations could be supported only by tank truck delivery from the USMC Air Base, Danang to a washed out bridge and thence by LCM ferry. A floating drydock with ancillary tools and equipment was mandatory for even minor craft maintenance. Harbor dredging was an imminent and continuing requirement.* Extensive modifications were required for the new PTFs at US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, to accomodate previously unknown mission requirements, e.g., increased internal fuel and water capability for long operating ranges; removal of excess and US attributable equipment, including 40 mm forward mounts, ready service lockers, single side band radios, IFF and UHF transceivers, galley ranges, ovens, refrigerators, hot water heaters, and detachable tables, bunks and living space items, and installation of electrical power control for gun mounts which could not otherwise by manually operated by the Vietnamese sailors.

C. (TS) MAROPS - TASKS

Maritime Operations tasks, as stated in OPLAN-34A-64, were as follows.

1. (TS) Conduct small scale demolition operations, intelligence collection actions, capture of prisoners, and temporary interdiction of lines of communication.

* (TS) Report, MST Danang, weekly Report to COMNAOPSUPPGRUPAC, Mar-Oct 64.

** (TS) Msg, COMNAVBASE Subic, DTG 190615Z Dec 63.

2. (TS) Make DRV aware of opposition by causing interruption in movement of supplies which will necessitate an increased readiness posture of DRV forces.

3. (TS) Conduct small scale seaborne raids by small forces on important military and civil installations.

4. (TS) Actions will be covert when possible. When, due to forces required, they become basically overt, nothing is to be directly attributable to the US

5. (TS) Operations may support one or more of these objectives

(a) Psychological resistance.

(b) Intelligence collection.

(c) Political pressure.

(d) Physical destruction.

6. (TS) US forces will not be used for operations within DRV or its territorial waters."*

D. (TS) COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (TS) Initial Approval Procedures. Approval of MAROPS missions was held closely at the Washington level during the first year of operations. The procedure in effect at this time was summarized in a CJCS memorandum as follows:

"a. COMUSMACV was required to submit a monthly program for approval by CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority.

"b. After receipt of the monthly program approval, COMUSMACV requested approval for execution of each individual maritime mission.

"c. Individual mission requests were coordinated for execution approval by the Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs then coordinated approval with the State Department and the White House. Consideration for approval of each mission was undertaken only after the results of the previous mission had been received and evaluated.**"

* (TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34-A-64/CAS Saigon OPLAN TIGER.
** (TS) MEMO, CM-295-64, "OPLAN 34A - Maritime Operations 8 Dec 1964.

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2. (TS) Revised Procedures

a. The Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff pointed out in the memorandum * that the above procedures were cumbersome and restricted the mission frequency capability of COMUSMACV The following proposed revision was approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance

"(1) COMUSMACV submits a 30-day program for approval by CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority

"(2) Approval at the Washington level is forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to COMUSMACV for planning purposes.

"(3) COMUSMACV subsequently submits packages of up to five missions from the 30-day program for execution approval by CINCPAC, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

"(4) Unless otherwise directed, approval of each package constitutes final approval for execution of the included missions at the discretion of COMUSMACV, in coordination with the American Ambassador, Saigon." *

b. Discretionary Authorities

(1) The first discretionary authority was granted to CINCPAC in January 1965.** CINCPAC was authorized to approve separate LOKI (junk capture) missions to meet intelligence requirements. Mission approval at the Washington level was not required.

(2) The next discretionary authority was granted to CINCPAC in March 1965.*** JCS authorized CINCPAC to approve and execute the following missions.

(a) DRIFT. Distribution of gift kits and transistor radio ashore and offshore.

(b) CADO. Psychological deception operations executed by agents infiltrated and exfiltrated by rubber boats launched from PTFs, on isolated stretches of the NVN coast.

(c) SWALLOW. Coastal personnel captures Raiding

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG, 131948Z Jan 65.
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 007776 Mar 65.

** (TS) Msg JCS, DTG 131948Z Jan 65 Appendix C

parties from PTFs and SWIFTs were tasked to capture [illegible] personnel in isolated areas for psychological and intelligence exploitation. Later, CINCPAC designated the codeword CADO to cover all three of these missions.

(3) In June 1965, CINCPAC was authorized to initiate PTF harassment and interdiction missions against Tiger Island at his discretion.*

(4) CINCPAC was also authorized,** at his discretion to permit PTFs returning from unsuccessful psychological and intelligence operations to interdict and harass the following military targets by the use of Naval gun fire:

(a) CAP LAY RADAR

(b) MACH NUOC RADAR

(c) THUONG LUAT

(d) AP TAN DINH SECURITY POST

(e) DONG HOI O.P.

(f) LY HAO O.P.

(g) THANH YEN O.P.

(h) RON O.P.

(i) CAP VINH SON RADAR

(j) CAP MUI DAO O.P.

(5) Further extension of these authorities was granted in November 1965. CINCPAC was authorized*** to employ the PTFs in shipping interdiction missions up to 20°N latitude and to deliver psychological leaflets by 81mm mortar rounds at his discretion.

c. In March 1967, JCS consolidated the discretionary authorities that had been granted the previous two years and set forth the procedures which were then followed until the stand down on 1 November 1968.**** CINCPAC was authorized to approve for execution all missions whose concepts had

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 003610 Jun 65
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 081458 Jul 65
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 291649Z Nov 65.
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 101523Z Mar 67.

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 081458 Jul 65

been previously approved at the Washington level. A twelve hour prior, mission intent message was required from MACV (SOG) to give higher authority (JCS, CINCPAC) a final opportunity for disapproval

3 (TS) Coordination Within MACSOG

a. The first step in normal operational planning procedure was for NAD to submit a mission concept to MACSOG who, after review, submitted it to CINCPAC for approval. If approved by CINCPAC or higher authority NAD was informed and the mission was then scheduled at a future time.

b. Missions were scheduled on a weekly basis by NAD in conjunction with MACSOG.

c. Requests for special purpose missions were made by other MACSOG sections or by higher authority, usually CINCPAC. Necessary instructions for these missions were issued by the Maritime operations office, MACSOG to NAD who then completed the planning.

d. Initially there was virtually no mission planning coordination with any activity outside of MACSOG. Following the gulf of Tonkin attack on US destroyers continuing liaison was maintained with U.S. Seventh Fleet. Coordination within SOG was effected with the PSYOPS and Intelligence branches primarily.*

e. Messages giving information on mission intent (Track information), mission launch and mission cancelled or completed were transmitted to a number of addresses including 7th Air Force, 7th FLEET (includes SEA DRAGON), MARKET TIME, CINCPAC and JCS. Coordination with MARKET TIME and SEA DRAGON on recognition signals was additionally effected.*

f. Overall planning concepts were coordinated between STD and MACSOG; however, there was little or no coordination

* (TS) Instruction, MACSOG-31, "PARBOIL (c) duty officer watch standing Inst.," 1 April 1969

on proposed operations, their authorization and scheduling. CSS officers participated jointly with counterpart MAF personnel in the planning, briefing and debriefing of mission personnel

4. (TS) Other Authorities and Constraints

a. In January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that "bombardment missions were considered primary in attaining objectives of OPLAN-34A MAROPS." *

b. In July 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized "Stop and Search" role for MAROPS PTFs. **

c. Later in July 1965, authorization was given to interdiction of small tonnage NVN shipping by the MAROPS PTFs, with proviso that no US personnel would be aboard and that operations be restricted to areas south of 19-00N. ***

d. In November 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized utilization of PTFs in Phase I interdiction of small tonnage NVN shipping and stated.

"US personnel will not repeat not be aboard PTFs." ****

e. In July 1966, CINCPAC established mission categories and assigned numerical series designations for each type, i.e.:

MINT	300-399
LOKI	400-499
CADO	500-599
MINT/PSYHAR	600-699
LOKI/PSYHAR	700-799
CADO/PSYHAR	800-899
SPECIAL PURPOSE (SAR, etc)	900-999 *****

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 131942Z January 1965
** (TS) Memo, JCSM-525-65, 3 July 1965 (Approved by DepSec Def 28 July 1965)
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 281530Z July 1965
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 281530Z November 1965
***** (TS) Msg, ADMINO CINCPAC, DTG 012347Z July 1966

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f. In March 1967, CINCPAC set forth and consolidated PLOWMAN (C) rules of engagement, and re-defined the three basic types of missions above 17°N upon which PLOWMAN (C) craft could embark: MINT, LOKI, CADC. * (See concept of operations paragraphs for details.)

g. In August 1967, CINCPAC re-established 20°-00'N as the northern limit for PLOWMAN (C) MINT missions. **

h. In April 1968, CINCPAC set forth directions governing the conduct of PLOWMAN (C) operations north of 19°N. COMUSMACV was authorized to continue PLOWMAN (C) operation to 19°N limited as described below:

(1) Firing or delivery of ordnance in the area from 17°N to 19°N was specifically limited to that required for self-defense.

(2) Operations between 17°N and 19°N were limited to the stopping and searching of NVN watercraft, jettisoning/confiscation of military supplies discovered, the on-site interrogation of NVN crews, and the return of detainees.

(3) No prisoners were to be taken during the conduct of PLOWMAN (C) operations north of 17°N.

(4) No PLOWMAN (C) cross-beach operations were to be conducted north of 17°N. ***

i. The direction provided as stated above was subsequently modified as follows: In June CINCPAC authorized the conduct of PLOWMAN (C) operations in the area south of 20°N and the destruction of enemy craft carrying military personnel or cargo, subject to the restrictions defined above. ****

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 192147Z August 1967
*** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 102038Z April 1967
**** 1. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 012257Z June 1968
2. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 161436Z June 1968

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j. In July the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized at CINCPAC's discretion, the continuance of PLOTTAN (C) operations below 20-00N; and further authorized the re-institution of the maritime detention program, limiting operations to below 19-00N and the taking of a maximum of ten detainees per week who were to be returned to NVN within two weeks.*

k. On 1 November 1968, all PLOTTAN (C) missions north of 17-00°N were discontinued. **

l. The MACSOG Duty Officer Watch Standing Instructions for PARBOIL (C) (MAROPS), dated 1 April 1969, is at Tab 2. This instruction provides detailed procedure for actions to be accomplished in the coordination, clearance, launching and surveillance of MAROPS missions.

m. US Naval Advisory Detachment Instruction 003100.2B is at Tab 3. This instruction provides detailed guidance and basic policy pertaining to USNAD Danang responsibilities in preparation for, and conduct of MAROPS launched from the Danang base.

E. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. (TS) SSPL. Maritime forces were designed to operate under the cover story control of the Sacred Sword Patriot League (SSPL), [redacted] The SSPL was portrayed to consist of North Vietnamese partisans who, from within NVN, opposed the policies of the NVN government and sponsored resistance and actions opposing the NVN government.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

2. (TS) Operating Areas. The mission of MAROPS forces was to conduct maritime operations off the coast of NVN. The sea

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011351Z July 1968
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 010219Z November 1968

overlapping areas of operation, extended from 17°N to 21°N latitude, and from the NVN coast line to approximately 30 miles off the coast (Figure CD-2) All NVN operations originated from the NAD Base, Danang East, SVN.

3. (TS) Missions. There were three basic types of operations conducted: interdiction, intelligence and cross-reach. Each of these missions could be combined with a PSYOPS mission to give a total of seven (six plus a special purpose mission). These were as noted in an earlier paragraph.

a. Series 300 Interdiction (INT) Missions. The primary purpose of the series 300 missions was the interdiction of NVN small tonnage shipping up to the JCS approved limit of 20°N. CINCPAC further restricted 300 series missions to a northern limit of 19°30'N. NVN waterborne traffic encountered in the patrol area, or along the track to and from the patrol area, was stopped, boarded and searched. If the craft was carrying military cargo, military support cargo, or had such a transport capability, it was destroyed, disabled or captured as the tactical situation dictated. Selected crewmen were removed for intelligence and psychological exploitation. *

b. Series 400 Intelligence (LOKI) Missions. The primary purpose of the series 400 missions was the collection of intelligence. Missions in this category were designed to supplement the intelligence take from series 300 missions. They were ordinarily conducted in areas prohibited to interdiction missions, and thereby provided intelligence sources from otherwise denied areas. NVN waterborne craft along the mission track were stopped, boarded and searched. Crewmen were subjected to spot interrogation. Selected personnel, who demonstrate knowledge of activities which might prove to be of intelligence value, were detained and were given

*(TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967

*(TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967

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FIGURE CD-2 (TS)

MANETTE II OPERATIONS GROUND OPERATIONS

TOP SECRET - OPC
LIMDIS TIGER



FIGURE CD-2

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comprehensive interrogation for subsequent psychological exploitation. Any cargo of intelligence value was removed. If the craft was carrying military cargo or had a transport capability, it could be destroyed.

c. Series 500 Cross-Beach (C-BC) missions - separately scheduled special mission wherein maritime action teams were infiltrated/exfiltrated against specific targets ashore along the NVN coast in order to complete the following type missions:

Intelligence operations

Capture of prisoners and/or material

Delivery of PSYOPS material, gift kits and radios.

Selective physical destruction.

Series 500 missions were normally reserved for high priority targets which offered a relatively high probability of producing intelligence of unusual value. *

4. (TS) Rules of Engagement - Summary*

a. Prisoners. Prisoners could be returned to NVN waters or released during any of the maritime missions.

b. Control of Fire. MAROPS craft were authorized to deliver fire against military targets on the NVN coast in self-defense when the safety of craft and action teams were endangered. MAROPS craft were authorized to fire against NVN aircraft and watercraft in self-defense and as necessary in order to ensure success of the mission.

c. Area Limitations. In order to lessen possibility of encounter with CHICOM patrol craft or aircraft, MAROPS craft could not approach the island of Hainan closer than 40nm.

* (TS) sg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967

Due to the shortage of MAROPS craft and the inadequate PTF capability, 19°-30'N was set as the normal northern limit for MAROPS Missions north of 19°-30'N were considered only on a highly lucrative and exceptional basis (Modified in in August 1967 to 20° -00 N)

d. Personnel. US personnel were not embarked on craft proceeding on PLOWMAN (C) missions above 17°00'N.

e. US Air and Surface Support. MAROPS forces were not normally supported by US ships or aircraft in the Gulf of Tonkin However, when MAROPS forces were engaged by NVN aircraft or superior NVN surface forces, they were authorized to contact US ships and/or aircraft for assistance. Additionally, certain high risk missions proceeding above 19°-30'N required the support of prescheduled US air support. Such support was authorized provided it was included in the request for mission approval and was coordinated with PACFLT forces. MAROPS craft experiencing serious personnel casualties could also contact US surface forces for medical assistance and could rendezvous with these forces when out of sight of land.

f. Boarding. In carrying out MAROPS, mission craft occasionally encountered vessels of other than NVN or US origin. MAROPS forces were to make every effort to ensure that only vessels of NVN origin were boarded.

5. (TS) Mission Description - 1967

a. Each mission consisted of two NASTY (PTF) class boats, or three boats if the operation was either north of 19°N latitude or for across beach missions. For operations between 17°N and 19°N, boats proceeded on a predetermined track, normally outside of coastal radar range, to a specific operations area (OPAREA). Once inside the OPAREA there was no restriction on their track. No outside or additional support was

required for these operations. North of 19°N latitude, boats were required to adhere to a predetermined track and time schedule for the entire operation. Standby CAP support for these missions was normally provided by units of the 7th FLEET.*

b. Crews for PTFs and action teams (CADO) were all Vietnamese nationals. Crews were briefed and debriefed by NAD and CSS personnel before and after each mission. Prisoners were brought back blindfolded, then transferred to junks or support craft outside of Danang for transport to Paradise Island. When prisoners were being returned (to NVN), the procedure was reversed. *

c. Once boats were launched on a mission, operational control shifted to MACSOG (maritime operations), Saigon [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

d. Time of missions varied from 20 to 30 hours depending on the time to reach the operational area. Normally, six and one-half to seven hours were spent in the operational area, except on missions north of 20°N latitude during which the boats essentially stayed on a predetermined track. *

e. Maritime forces were authorized to request assistance from US forces in cases of emergency only, such as overwhelming enemy attack, need for medical assistance, and if sinking. This was normally requested [redacted] to MACSOG who, in turn, transmitted the request to 7th FLT liaison officer at Tan Son Nhut for transmission to the fleet. ** (b)(1) (b)(3)

* (TS) Report, MACV J-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report", 14 February 1968

** (TS) Instruction, MACSOG-31, "MAROPS Duty Officer Watch Standing Inst.", 1 April 1969

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6. (TS) Coordination with 7th Fleet In March 1967, CTG 77.1 promulgated procedures for coordination between SEA DRAGON and PLOWMAN (C) units to prevent mutual interference. The following directions to SEA DRAGON units were included:

> "No assistance will be rendered any PLOWMAN (C) craft by SEA DRAGON units unless specifically requested to do so by the craft itself, via UHF voices or flashing light, or by message from higher authority. This rule must be strictly adhered to for purposes of security."

> "If PLOWMAN (C) missions are detected by SEA DRAGON forces outside of assigned opareas or more than one hour or ten miles from assigned track, the task unit commander will report the situation by FLASH precedence message to COMUSMACV, info various fleet units."

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* (TS) Msg, CTG 77.1, DTG 250638Z March 1967

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PART II. RECIPROCS (U)

A. (TS) OPS-[illegible]

1. (TS) General.

a. Maritime operations were under the overall supervision of Chief MACSOG. Direct supervision was the responsibility of the MACSOG operations officer, and, under him Maritime Operations (MAROPS) Officer and his division which had staff planning responsibilities for the program, and operational control of forces when they were conducting a mission. Logistics support coordination, advisory effort, maintenance, training and local control of the MAROPS forces was vested in Officer In Charge, Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Danang, who reported to Chief, MACSOG.*

b. The Vietnamese counterpart organization to MACSOG was the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), located in SAIGON. The Coastal Security Service (CSS), located in Danang, was the Vietnamese counterpart organization to NAD and was responsible to STD for maritime operations.*

c. Both the NAD and CSS organizations ostensibly conducted operations in consonance with their titles, actual operations were conducted covertly.*

d. All maritime operations north of 17°N Latitude were conducted by Vietnamese personnel under the administrative control of CSS, using unmarked PTFs which were leased to GVN by the US Navy.*

2. (TS) Naval Advisory Detachment, Danang (NAD)

a. Purpose. Organization of the Martime Operations Group evolved during February-March 1964 with US and Vietnamese personnel functioning jointly, but under separate commands

* (TS) Report, C.O. NAD DANANG, "Historical Analyses of Maritime Operations Group, Danang," 3 Jan 69.

with cover names of US Naval Advisory Detachment, Danang (USNAD), and the VN as Coastal Security Service (CSS). The US Navy and Marine Corps personnel attached to USNAD serves as advisors, to train and support their counterpart Vietnamese maritime operations forces assigned. The combined US/RVN forces were responsible for the conduct of covert maritime operations against North Vietnam for the purpose of:

(1) Destruction of selected military targets.

(2) Interdiction of waterborne logistics.

(3) Collection of intelligence, including capture and detention of North Vietnamse for intelligence exploitation.

(4) The conduct of psychological warfare.

In compliance with the concept of non-attributability to US sponsorship of actions in NVN territory, US assigned personnel were not permitted to accompany nor participate in actions north of the 17th parallel line of demarkation. Planning and operational control were retained by the United States Government. Operations included, but were not limited to: interdiction and harassment accomplished by interception, capture, interrogation and destruction, as appropriate, of North Vietnamse logistic craft and armed junks; bombardment of coastal targets and cross-beach operations involving "sea-commando" teams; and, delivery of psychological warfare material including propaganda leaflet, radios and gift kits.*

b. Mission.* The mission of the Maritime Operations Group (USNAD, Danang) was to provide policy guidance, supervision, coordination and administration for the MAROPS program.* Tasks in support of this mission included:

* (TS) Ibid

(1) Exercise of operational and administrative command of the Maritime Operations Support and Training Base, Danang and all US personnel stationed there, as directed by Chief, MACSOG.

(2) Advise, assist and support the RVNAF to plan, coordinate and implement special operations against North Vietnam, as mutually agreed upon by the US Government and the RVN.

(3) Coordinate activities of USNAD with other US forces as directed by Chief, SOG.

(4) Promulgate policy guidance and implementing instructions for the internal physical security and management of the Maritime Operations Support and Training Base, Danang.

(5) Supervise, coordinate and assist RVN counterpart operational personnel in the recuriting, organization, training, preparation, briefing, staging and launching of operational forces engaged in MARCPS.

(6) Maintain Maritime Operations Group Headquarters, Operations/Training Support, and security branches as directed by Chief, MACSOG to perform the functions directed by COMUSMACV.*

c. Command and Organization.* Command of NAD was vested in an officer-in-charge whose title was Commander, Maritime Operations Group. He reported directly to Chief, SOG, USMACV. USNAD was organized into seven sections: Administrative, Operations/Training, Support, Public Works, Security, SEAL/RECON training, and Mobile Support Team (MST). Each section was headed by a section chief, except for the MST and SEAL/RECON sections which were administered by officers-in-charge of their respective TAD detachments.

* (TS) Ibid.

* (TS) Ibid.

(1) Authorized allowance versus on-board strength of USNAD, on 31 December 1968, was as follows:*

	Officer	Enlisted	TOTAL
Authorized	15	33	48
On-Board	16	39	55[a/]

a/ One officer and nine enlisted SEAL Detachment ECHO personnel included (this number reduced from a previous allowance of two officers/12 enlisted).

(2) Allowance and on-board strength of MST, Danang (under CFCON of NAD Danang) on 31 December 1968, was:*

	Officer	Enlisted	TOTAL
Authorized	4	35	39
On-Board	4	34	38

(3) The procedure of providing US Navy personnel, MST and SEAL teams, on a TAD basis was developed originally because of the shortage of skilled personnel in these areas throughout the US Navy.** By 1968, many SEAL and MST personnel had been assigned as many as five rotated tours to Vietnam. As it evolved, there were advantages to this system, as compared to the normal one-year in-country tour. They were: high professional capability, familiarization with counterpart Vietnamese and their language, area orientation and understanding of the operational problem.*

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Msg, COMNAVBAS SUBIC, DTG 196615Z Dec 63.

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3. (TS) Mobile Support Teams (MSTs). The MST was initially formed from the US Navy PTF crews who delivered the Norwegian MASTI-type craft to Vietnam, augmented by artificer rates men specially trained at the Napier Deltic factory in London, England. To insure continuity and avert loss of skills through transfer, these selected personnel were assigned to a parent command, Boat Support Unit ONE at USNAB Coronado, California, and were rotated on six-month, one-in-three, TAD basis to MACSOG (NAD Danang). The MST, under an officer-in-charge, was internally organized into a Boat Training Team (BTT) tasked to advise and train their Vietnamese counterparts in the tactics, gunnery, navigation, and detailed operations of PTFs; and a Maintenance Training Team (MTT) responsible for hull and engineering maintenance training.* The numerical strength of the MST varied from an initial requirement in 1964 of approximately 15 officers and 75 enlisted, when both training and maintenance requirements peaked, to a 1968 on-board allowance of four officers and 34 enlisted supporting seven PTFs. An additional US Navy officer and five enlisted with previous MST experience were assigned TAD by Boat Support Unit ONE to the US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, P.I. to assume security custody and to assist with maintenance, major repair and overhaul of PTFs rotated from Danang.

4. (TS) Coastal Security Service (CSS). The CSS was conceived as a cover name and organization for the Vietnamese maritime operational group conducting actions against NVN. Subordinate to the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), Vietnamese counterpart organization of MACSOG, the CSS was the operational parallel to NAD with all functions established in Danang.

* (TS) MSG, COMNAVBASSUBIC, DTG 191615Z, December 63.

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a. Mission

(1) The defined mission of the CSS was:

"... to exercise operational command over Naval Forces and Personnel assigned or attached to execute Naval Special Operations or conduct unconventional warfare as directed by the Strategic Technical Directorage or competent higher authority."

(2) Capabilities tasked to the CSS include:

(a) Providing command and control of naval forces performing special maritime operations.

(b) Planning, coordinating and implementing those special maritime operations missions directed by STD/JGS.

(c) Preparing coordinated USN-VNN plans for special contingency or special emergency operations as directed by the STD/JGS developing capabilities to provide naval support for the accomplishment of such special contingency or emergency plans.

(d) Training those naval forces assigned for naval special operations.

(e) Supporting and repairing boats, craft and junks used in special maritime operations.

b. Personnel

(1) The Commander, CSS, exercised, under direction of Commander, STD, operational and administrative command functions of the Danang base facilities, VN military and contract civilian personnel stationed there. With the "advice" of the officer-in-charge, NAD, he planned, coordinated and implemented special operations and missions; coordinated activities with other VN commands; promulgated policy guidance, administered and exercised command

* (TS) CSS Standard Operating Procedures, 23 Jun 66.

authority for the internal management of the Danang base, its facilities and personnel (including Vietnamese military, mercenaries and civilian).*

(a) The importance of the Commanding Officer, CSS, is apparent. In this unusual situation of joint operations, with Vietnamese performing all combatant actions, the US counterpart maintained operational control and dominated planning guidance (to the extent of satisfying Washington level direction and restrictions) by virtue of its advisory position and logistic support. A compatible and cooperative relationship was essential between the officer-in-charge, NAD and commanding officer, CSS and their staffs to ensure training, readiness and effectiveness in operations.

(b) Such was not always the case. Periodically, during the development and expansion phases of the MAROPS program, the motivation and capabilities of VN-assigned personnel were frequently challenged; discipline was neither in accord with US standards nor remedied by CSS officers. Desertion rates were at critical levels; there was indifference to material damage and loss; attainment of military goals was distantly second to mercenary gain; and black marketing of US-provided resources was accepted. The lack of VN leadership during the early period was a much lamented US concern and joint relationships were degraded at times to letter writing protest exchanges vice coordinated efforts.**

* (TS) Told.
** (TS) Interviews, NAD officers, Cdr. Olson, LCdr Peterson, LT Williams, May 1969.

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(2) Recruiting. The Commander, CSS, was also responsible for recruiting negotiation and security clearance for all VN civilian personnel supporting CSS and NAD. Recruiting of civilian team agents was culminated by a contract agreement between Commander, CSS and the "volunteer". A sample contract is at Tab 4. It delineates the basic pay, indemnities and incentive bonuses initially developed during the period of CAS sponsorship. The system was subject to criticism by both CAS and MACSOG as an undesirable stimulus to mercenary rather than patriotic motivation, but a workable alternative was not developed. Mission bonuses were paid, when appropriate, for meritorious mission upon receipt of a joint recommendation from NAD/CSS, subject to approval of Chief, MACSOG. Pay scales and bonuses in effect in July 1969, are on file.*

(3) A breakout of personnel, both US and VN, is at Tab 5.

* (TS) Provided by MACSOG-NAD-DANANG Finance Officer, 23 July 1969.

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B. (TS) FACILITIES

1. (TS) Support Bases. By 1968 there were seven base areas used in the support of maritime operations. Figure CD-3 is a map of the area. The function of each of the bases was as follows:

Name	Use
a. Upper Base	Billeting for VN personnel
b. Naval Advisory Detachment (lower Base)	Headquarters for US and VN, operating and maintenance for PTFs
c. Camp Fay	Billeting for US personnel
d. Black Rock	Billeting and training for Action Teams
e. Spanish Beach and two smaller beaches	Training for action teams*

2. (TS) Description of Facilities

a. Early Facilities

(1) In January 1964, USNAD Headquarters were located, along with CSS, in the "White Elephant" building in Danang city. NAD personnel were billeted within Danang, with the exception of the SEAL and RECON advisors who inhabited a compound at My Khe, across the river and fronting the sea. Operations were conducted out of the VNN Naval base located at the end of the peninsula, near Monkey Mountain. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

Additionally, a Nung Security Company was located adjacent to the VNN naval base, a civilian indigenous

* (TS) Report, AD HOC Evaluation Group Report, 14 Feb. 1968.

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defense guard (CIDG) Company at My Khe, and CIDG squads were required at Hai Lam and Bai Rac training areas.

(2) In May 1965, the headquarters of CSS and MAD, along with the Security, Public Works and Supply sections moved into a newly constructed camp site, Camp Fay. In July, the MAD headquarters moved to the present location, Lower Base, and personnel billeted in Danang city were moved into Camp Fay enabling the special guard force to be reduced to an authorized strength of 44.*

b. NAD. The NAD Command Post, known as The Tank, administrative offices and medical dispensary were located within the operating base compound, known as the Lower Base. The compound contained the administrative, industrial and support spaces of the MST and the CSS Command Post. Four permanent piers served the assigned afloat assets, including 14 PTFs (authorized), three SWIFT, two LCM pusher craft, one floating drydock and floating crane. A fuel farm was located at one end of the compound. On-board PTFs were reduced to seven, following the NVN bombing standdown and the restricted operations ordered in November 1968, with an additional six PTFs in stand-by availability at SRF, Subic Bay.*

c. Camp Fay. Camp Fay, located at the foot of Monkey Mountain in Danang East, was the billeting compound for all US personnel assigned to the MAROPS program with the exception of the SEAL team advisors, who were billeted at Black Rock. The SOG Command and Control Detachment north, part of the PRAIRIE FIRE (C) program, was also billeted at Camp Fay until relocated to their own area, at which time

* (TS) Report, O-IN-C MAD, "Historical Analysis of Maritime Operations Group Danang 1969-1968", 3 January 1969.

(TS) Report, O-IN-C MAD, "Historical Analysis of Maritime

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The STRAC Supervisory personnel moved in. A BOQ [illegible] three BEQ buildings, and a galley/mess hall were the principal structures. There were laundry facilities and various recreational facilities from a club to volleyball basketball court. Work spaces of the Support, Facilities and Security sections were contained within Camp Fay and included two buildings, two warehouses, a motor pool and various associated storage areas. Bunkers were situated adjacent to each quarters building and the security building.

c. Camp Black Rock. Camp Black Rock provided billeting, messing, storage facilities and working spaces for the SEAL and RECON training sections, composed of SEAL Team ONE Detachment and USMC RECON personnel. Four Vietnamese action teams of 18-20 men each were quartered threre in separate BEQs. Camp Black Rock, the training base for the cross-beach (CADC(C)) mission action teams, was located on the China Sea (eastern) side of Danang East peninsula. This area was approximately 50 acres in size and included approximately 18 buildings. The buildings consisted of living quarters both for VN and US personnel, a warehouse, a parachute rigging loft, messing facilities, CIDG guard force billeting and magazines. The base was constructed to accommodate 200. It was also used as an isolation area for STRACA teams.*

e. Other Camps. Additional camps of the NAD/CSS complex include the Upper Base, Camp Tran Hung Dao, which provides billeting and messing for approximately 200 Vietnamese assigned to boat crews and staff billets, and the Nung Camp Camp Tien Doan An Ninh, which housed the Vietnamese guards.

* (S) Ibid

the Special Police and CIDG for NAD and CSS. An ammunition storage depot was located at nearby Spanish Beach. Three other training beaches were restricted for NAD/CSS use, one of which incorporated a firing range.*

f. Transportation. The various bases, such as Camp Fay and Lower Base, were located quite a distance apart which placed a heavy requirement on transportation facilities. The 89 vehicles assigned NAD in 1969 provided one vehicle for every 10 people.**

g. Photography. Photography of NAD base facilities is retained in the MACSOG files, JCS-SACSA.

C. (TS) TRAINING

1. (TS) Initial Problems. Because of a general shortage of VN personnel with a nautical or mechanical background, the VN Navy had difficulty supplying quality selectees for PTF training. Their responsiveness to training was relatively good considering these handicaps, and the fact that the Nasty Class PTF was a sophisticated combatant craft with a propulsion system that was complex even for US Navy personnel averaging 10-12 years experience. Periods of training necessary to attain minimum qualification and operational readiness varied from 2-4 months. Pressures to expediate activation of the program in many instances influenced reluctant acceptance of reduced standards of personnel effectiveness and capability. Damage attributable to VNN crew negligence, indifference or ignorance was commonplace. Repairs were accomplished, of necessity, by the supporting US Navy MTT. Unnecessary damage to craft and excessive maintenance and repair expenditures were tolerated as the overall level of competence continued to improve with the intensive schedule of operations.

* Ibid.
** (U) Interview, O-IN-C NAD Danang, July 20, 1969.

2. (TS) Supervised Training. In October 1965, following more than one year with VNN personnel conducting a broad scope of actions into NVN, it was deemed advisable to revert to supervised tactical training including basic boat handling and maintenance on a continuing basis, restricted only by craft availability. In spite of sensitivities bordering on resentment on the part of some Vietnamese, this tactical training was commenced and continued with good results, particularly during periods of inactivity, such as holiday standdowns. The prohibition against US advisors participating in actions against NVN, eliminated the excellent potential training that could have been conducted on actual missions.*

3. (TS) Engineering Training

a. Training for VNN officers and crewmen, commencing in October 1965, was directed toward preventative maintenance with the ultimate objective of having VNN personnel assume responsibility for their own support and PTF repair and maintenance. Until this program was initiated, US personnel had accepted full maintenance, repair and logistic planning responsibilities. Training of VNN was, of necessity, concentrated upon improved operational capability.*

b. A VNN MST was established in April 1967 to further encourage VNN assumption of maintenance and repair responsibilities.** An ultimate strength of 73 men was authorized for fulfillment by September 1968. A LCDR, USN, officer-in-charge was designated and selected VNN engineering personnel were sent to US Navy Ship Repair

* (TS) Reports, O-IN-C MST Danang, Weekly Reports to CINCPACFLT and COMNAVOPSUPPGRPPAC, October 1965.
** (TS) Ltr, O-IN-C USNAD, "VNN MST, establishment of," 4 February 1967.

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Facility, Subic Bay for advanced training during craft hull and engine overhauls. On-site training was conducted by US MST counterparts, both in classroom and on-the-job. By July 1969, all VNN enginemen and electricians, 30 in number, had been provided two weeks on-the-job training at Subic Bay; 52 personnel constituted the VNN MST. The officer-in-charge demanded thorough work and effected disciplinary action for UNSATISFACTORY accomplishment. Capability of the trainees was considered GOOD, with the eventual assignment of one PTF and the three PCF SWIFT boats to their responsibility. The major shortcoming resulted from the indifference of the VNN operational boat crews and their tendency to expect the maintenance crew to take over all upkeep, including dirty-work details. The officer-in-charge of US MST in July 1969, estimated that two more years of training on the present scale would be required to achieve a minimum VNN MST capability and reliability to risk the responsibility for maintenance of NAPIER-DELTIC engines.*

4. (TS) Training Material of File. The following documents concerning training are on file with JCS, SACSA.

a. "SEAL training schedule for Indigenous Personnel" 29 July 1969.

b. "Mobile Support Team Training Manual", 8 November 1968.

* (TS) Interview, O-IN-C MST, Danang, 20 July 1969.

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PART III. OPERATIONS (U)

A. (TS) OPERATIONS - 1964

1. (TS) Activities. Although the Special Operations Group MACV was activated 24 January 1964, maritime operational capabilities were limited [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) On 30 January, General Khanh replaced General Minh as head of the government after a bloodless coup d'etat that temporarily immobilized the VN military effort. Phase I of OPLAN 34A was approved for execution at the Washington level on 1 February 1964 but did not stimulate immediate reaction or support within the RVN. Neither military equipment from US sources nor additional personnel from VNN were immediately forthcoming. The initial harassment, interdiction and sabotage operations were launched in March 1964 on a limited basis with three PCF SWIFT craft available for action.

2. (TS) Washington Concern. By 3 April 1964, concern was directed at the Washington level to "the lack of success in the program to date."* CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were requested to evaluate the entire program and determine what was needed to put it on successful basis. A joint response included the following with respect to MAROPS:**

a. Limited time since activation - 2 months; lack of GVN support.

b. Lack of VNN motivation and dependence on civilian mercenaries.

* (TS) Memorandum, SACSA-M 227-64, 3 April 1964.
** Ltr, CINCPAC/MACV, ser 000149, 18 April 1969.

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c. Extremely bad weather and heavy seas during period in question.

d. Non availability/delivery of major equipment items and support; PTFs due in-country 1 June.

e. Lack of adequate intelligence on NVN for target/objective planning.

f. Lack of security from VN observation of training, type and launchings of operations.

g. Prompt development of tighter NVN defense, alert and with mobilized effort.

h. Lack of US personnel support (JTD of 100 military not approved at Washington level until 1 April).

3. (TS) Phase II. CINCPAC was requested to prepare a plan* for Phase II 34A operations to "embody destruction operations of greater scope and intensity involving targets of greater criticality than those in Phase I - to encompass the period 1 June - 30 September 1964".

4. (TS) Early Cross Beach Operations. Commencing 14 January 1964, infiltration operations of cross beach action teams were attempted by MACSOG on the same basis, and with the same agent personnel, [redacted] Ten missions were launched during the year, prior to 5 August, with harassment actions varying from attempted bridge destruction to delayed firing fires to demolition raids. Only four of the ten were considered successful, although the overall effort was believed to have significantly pressured NVN to divert forces and attention to strengthen their coastal security. The number of missions in 1964 was restricted by the decision following the Gulf of Tonkin incident on 5 August to restrict operations north of 17° N.** Although MAROPS were

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* (TS) MSG, JCS DTD 212340Z, March 1964.
** (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 051763Z, August 1964.

** (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 051763Z, August 1964.

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resumed in September,* emphasis was directed to PTF bombardment of shore targets. Cross Beach missions were not launched again until June 1965.

5. (TS) PTFs Operational. By June 1964, NAD/CSS had seven PTFs operational. Shore bombardment and combined boat/ sea commando operations for the first time were able to strike targets farther north and on a regular basis. VNN operators and PTF crews accomplished noteworthy progress and experience. Functioning of the NAD/CSS joint staff gradually improved as outfitting, base and facility construction, assembly and orientation of personnel moved ahead. Until approximately 1 July, and in spite of DOD pressures for expeditious action and spectacular results, the 34A maritime operation was basically a continuance of the CAS program, represented by the same advisory personnel, facilities and operational assets.

6. (TS) Operational Results. Between April 1964 and 31 December 1964, 32 missions were launched** including actions against such targets as security posts, bridges, island garrisions and radar stations. Twelve shore bombardments accounted for significant damage to enemy defense installations, barracks, buildings support facilities. Three enemy junks were captured and 27 prisoners were brought from NVN for intelligence collection purposes. It was apparent by mid-1964, that cross-beach operations and raids were both ineffectual and highly hazardous. NVN coastal and beach defense were rapidly increasing in resistance and capability, induced presumably by the more frequent presence of the PTFs threatening both shore line security and fishing craft operating offshore. A continuing psychological warfare program was introduced including leaflet bombardment and delivery of gift kits, supported by related

* (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 101804Z, September 1964.
** (TS) JCS-SACSA Redbook - a chronological report of MACSOG MAROPS-1964-68.

MAROPS-1964-68.

radio propaganda and news broadcasts, and thorough indoctrination of NVN prisoners to be later returned to NVN.

7. (TS) JCS Memorandum. In December 1964, JCS encouraged intensification of OPLAN 34A maritime operations, "to accomplish repreated and unscheduled bombardment and harassment sweeps of selected targets such as Tiger Island and Capt Lay radar as additional effort while returning from other scheduled missions".* Additional harassment activity was introduced to include "SNARE" and kidnap actions against junks and encountered seacraft. Friendly casualties during 1964 totalled two KIA, two MIA and four WIA.

B. (TS) OPERATIONS, 1965

1. (TS) Summary. One hundred and seventy missions sortied from Danang over a period of 358 possible operational days during 1965. MAROPS missions effected the capture of 126 prisoners, the destruction of more than 50 enemy junks and damage to 19 enemy vessels, including three patrol craft. Forty-nine bombardment and 25 psychological harassment (PSYHAR) missions were considered successful; 13 deliveries of gift kits, radios and psychological warfare materials were fulfilled. One thousand radios were delivered, 28,742 gift kits dispensed, and 1,124,600 leaflets dispensed by 81 MM motar. MINT/LOKI operations were approximately 50 percent successful.**

2. (TS) Significant Developments. MAROPS during 1965 developed into the unconventional and special operations organization envisioned by OPLAN-34A.

a. At the beginning of the period, the MAROPS Group had eight PTFs and three SWIFT boats assigned. Four new PTFs were assigned in July/August 1965 and three more in early 1966. Two, however, were replacements for two prototype,

* (TS) Memo, JCSM 1042-64, 12 December 1964.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV 1965 C.H".

obsolete, gasoline-powered USN PTFs which were returned. Two PTFs were normally rotated to Subic Bay for routine overhaul and maintenance, leaving seven PTFs and three SWIFTs available for operational purpose. This was considered by MACSOG an unacceptably low level and caused COMUSMACV to request an increase boat strength as early as possible. Central to the problem was that no boat replacement program was authorized either for boats lost operationally or for boats that became unserviceable through normal use.

b. Operations through 1965 were restricted to areas south of latitude 20°N. However, within this restriction, MAROPS were conducted with increasing frequency in the more northern areas. In addition to causing harassment to NVN shipping and having a desirable psychological impact on the NVN population along the coast, the operations caused the NVN government to divert additional resources to protect its coastline.

c. Vietnamese action teams under MAROPS totalled 148 personnel (less trainees):*

13 VNN UDT (Parachute Qualified)
27 VNN
29 VNMC
20 Nungs
31 ARVN
28 RVN Civilians (Parachute Qualified)
120 ARVN in Training

Cross Beach operations were recommenced in June 1965. Sixteen missions were attempted during the remainder of 1965, six of which were considered successful. Hardening

* (TS) Study, "MACV 31-34A Project Staff Study", 8 Sept. 1965.

of NVN coastal defenses, both with physical security measures and electronic surveillance, continued to diminished the effectiveness of cross-beach tactics.

d. Figure CD-4 is a summary of mission types, primary and secondary for calendar year 1965.

3. (TS) Operational Support

a. Intelligence. Intelligence support for maritime operations was provided by the MACSOG Intelligence Branch, consisting of a collection section, a targeting section and a security section. In addition to providing intelligence to support MAROPS, it was responsible for dissemination to the intelligence community information collected as a result of all MACSOG operations. Support provided for operational purpose included:*

(1) Detailed photo analysis of operational areas to determine location of targets, defenses, landing and drop zones.

(2) Coordination with other agencies in obtaining aerial and photo reconnaissance of operational areas. The following reconnaissance programs were utilized.

(a) TROJAN HORSE. High-level U-2 coverage of NVN and Laos, flown by SAC.

(b) BLUE TREE. Medium-level coverage of NVN, flown by 7th Fleet and 7th Air Force.

(c) YANKEE TEAM. Medium level coverage of Laos, flown by 7th Fleet and 7th Air Force.

(d) TIGERHOUND. Visual reconnaissance flown by TIGERHOUND FACs.

(3) Maintaining complete order of battle information on North Vietnam and Laos.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV 1965 C.H.".

ANNEX O APPENDIX C

FIGURE CD-4 (TS)

MAROPS SUMMARIES, 1965 (TS)

Type	Type Missions	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
LOKI	(Junk-Personnel Capture)	0	1	4	2	15	21	8	5	6	1	1	1
SNARE[a]	(Secondary, Swatow Capture)	10	2	2	5	16	21	11	14	0	0	0	0
TRIDENT[a]	(Secondary Junk-Pers Capture)	10	3	2	5	16	21	11	14	14	0	0	0
LANCE	(Boat Capture)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PSYCHHAR	(Psychological Harassment)	3	6	5	5	2	1	0	4	2	1	1	4
CADO	(Cross Beach Action, Deceptive Resupply)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	2
DRIFT	(PSYOPS Delivery)	7	4	0	1	2	5	3	6	2	0	0	0
SWALLOW	(Team Kidnap Ashore)	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	6	4	1	0	0
H/I		11	4	4	4	0	12	0	2	2	0	0	0
MILINT	(DRV Military Cargo Interdiction)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	8	8	16
	TOTAL	41	20	17	22	51	85	36	53	50	12	10	23
	PRIMARY	14	8	9	8	16	26	11	16	--	--	--	--
	COROLLARY	27	12	8	14	35	59	25	37	--	--	--	--

a/ary / Corollary Missions - Scheduled after completion of primary mission or in conjunction with primary mission.
Example - Primary mission is LOKI. Upon reaching northern-most position and upon transit returning to base, SNARE/TRIDENT in effect.
Similarly, SWALLOW, DRIFT and CADO missions are sometimes dual missions.
H/I firing is presently a corollary opportunity mission. Prior to May, H/I was a primary mission.

Sep NOTE: September-December statistics are inconsistent but representative of recorded activity, influenced by heavy weather and current
pol political restrictions.

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(4) Obtaining details of terrain, defenses, security and other factors from interrogation of MAROPS prisoners and SHINING BRASS reconnaissance teams.

b. Communications. MACSOG Communications Branch provided communications between SOG installations in RVN and with deployed operational teams. In-country communications were provided by tele-typewriter circuits between MACSOG Headquarters, Saigon, NAD, Danang, and 1st Fleet Detachment, Nha Trang. SHINING BRASS C&C Detachment at Danang utilized the NAD facilities, as required. The circuits were crypto-covered and were manned 24 hours a day. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

4. (TS) An Evaluation - 1965. As evaluated by a MACV Staff Study in September 1965, the MAROPS program was "currently the most productive of all 34-A programs and the one area in which an expanded program on a long-range basis appears to be desirable".* LOKI and SWALLOW (junk and shore kidnap) operations were considered the most lucrative from the viewpoint of accomplishment. The operations were recognized as a "primary source of information on activities within the DRV and additionally were considered effective beyond actual damage created, in causing constant alert of NVN shore defenses and burdensome concern that an attack was imminent at any place along the coast south of the 20th parallel." It was concluded that MAROPS harassment missions complemented the concurrent and more

* (TS) Study, "MACV 31-34A Project Staff Study," 8 Sept. 1965.

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devastating ROLLING THUNDER air strike operations and that graduated pressures against the DRV, an aim of our national policy, was being contributed by the program.

C. (TS) OPERATIONS - 1966

1. (TS) Summary

a. With a reduced number of possible operational days (287) available during 1966 because of various standdowns, a fewer number of missions were launched: 126 primary and 56 secondary. No MAROPS were conducted in 1966 until 17 February, at which time a 55-day holiday standdown was terminated. Coastal guns engaged MAROPS craft frequently, and combined with other enemy attacks influenced planned actions toward conserving the limited number of boats on hand. Five PTFs were lost for various causes. Significantly, however, missions were executed farther north and with greater frequency. More than one-half of the total MAROPS missions during the year were between 19-00 N. and 20-00 N. MAROPS accounted for:

353	Prisoners Captured
352	Prisoners Returned After Reorientation
86	Enemy Craft Destroyed
16	Enemy Craft Damage
37	Intelligence Reports
117	Spot Intelligence Reports
2,000,600	PSYHAR Leafelts Distributed by 81mm Mortar
60,000	PSYHAR Gift Kits Delivered
2,600	PSYHAR Radios Delivered*

b. The most effective operations conducted by MAROPS in 1966 were PTF maritime interdiction missions. As reflected by the number of prisoners captured and enemy craft destroyed, the pressence of MAROPS craft created the type and degree of pressure upon the NVN coastal areas originally envisioned in OPLAN-34A. Maritime action team (Cross Beach) missions during the year did not attain the success anticipated.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV 1966 C.H.".

Figure CD-5 is a summary of 1966 Maritime Actions. It shows the trend of MAROPS toward shipping interdiction and intelligence collection through captured prisoners vice cross beach and harassment missions.

2. (TS) Cross Beach Operations

a. Actions in the North. Thirty-four cross beach (CADO) missions were attempted in 1966; only four were considered successful. Several factors contributed to the poor results: (1) adverse weather caused cancellations of missions that could not be promptly rescheduled, (2) lack of timely intelligence, primarily good pre-strike photography, (3) increased and more effective coastal defense, and (4) the reluctance of some team leaders to engage the enemy.*

b. Operations in the South. The decline in CADO activity against northern targets created an undesirable training environment for action team personnel. Loss of combat bonus pay caused dissatisfaction and increased AWOL rates. As a partial solution, action team personnel were utilized to augment PTF crews as gunners. In September 1966, Southern Training Operations (SOTROPS) were implemented against known or suspected VC infrastructure as well as VC/NVA military targets along the coast of I Corp Tactical Zone (CTZ). Action teams were accompanied on these operations by US advisors who observed the conduct of the team throughout the operations. This close observation assisted in developing improved techniques, and

evaluating VN personnel capabilities. The concept, authorized under guise of training, proved successful and was ultimately expanded to the II CTZ and MEKONG/BASSACK DELTA area for special actions in support of COMUSMACV conventional

* (TS) Ibid

Figure CD-5 (TS)

OPLAN-34A Actions Attempted and Accomplished, 1966

Maritime Operations (By Mission)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Shipping Interdiction/ PSYOPS (MINT/PSYHAR)	a/	5 (1)b/	7 (2)	4 (1)	4 (1)	2 (2)	3	1	3	- (2)	2 (1)	3 (-)	34 (10)
Shipping Interdiction (Only) (MINT)	a/	-	3 (1)	6	1 (6)	4 (4)	1 (3)	1 (7)	4 (3)	2 (6)	1 (1)	5 (3)	28 (34)
Junk Captures (LOKI)	a/	-	-	-	-	-	1	2 (1)	-	-	-	-	3 (1)
Team Landing Operations- Ambush/Kidnap Shore (CADO)	a/	- (2)	2 (5)	- (6)	1 (2)	- (2)	- (2)	1 (1)	- (2)	- (4)	- (4)	-	4 (30)

a/ Political directed holiday standdown in January.
b/ Figures in parentheses indicate unsuccessful attempts in addition to the successful missions.

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operations. Each SOTROP was scheduled and executed as a final rehersal for a future mission in NVN and as nearly as possible involved elements and techniques which the teams would experience in operations in NVN. In addition to beneficial action team training, intelligence information of value to the III MAF in the I Corps was furnished to G-2, III MAF.*

3. (TS) PTF and Personnel Losses. Operational problems in 1966 were compounded by boat losses: one to an enemy aircraft attack on 7 March; two by grounding and destruction during an unsuccessful CADO mission on 22 May; one by sinking from friendly gunfire on 17 June; and the loss of a fifth craft following collision with a friendly craft in company during a storm on 19 August. Twelve (12) new Nasty class PTFs were provided by US Navy in support of the MAROPS program during 1966. An average of 11 VNN crews and seven PTFs were operationally ready throughout the year. A total of 22 MAROPS missions received NVN coastal defense gunfire. Five were attacked by enemy aircraft and six by surface vessels. Personnel losses totalled 13 KIA, 31 WIA and six MIA.**

4. (TS) Coordination With SEA DRAGON. Operational areas available to the MAROPS craft became increasingly limited due in part to the commencement of SEA DRAGON, a US Navy interdiction operation employing USN destroyers to engage military cargo vessels and military coastal installations. By years end 1966, SEA DRAGON had extended north to 18-00N. Additional limitations were imposed by CINCPAC restricting MAROPS craft to areas south of 19-30N to avoid exposing PTFs to known operating areas of NVN air. PTFs without possessing adequate air defense weapons, were attacked in northern waters by enemy air in 1966.

* (TS) Report, MACV J-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report", 14 February 1968.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV 1966 C.H.".

** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV 1966 C.H.".

5. (TS) REDEYE and Communications Proposals. Threat of air attacks prompted COMUSMACV with CINCPAC concurrence, to request authority to employ REDEYE missiles as defensive weapons aboard MAROPS PTF craft. The proposal was further justified by inadequacy of US air cover support because of time and space factors and the difficulty in maintaining the plausible deniability of such cover. Deficiencies of the REDEYE system, however, caused additional testing prior to service acceptance. In the interum, the enemy air threat diminished and the missiles were not installed. There was also concern at this time that communications between MAROPS craft and US Navy forces operating in proximity were inadequate for coordination of effort, safety and joint SAR activity. CINCPAC proposed employment of US radio operators aboard PTFs to insure communications and to offset language barriers. JCS disapproved the request* and referred to an earlier Joint State-Defense message:

> "... it should be clearly understood that, since 34A operations are covert and not acknowledged by the U.S., they are not entitled to be characterized as 'friendly' under the U.S. rules of engagement which have been promulgated for Southeast Asia and Laos.
>
> "... In the Gulf of Tonkin, SAR operations in behalf of 34A forces should be the responsibility of the RVN and should include no U.S. forces without prior approval from Washington."**

D. (TS) OPERATIONS, 1967

1. (TS) The tasking of the maritime missions during this period evolved into interdiction of waterborne craft, primarily fishing junks, and to detention of large numbers of fishermen for intelligence and psychological exploitation. The US Navy's

* (TS) Message, JCS, DTG 152033Z, December 1966.
** (TS) Message, State-Defense, DTG 272235Z, October 1964.

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SEA DRAGON and MARKET TIME* operations influenced reduction of junk traffic, and targets became scarce in areas south of 19-00N. Figure CD-6 is a mission summary for 1967.

2. (TS) Intelligence gained through reports derived from maritime operations continued as the only human intelligence (HUMINT) sourced information on the NVN coastal area. CINCPAC** on 16 March 1967 emphasized that MAROPS concentrate primarily on intelligence collection actions. Scope of data pertinent to military interests at this time included:

a. NVN military order of battle.

b. Coastal defense installation information.

c. Paramilitary activities.

d. Air Defense.

e. Conscription.

f. Coastal sea transportation.

g. LOC data.

h. NVN population control policy.

i. Identification of dissident groups.

j. Air strike and naval gunfire results.

k. Government and popular reaction to psychological operations.

l. Effects of maritime mining operations, downing and disposition of US aircraft and pilots.

m. NVN interrogation and treatment of returned detainees.

n. NVN defensive measures against MAROPS activity.

* (TS) SEA DRAGON forces consisting of four to six destroyers or cruisers, operating in areas off the NVN coast with the primary mission of interdicting and destroying NVN waterborne logistics craft. An additional mission was naval gunfire on targets ashore.

MARKET TIME forces maintained a continuous barrier patrol at 17 N. All vessels entering this area were detained and brought into port.

** (TS) MSG, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z, March 1967.

FIGURE CD-6 (TS)

1967 MISSION SUMMARY - MAROPS (U)

		OP AREAS					
	TOTAL	PURPLE	GREEN	BLUE	WHITE	YELLOW	RED
Missions Launched	151	10	13	60	61	0	7
Missions Aborted - Weather	19	1	1	7	9	0	1
Aborted - Casualties	7	0	0	3	3	0	1
Missions Completed	126	9	12	50	49	0	5
MINT (Series 300)	102	2	6	46	48	0	0
LOKI (Series 400)	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
CADO (Series 500)	12	5	6	1	0	0	0
MINT/PSYHAR (Series 600)	5	0	0	3	2	0	0
LOKI/PSYHAR (Series 700)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CADO/PSYHAR (Series 800)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special (Series 900)	3	2	0	0	0	0	1
Enemy Craft Destroyed	102	7	1	29	65	0	0
Damaged	3	0	0	1	2	0	0
Captured	3	0	0	2	1	0	0
Prisoners Captured	328	0	10	117	192	0	9
Returned	329	3	4	98	224	0	0
On Hand	26	0	0	0	0	0	0
CD Fire Rcvd on Mission	54	2	0	19	32	0	1
A/C Attacks Rcvd on Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Surface Tracks Rcvd on Mission	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
Personnel KIA	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
WIA	3	1	0	0	2	0	0
MIA	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

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3. (TS) Two-thirds of the missions completed were in two operational areas: Blue and White. With six PTFs operational, it should have been possible to conduct 27 missions per month (16 two-boat missions and 11 three-boat missions). However, the highest number scheduled was 22; the highest conducted 16. Utilization of available craft in 1967 was estimated as 18 percent, indicating that number of craft was not the limiting factor in frequency of operations.*

4. (TS) The following data derived from an Ad Hoc Evaluation Group study of MACSOG effectiveness dated 14 February 1968 was assembled under direction of MACV J-3.**

a. Estimate of number of missions required.

(1) Based on MAROPS results during 1967, the following table was derived. (All figures for one month).

(a) Number of prisoners which can be expected to be captured:	30	54	96	108
(b) Number of successful missions required to capture prisoners in (a):	5	9	16	18
(c) Number of missions which will not be successful:	4	7	12	14
(d) Number of CADO missions which can be conducted:	3	3	3	3
(e) Number of times each area would be covered for number of missions in (b):	less than 1	1.5	2.6	3
(f) Number of missions which should be scheduled in order to complete missions in (b):	12	19	31	35

(2) The average number of prisoners processed each month during 1967, through Paradise Island, was 27.6 per month. The capacity of Paradise Island was being increased from 150 to 200 and during 1968 a goal of two month average processing time was being established. This

* (TS) MSG, COMUSMACV (MACSOG), DTG 030607Z, November 1967.
** (TS) Report, MACV-J-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report", 14 February 1968.

would require that 100 prisoners be captured per month, which would require 16 or 18 successful missions per month.

b. PTF's Required to Support Missions. Based on experience and data from 1967, the AD HOC Group devised a formula for determining the number of boats required to support a given number of missions. To support 31 missions, and the goal of taking 100 prisoners per month, the number of boats required was eight. This number was increased by two to account for one boat being in standby and one in overhaul. The total requirement recommended by the Group was 10 boats and 12 crews.*

5. (TS) Cross Beach Operations. In 1967, 12 missions were launched, six of which were tasked to capture military prisoners. One of these was successful, but the prisoner was a fisherman who proved to be of little value as an intelligence source. Six teams did not reach the beach for various reasons; such as: gunfire, guards alerted, and rough weather. Action team personnel were additionally employed in a riverine, delta environment (Dong Tam Operations) in IV Corps during the period October 1967 - March 1968 with noteworthy success, as indicated by the following:

- Total Missions Conducted: 44 (57 patrols)
- Total Months Deployed: 4
- No Contact: 20 Missions (27 patrols)
- Contact: 24 Missions (30 patrols)
  - VC Observed/No Contact: 3 missions
  - VC Observed/Fire Fight: 10 missions
  - VC Weapons/Ordnance Uncovered: 4 Missions
  - Prisoners Taken: 16 Missions (19 patrols)

* (TS) Ibid

- Total Number of Prisoners: 34
- VC Casualties: 22 - 15 KIA (Body Count), 6 KIA (Probable) 1 WIA (Escaped)
- VN/US Casualties: 6 - 1 KIA (VN), 5 WIA (2 US/3 VN)*

E. (TS) OPERATIONS - 1968

1. (TS) 1968 Authority Review. Emphasis was shifted from traffic interdiction to support of psychological warfare operations in early 1968, as additional restrictions were introduced prohibiting MAROPS destruction of junks less than 10 meters in length, unless they were 'determined' to be carrying military supplies or an uncommon amount of foodstuff or cargo. Smaller junks obviously employed in fishing were thus spared. Detention of NVN fishermen was discontinued 3 April by JCS order** and 81mm leaflet distribution confined to south of 20°N. On 6 April leaflet bombs were further limited to 19°N by CINCPAC,*** and gift distributions were similarly restricted on 10 April.**** The 10 April message also curtailed MAROPS to permit only coastal reconnaissance south of 19°N and detainee return missions. Rules of engagement were eased on 1 June to permit destruction of waterborne logistic craft below 19°N and collection of detainees was again authorized in July with new parameters however, restricting junk targeting to selected actions south of 19-00N (preferably from known dissident groups). No more than 20 detainees at one time were authorized at the Paradise Island Camp with length of detention period reduced to 14 days. The last detainee was returned to NVN 22 October 1968. PTF interdiction and surveillance patrols were, however, permitted to proceed to 20-00N.# JCS suspended active PTF MAROPS missions into

* (TS) 1. Report, MACV J-3, "Ad Hoc Eval Report", 14 Feb 1968.
2. History, MACSOG, "Annex F to 1968 MACV C.H."
** (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 031792Z, Apr 1968.
*** (TS) CONCPAC 060230Z, Apr 1968.
**** (TS) CINCPAC 102038Z, Apr 1968.
\# (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 011351Z, July 1968.

NVN territorial waters at the time of the U.S. bombing halt announced 1 November 1968 and at the same time directed the maintenance in readiness of all MAROPS personnel and material assets for possible resumption of operations including the support of infiltration/exfiltration of agents, if directed.* No MAROPS north of 17-00N have since been launched.

2. (TS) Operational Summary. During the 1968 operational period of 300 days, the number of PTFs available varied from six to nine with an average of seven in readiness. Outstanding maintenance capability of the joint MST (US) and MTT (VN-CSS) insured operational availability of seven PTFs nearly 100 percent of the time. The months of August and September were critical for maintenance with peaks of 33 and 25 missions run, and supported the 1967 premise that with eight operational PTFs the 31 missions per month considered the desired level by the Ad Hoc Evaluation Group could be achieved. Figure CD-7 is a summary of MAROPS actions for 1967 and 1968.

3. (TS) Operational Areas

a. Operational statistics for 1968 show that the WHITE operation area (18-35N, 20-00N) daylight missions were the most lucrative in terms of detainees and vessels destroyed. Figure CD- 8 portrays the designated operating areas and number of vessels destroyed.

b. Few missions were conducted in the GREEN and PURPLE operation areas because the preceding two years of constant pressure from air, PTFs and US Navy SEA DRAGON forces practically denuded the areas of fishing craft. The majority of missions conducted in the WHITE and BLUE area were within

* (TS) JCS 4651/010219Z, Nov 1968.

FIGURE CD 9)

MAROPS ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED, 1967 AND 1968 ( )

Op	Maritime Operations (By Mission)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
						1967							
In RA	Shipping Interdiction/PSYOPS (MINT/PSYHAR)	1 (2)a/	3 (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
In	Shipping Interdiction (MINT)	3 (5)	2 (5)	7 (8)	7 (6)	7 (5)	6 (5)	8 (6)	5 (6)	6 (4)	4 (5)	4 (4)	3 (4)
In	Shipping Interdiction (LOKI)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (2)	- (-)	- (2)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	- (-)	- (-)
in dn	Team Landing Operations - Ambush/Kidnap Ashore (CADO)	-	-	--	- (1)	- (1)	- (1)	1 (1)	- (2)	- (2)	1 (1)	- (2)	- (1)
ec	Special Reconnaissance	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
						1966							
ic n/	Interdiction/Intelligence Collection/PSYOPS (MINT/PSYHAR)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	17 (-)	27 (-)	12 (-)	15 (3)	- (-)	- (-)
ic n	Interdiction/Intelligence Collection (MINT)	2 (6)	2 (5)	13 (4)	10 (3)	13 (-)	14 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
ic n	Interdiction/Intelligence Collection (LOKI)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
ch	Cross-Beach Operations (CADO)	- (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (3)	- (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
ec	Special Reconnaissance	2 (-)	- (-)	- (0)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
	Other	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)

a/ Numbers in parenthesis indicate unsuccessful operations

Annex D to Appendix C

TOP SECRET

C-D-54

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

FIGURE CD-8 (TS)

MARITIME OPERATIONS GROUP OPERATION AREAS (U)

1968



two areas of significant fishing activity; one, in the vicinity of Hon Matt and Hon Nieu Islands (18-50N), the other between 19-30N and 20-00N frequented by craft from fishing villages on Lach Yapp, Lach Chao and Cua Day. Water-borne logistic craft were encountered along this stretch of coast as well as armed junks usually running only at night and hugging the shoreline beyond pursuit capability of PTFs. The largest concentration of fishing cooperative activity was in the vicinity of Cap Falaise, 19-50N. At least 17 cooperatives were known to operate two or more protective junks.*

4. (TS) Cross Beach Operations - 1968. No Cross Beach (CADO) Operations against NVN were attempted in 1968.

a. BIFROST and DEWEY RIFLE. Cross beach operations conducted in areas south of 17-00N were known as BIFROST (formerly SOTROPS) when conducted in I Corps and as DEWEY RIFLE in II Corps. The basic concept was similar to CADO operations except that VC infrastructure as well as VC and NVN military was targeted. BIFROST and DEWEY RIFLE operations were effectively conducted following political restriction of action team activities in NVN effected November 1968. An advantage of these actions was that they were considered as training operations" allowing US advisors to accompany the missions. On-the-spot appraisal of the action teams' performance improved the training and discipline of the teams.

b. RIVERINE Operations. In 1968, one action team (teams were rotated about every six weeks) was assigned to NAVFORV to work with the RIVERINE forces in the Delta. The agreement between MACSOG and NAVFORV provided action team training under combat conditions with US advisors in company and provided the RIVERINE force with a SEAL Team capability. This arrangement

* (TS) Report, O-in-C NAD Danang, "Hist Analysis of MAROPS, Danang 1964-68", 3 January 1969.

was designed for realistic training during the monsoon season when the weather in the North precluded CADO(C) operations. The action teams attained excellent results in Delta operations, and captured one very valuable prisoner who was chief of the VC intelligence in his sector. However, action teams were not organized for the purpose of providing a SEAL team capability to the RIVERINE force. Further, it appeared that a great deal of the success was due to the presence of US advisors with the teams, and friendly forces available to come to their aid.*

5. (TS) Statistical Summary. Figure CD-9 is a statistical summary of maritime and BIFROST operations from 1964 to 1969.

* (TS) Report, O in C DANANG, "Historical Analysis of Maritime Operations," 3 Jan 1969.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

FIGURE CD-9 (S)

MAROPS AND BIFROST OPERATION STATISTICS ( )

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
MAROPS (NVN)					
PTFs (Danang)	7	7	7	7	7 NASTY 4 OSPREY
PTF Losses	0	1	5	0	0
Missions Launched	~~32~~ 37	~~105~~ 155	144	153	160
Missions Aborted	Unk	Unk	8	82	32
Missions Conducted	~~Unk~~ 37	~~16~~ 155	~~126~~ 127	~~125~~ 126	~~145~~ 140
Enemy Craft Destroy/Capture	34	34	86/1	102/3	40/1
Detainees Collected	--	126	353	328	185
Intel Spot Reports	--	46	103	167	337
Aircraft Attacks	--	5[a]	0	2	1
Armd Surface Attacks	--	4[a]	8	2	6
Coastal Defense Fire	--	5[a]	22	54	58
Enemy KIA (Est)	--	--	--	--	80
Personnel Casualties					
KIA	--	1[a]	15	1	6
WIA	--	8[a]	31	3	10
MIA	--	--	6	1	4
BIFROST (RVN I CTZ)					
Missions Launched			10	10	38
Missions Aborted			0	1	10
Missions Conducted			10	9	28
Detainees Collected			11	5	18
Personnel Casualties					
KIA			0	1	1
WIA			0	0	0
MIA			0	0	2

F. (TS) OPERATIONS - 1969 (WITHIN SVN)

1. (TS) BIFROST and DEWEY RIFLE. Following the moratorium placed on NVN MAROPS in November 1968,* an evaluation was undertaken by MACSOG to determine training and readiness requirements to maintain the MAROPS unconventional warfare capability. Stepped up coastal attacks and intelligence collection operations in I and II CTZ areas within a 250 mile operating range from the Danange base were considered appropriate for this purpose and were welcomed by field commanders to provide reconnaissance of areas inaccessible to ground forces, exploratory raids, and limited coastal bombardment.

a. Commencing 1 January 1969, a series of operations were commenced in the I Corps coastal area under code name BIFROST which by 2 June "contributed significantly to the war effort in SVN with 58 missions producing the following results: 84VC/VC1 KIA: 4VC/VC1; WIA: 34 VC/VC1 POW; 9 sampons or ferries destroyed; 3 extensive bunker systems destroyed or rendered unusable; 7,000 pounds of rice destroyed; and numerous documents, weapons and other war materials captured or destroyed."** US advisors accompanied action teams on these missions. Team casualties were 5 KIA and 9 WIA with no US losses.

b. Action teams were simultaneously deployed to the II CTZ under Operation DEWEY RIFLE with a six mile area known as the Southern Free Strike Zone, bordering Phan Thiet and Le Hong Phong Forest. MACSOG noted in February that

* (TS) Msg CINCPAC, DTG 010810Z Nov 68
** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 111436Z June 69

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"the DEWEY RIFLE operations have been more productive than the BIFROST" and were recommended for continuance. Although fire support from PTFs provided good support action, distance from operating area to PTF logistic base created certain limitations and necessitated temporary movement of back-up support and personnel to Nha Trang.

b. On 3 June 1969 the code name BIFROST was changed to DODGE MARK. Fifteen missions were launched between 3 June and 20 July without US advisor accompanying the action teams. Results included only 2 enemy KIA, 1 WIA and 1 captured. US advisors were returned to the teams on 17 July with immediate improvement in team effectiveness. A summary of coordination and constraints for BIFROST operations follows:

(1) Coordination was accomplished through III MAF, both American and Vietnamese sides of I Corp, CAS and the Danang Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) which controlled US Navy MARKET TIME forces and advised the Vietnamese Sunh force. Initial coordination was effected 72 hours prior to scheduled date of operations with senior commands, followed by NAD detailed coordination of call signs, communications, air cover. fire support, etc., with all friendly forces in the operating area.

(2) Monthly coordination/targeting staff visits were conducted with III MAF and I FFV to obtain suitable targets or areas of operation in these commands for MACSOG action teams. NAD was responsible for intelligence gathering necessary to evaluate the targets and plan specific operations to accomplish defined missions.* The operation plans were coordinated with Area of Operations commander and presented to MACSOG headquarters

* (S) A typical intelligence plan, including situation, enemy situation, and tactics, miscellaneous preparatory information and interrogation data is on file.

and interrogation data is on file.

for approval not later than the Friday preceeding the week that the operations were scheduled. All operations were conducted cross-beach utilizing MACSOG assigned PTF/PCFs and action teams. The following restrictions were in effect:

(a) All operations were under MACSOG operational control and were not in conjunction with other operations. Coordination with friendly forces for the prevention of mutual interference and supporting arms was effected.

(b) Helicopters could not be used for insertion but could be used for reconnaissance and administrative lifts (and emergency extractions).

(c) Operations were coastal and not to be conducted in rivers.

(d) Maximum effort was to be made to conduct operations without US personnel.

(e) Specific operational intents were to be passed to MACSOG at least 24 hours in advance of the conduct of an operation.

(f) One of the four remaining MAROPS action (CADO) teams was to be conducting training and providing security on Paradise Island at all times.

(g) Operations were not to be conducted more frequently than three per week.

(h) Lucrative targets of opportunity could be optionally undertaken based on current intelligence and a target intent message submitted to MACSOG at least 24 hours prior to conduct of the operation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] Inactivation, prompted by the moratorium of VNV MAROPS and termination of prisoner source, was a natural economy action. Property and supplies, with exception of excess weapons, were inventoried and transferred to NAD Danang for storage and safe keeping. A garrison force was assigned consisting of a camp commander (MSgt, CSS), three assistants, and one Sea Commando team to be rotated for combined training/security duty responsibilities.

3. (TS) Re-Evaluation of PTF Requirements

a. Four OSPREY Class PTFs (aluminum hull, US construction) were deleted from MACSOG allowance on 15 January and were returned to US Navy control. Six 17 class NASTY PTFs (US constructed, Trumpy) were placed in reserve status, to be maintained in readiness at US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay. In recommending the deletion of the 17 class craft, the CINCPAC position was that the remaining seven operational PTFs at Danang constituted an adequate force to satisfy foreseeable future requirements including resumption of operations against NVN, if directed.*

b. In May 1969, MACSOG re-evaluated the need for the thirteen PTFs, seven of which are on lease to the GVN and stationed at NAD Danang and six held in reserve status at SRF, Subic Bay, P.I. The following conclusions were reached:**

(1) Current operating restrictions obviated the need for such an extensive inventory.

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 52253Z Jan 69.
** ( ) COMUSMACV 1930 180229Z May 69.

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(2) The lengthy standdown period had diluted the credibility of the SSPL presence in the Northern Tonkin gulf.

(3) If MAROPS against NVN were resumed they would initially be conducted at a reduced tempo, probably restricted to surveillance inserts and exfiltrations.

(4) The seven PTFs leased to the GVN were adequate to conduct a sustained mission capability of fifteen missions per month, in addition to training operations, MAROPS then being conducted in SVN waters. Additionally, a higher tempo could be sustained for a limited period while effecting a PTF build-up at Danang.

(5) Under current and projected conditions little justification could be found to hold the PTF 17 class at SRF Subic in reserve for MACSOG.

(6) COMUSMACV recommended* that the six PTF 17 class craft be released to the fleet for employment in the Pacific theater, with the provision that if high priority commitments were established by higher headquarters beyond the capability stated above, sufficient additional PTF 17 class craft would be made available to meet commitments; and that the MACSOG PTF allowance be reduced to seven. (As of 1 July 1969, no action had been taken by JCS).

4. (TS) Review of MAROPS Future. A review of current and future plans for the continuance of MAROPS and the NVN (FOOTBOY) operations in the new political military environment influenced by the stand down of activity and the Paris Peace talks was conducted at CINCPAC on 5 November 1968. It was concluded that MACSOG should retain

* (TS) COMUSMACV 1930 180229Z May 69.

its personnel and material assets in order to resume operations against the North should the decision be made to do so.*

a. In accordance with this prospect, MACSOG during the first half of 1969 developed a comprehensive plan to create a self-sustaining NV capability to maintain a MAROPS unconventional warfare (UW) capability after phase out of major US support.** the program included two concepts:

(1) That a capability within the realistic abilities, needs and size of a future RVN military force be established.

(2) That such a capability be evolved through a succession of gradual steps that would minimize any reduction of present US capabilities and prevent any significant impact at the time of US withdrawal.

b. To carry out this plan the following post-withdrawal goal was established· An all VN Navy UW MAROPS organization consisting of four Nasty-Class PTFs, Two Twenty-Man action teams, and Support Forces, with a two-fold mission of northern territorial waters protection and surveillance and a limited UW capability.

G. (TS) ENEMY COASTAL DEFENSE

1. (TS) Statistics. Ananlysis of NVN coastal defenses related to MAROPS indicate that the North Vietnamese Armed Forces employed a variety of weapons to support coastal security and to provide nominal protection for the country's fishing industry. Weapons varied from light, short range artillery and mortars, to heavy caliber guns (130 MM and greater) with maximum range up to 15 nm. Figures CD-10 and CD-11 presents comparative statistics and areas of 1966, 1967 and 1968 firing

* (TS) Report, Conference on MACSOG Programs, MACV TS 000-6274, 6 Nov 1968.

** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 111436Z June 1969.

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FIGURE CD-11 (S)

CD FIRE STATISTICS (TS)

	1966	1967	1968
No Missions Conducted	144	153	160
No Missions Received Fire	32	54	58
Estimated Total No RDS	1000	3600	2600
Percent Missions Received Fire	22%	35%	36%
Estimated Average No RDS per Mission received Fire	31	66	44
Average Closest RDS	Occasionally <10M or >1000M, but mostly 100-200M	Occasionally <10M or >1000M, but mostly 100-200M	Occasionally <10M or 1000M, but mostly>100-200M
Average Maximum Range	7-10 nm	7-10 nm	7-10 nm

a/Data in these two columns is highly valuable. Figures shown are the result of visual examination of the available date and more closely represent a model rather than a mean value


CD FIRE STATISTICS
Area of CD Firing
1966
1967
1968
Figure represents number firings
THANH HOA
VINH
VM/R-2
32
77
55
20°
19°
18°
17°
107°
106°
BE
CE
BD
CD
FC
GC

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incidents experienced and reported from MAROPS activity. The percentage of missions receiving fire increased significantly in 1967 from 22 to 35 percent. This increase in frequency of firings could be attributed to a general intensification of the war with an attendant increase in number of weapons available to the NVN coastal defense forces.*

2. (TS) Patterns. Firing incidents directed at MAROPS craft reveal certain patterns in the deployment of enemy weapons which remained almost unchanged from 1966 thru 1968. Areas of greatest concentration (e.g. the HON MATT, HON NIEU and MUI GA area) were prime fishing areas and lucrative target areas for MAROPS missions. The concentrations may have been designed primarily to limit the effect of MAROPS, or simply placed in these areas because these same areas are of large populations and adjacent fishing grounds. Shore battery fire had a limiting effect on missions in these areas and PTF craft often were forced to depart an area with many fishing craft untouched. Statistics reflecting accuracy and range of weapons were variable; however, extremely accurate fire at ranges in excess of 10 miles was received on a few occasions. There was no substantive evidence to show that radar controlled fire was utilized.

* (TS) Report, CTG NAD DANANG, "Historical Analyses of MAROPS Danang 1964-1968" 3 Jan 69.

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PART IV. EVALUATIONS (U)

A. (C) GENERAL

A detailed study of maritime operations was conducted in late 1967 and early 1968 by two committees: the CINCPAC survey and the MACV Ad Hoc Evaluation groups. These evaluations were particularly timely because they came at the height of MACSOG maritime activity against NVN. The restrictions imposed in April and November 1968 limited and then terminated all operations against the North.

B. (TS) AD HOC EVALUATION GROUP

Included in this report are the conclusions of the CINCPAC survey group.

* * *

"10. AD HOC Evaluation Group Conclusions:

"a. There is no conflict between PLOWMAN (C) mission and MARKETTIME mission.

"b. There is a conflict between the PLOWMAN (C) mission and the SEA DRAGON mission of interdiction and destruction of NVN vessels.

"c. Harassment (or destruction) of NVN shore installations is a mission for SEA DRAGON and is not feasible for PLOWMAN (C) forces due to the vulnerability and light armament of PTF's.

"d. Intelligence derived, while generally low-level, has included some of significance and represented the only HUMINT from the coastal provinces of NVN.

"e. PLOWMAN (C) PSYOP in support of the SSPL program have been successful in that they have provided the only personnel for personal indoctrination and have distributed, on a personal basis, SSPL gifts and literature.

"f. The mission of PLOWMAN (C) should be revised to take into consideration similar missions being performed by other forces and those missions from which PLOWMAN (C) has had or can expect to have the best results.

"g. The majority of prisoners captured, both for SSPL and intelligence purposes have been from a small area, 93% of all captured during 1967 were from two of the six PLOWMAN (C) operation areas.

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"h. Although PTF crews are required to interrogate crewmen of NVN fishing vessels in order to determine lucrative intelligence sources, glean intelligence and potential SSPL supporters, the PTF crews are not trained in interrogation methods or in PSYOPS methods.

"i. While CADO operations did not produce any significant results during 1967, the potential for obtaining significant results, i.e. capture of military prisoners, warrants their retention as part of PLOWMAN (C). However, the present number of teams should not be increased.

"j. Action teams are qualified and are trained on a regular basis for parachute jump qualification. There is no requirement for them to be parachute jump qualified since the concept of operations is to insert/extract them via water.

"k. The system of payment of a bonus to action teams for crossing 17° North Latitude, whether or not the CADO mission is actually successful in getting ashore does not appear to be conducive to successful operations.

"l. While the results obtained by Action Teams in the Delta have, in general, been excellent, operation within SVN is not within the mission of PLOWMAN (C). Further, the type of operation in the Delta, owing to environment both by terrain and friendly support, is not typical of operations in NVN and hence is of limited value as a training vehicle. Training exercises across the beach in I CTZ against known VC strong points should produce a better quality of training.

"m. CADO missions of destruction, if related to SSPL, could be counter productive unless the NVN populace has been told that SSPL is going to destroy a specific objective in the interest of furthering the SSPL. To destroy targets which do not enhance SSPL could produce a fear of the SSPL in the minds of the populace.

"n. Training of the CSS Staff to take over planning and control of PLOWMAN (C) has not been effective owing to the small number of officers on the CSS Staff. If the policy has been established that SVN will continue to conduct covert operations in NVN with US assets upon the withdrawal of US forces, then the CSS staff needs to be enlarged. If such a policy has not been approved, then such efforts should be limited to the capability of the CSS Staff.

"o. Training of NV personnel in the maintenance and repair of PTF's is not practical owing to an insufficient number of VN personnel in the present training program. As in the training of the CSS staff, this program should be very limited, unless it is required to meet a US policy objective then the number of VN personnel must be significantly increased.

"p. The increase in NVN coastal surveillance, coastal defense batteries, and retrenchment of the fishing fleet in the Southern provinces appears to be related more to SEA DRAGON operations than to PLOWMAN (C). However, the indicated increase in NVN internal security in the coastal provinces and a resentment by the populace in these areas against the NVN government is directly and solely attributed to PLOWMAN (C).

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"q. The US organization for the PLOWMAN (C) program is satisfactory except for the following:

"(1) MACSOG OP-31 required one additional officer in order to effectively carry out all their staff responsibilities.

"(2) The NAD organization of three separate groups each with an OIC and with two groups TAD (TDY) is unwieldy and not conducive to proper control and efficient accomplishment of their mission.

"(3) The requirement that officers in the command, operations and plans section be UDT qualified, as recommended in the proposed JTD for NAD, is not in consonance with the operations to be performed in that less than 10% of the missions conducted are UDT missions. These officers should be experienced in either PTF's or similar type boats or in surface tactics and should have a background in seamanship such as damage control, gunnery, etc.

"r. Financial management of the PLOWMAN (C) program requires improvement.

"s. While cost effectiveness if not a practical means of evaluating operations of this nature, the cost and the current and projected resources devoted to PLOWMAN (C) are considered to be excessive for the results obtained or potential results to be obtained.

"t. There is no specific, detailed long-range planning for PLOWMAN (C) operations.

"u. Planning coordination with activities such as STD, and 7th FLT outside MACSOG is adequate.

"v. The success of the PLOWMAN (C) operations is dependent on the training of the Vietnamese personnel. However, training of PTF crews in operational tactics is insufficient to insure the most optimum results from each mission.

"w. Although PLOWMAN (C) operations are covert, launching of a mission is easily visible to anyone and tracks to the OP areas are not always outside radar range of the NVN coast.

"x. Facilities for PLOWMAN (C) forces and personnel are excellent, and are adequate for an increased tempo of operations.

"y. Operational and Logistics support required from other activities in RVN, outside of SOG, are minimal.

"z. Utilization of PTF's on operational missions during 1967 averaged approximately 20% for each PTF which is considered to be very low.

"aa. Losses sustained by PLOWMAN (C) forces during 1967 were minimal. Only one PTF was damaged and none were lost.

"bb. Restraints imposed on PLOWMAN (C) do not significantly affect PLOWMAN (C) operations. However, better results could be expected if PTF's were permitted to operate freely in areas north of 20° North Latitude rather than be required to adhere to a predetermined track.

"cc. Use of Boston Whalers in conjunction with PTF's will have to be limited to calm seas. However, their use in conjunction with PTF's should permit operations closer to the shore and provide an element of surprise in boarding fishing vessels.

"dd. In 1967, a total of 101 missions were conducted for the purpose of capturing prisoners. A total of 328 prisoners were captured on 56 missions. Thus, an average of approximately 6 prisoners were captured per mission and approximately 56% of the missions were successful. Therefore, in order to furnish 100 prisoners per month to paradise Island, which is the number expected to be processed each month, a total of 16 successful missions per month should be conducted (16 x 6 = 96 prisoners per month). Only 56% of the missions can be expected to be successful. To arrive at the total number of missions which should be scheduled: 16 successful missions = .56 (total missions to be scheduled) or 28 missions per month. Additionally, 3 CADO missions (one per team) per month should be scheduled. Thus a total of 31 missions per month should be scheduled.

"ee. The number of boats required to conduct 31 missions per month is based on the following formula:

$$N = \frac{BDT}{AE}$$

"Where: B = Number of boats per mission. Based on equal coverage of all areas plus 3 CADO missions, for 31 missions this averages 2.2 boats per mission.

D = Average mission duration. For computation purposes the duration of the longest mission 30 hours is used.

T = Total number of missions to be conducted, 31.

A = Boat availability or 0.88 as obtained from MACSOG.

E = Engine hours per month. Based on 50% utilization with 20% of this time for training, 288 hrs per month available for operational missions.

"Therefore, to conduct 31 missions per month requires:

$$N = \frac{(2.2)\ (30)\ (31)}{(.88)\ (288)} = 8.07 \text{ boats}$$

"This number should be increased by two in order to have one boat in stand by and one boat in overhaul. The total number of PTF's required is ten. If normal utilization is 50% for a short period, a 30% increase in the number of missions which could be conducted would be possible by increasing utilization to 66% or 475 engine hours per month. The number of PTF crews required to conduct 31 missions per month, based on 3 days rest between missions is 10. (31 missions x 2.2 boats per mission = 68 boats msns per month· crew availability 7 missions per month [720 + (72 + 30)]. Two additional crews should be provided to allow for injuries, sickness, etc., thus 12 crews should be ample for 31 missions per month. For a short period, the number of missions could be increased by 30% by rotating crews every 48 hours vice 72 hours.

"(NOTE: Information on which to base attrition by battleloss, unexpected hull damage, etc. was not available, hence an attrition factor was not considered in computing the number of PTF's required. MACSOG should collect data for this purpose so that attrition rates can realistically be applied.)

"11. Cincpac Report:

"a. Conclusions made by the Joint Survey Team on MACSOG programs (C) are listed, together with the AD HOC Evaluation Groups (AHEG) comments, in the following paragraphs.

"b. Team Conclusions: The current SOG organization for the conduct of PLOWMAN (C) operations is adequate.

AHEG Comment: Concur except as recommended in AHEG recommendation numbers 12c and e.

"c. The current availability of seven PTF's has limited the conduct of PLOWMAN (C) operations in both frequency and in area and type of operation conducted. The assignment of additional PTF's would provide not only for greater mission frequency but in better geographic coverage of the NVN coast. This in turn would improve the opportunities to obtain intelligence sources knowledgeable in areas not adequately covered in the past.

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur. The AHEG concluded that 80% of the missions conducted in 1967 were in two areas; that with six boats operational it should have been possible to conduct a minimum of 27 missions per month (16 two boat missions and 11 three boat missions). However, the highest number scheduled was 22; the highest number conducted was 16. Further, the utilization of PTF's on operational missions during 1967 was approximately 20%. Therefore, do not concur that the number of boats assigned limited operations either as to frequency or coverage. .

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"d. In addition to restraints related to the shortage of PTF's there is a JCS imposed restraint on the employment of PLOWMAN (C) detainees for intelligence/defection operations. The requirement to obtain JCS approval for such employment, in cases where large scale defection operations are not involved, is unrealistic and limits the effectiveness of PLOWMAN (C) operations.

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur that the effectiveness of PLOWMAN (C) operations have been limited by this JCS imposed restraint. A JCS decision can be acquired in sufficient time to plan the return of detainees for intelligence or defector operations. Once these personnel are earmarked for this type operation additional training is required. Decisions from JCS should be expected in less time than it takes to provide this required training.

"e. PLOWMAN (C) operations have provided significant intelligence in the past largely through the detention of fishermen. However, better geographic coverage should be obtained. The collection of intelligence is a valid objective for PLOWMAN (C).

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur that better geographic coverage should be obtained and that collection of intelligence is a valid objective for PLOWMAN (C).

"f. CADO missions have achieved a low success rate in the past. However, there is no guarantee that the inclusion of US personnel in CADO teams would increase the quality of the intelligence take of such operations. Conversely, the use of US personnel in such missions could compromise the psychological objective of PLOWMAN (C) operations.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"g. PLOWMAN (C) operations are ineffective in impeding the infiltration of enemy resources in NVN by direct interdiction of enemy coastal shipping. Such interdiction can better be accomplished by overt means (SEA DRAGON). Interdiction is not a valid objective for PLOWMAN (C).

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"h. PLOWMAN (C) operations have achieved a significant psychological impact in NVN by providing the coastal fishing population with evidence of an alternative to communist suppression, exacerbating strains between the population and the government/party structure, and varying degrees and modes of concern at the several levels of NVN leadership as to the existence of dissident elements in the NVN population. Significant opportunities for even more effective psychological impact exists in achieving a closer integration between PLOWMAN (C) operations and psychological operations centered on an expansion of the SSPL.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"i. PLOWMAN (C) operations have caused significant diversion of NVN resources to coastal and internal security. This effect is resultant from the conduct of all types of PLOWMAN (C) operations and should continue as long as PLOWMAN (C) Forces operate in close proximity to the NVN coastline, whatever the specific objectives of the operation.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur. (SEA DRAGON forces also contribute significantly)

"j. *The sinking of fishing junks and the detention of* fishermen has produced an adverse effect on the economy of NVN. This effect has been incidental to the achievement of other objectives and in the case of junk destruction, probably has been counter-productive from the psychological standpoint.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"k. Recommendations made by the Joint Survey Team on MACSOG Programs (C), including CINCPAC comments on those which CINCPAC non-concurred are listed below together with the AHEG comments.

"1. Team recommendations (Page C-II-12, para 7). It is recommended that:

"(1) The PLOWMAN (C) mission be restated essentially as follows:

"(a) Increase NVN belief in the existence of a broadly based dissident organization (SSPL) operating in NVN.

"(b) Obtain human intelligence from detainees and prisoners, and from cross-beach reconnaissance.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"(2) PLOWMAN (C) operations be closely integrated with HUMIDOR (C) in order to achieve the objectives states in 1(1) (a) above.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"(3) PLOWMAN (C) operations in pursuit of both the intelligence and psychological objectives be conducted at a frequency consistent with operational requirements and as permitted by a SOG Force level of 12 to 14 PTF's (including boats in overhaul at Subic).

"AHEG COMMENT: See AHEG comment number 11 h (1).

"(4) Concomitant with the assignment of a revised mission, as stated, above, the administrative procedures be revised to permit COMUSMACV at his discretion:

"(a) To conduct PLOWMAN-(C) operations appropriate to the original mission in NVN coastal waters south of 20 degrees 30 minutes North Latitude.

"(b) To employ PLOWMAN (C) detainees as intelligence agents or as defection organizers.

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"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur. The AHEG does not consider that the current approval procedures impose any undue restraint on operations. However, the AHEG recommends that MACSOG submit on a monthly basis for approval a detailed plan covering a period of one month. Approval of this plan would permit day to day operations at COMUSMACV discretion without obtaining approval for each individual mission on a case by case basis.

"(5) US Advisors not be employed with the CADO teams for the time being.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur that US Advisors not be employed with CADO teams in operations north of 17° North Latitude since their use could be counter productive to the SSPL program.

"(6) Continued emphasis be given to developing the SVN capability to conduct covert maritime operations unilaterally or with a minimum of covert US control following a stand down.

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur. At the present time CSS has only six officers and it does not appear that this number will be increased. This number and their background preclude an effective, realistic training program for SVN to unilaterally assume the conduct of PLOWMAN (C). Therefore, the AHEG recommends instead that MACSOG request STD to assign an adequate number of officers to the CSS to permit a realistic training program for this purpose. This recommendation is valid only if policy has been approved to permit RVN to conduct covert operations in NVN after US withdrawal.

"m. Team Recommendations:

"(1) That an on board allowance level of ten PTF be maintained for NVN operation in the PLOWMAN (C) program, with an additional four craft manned by US Navy crews to be assigned to the PLOWMAN (C) program, to be utilized for joint operations as appropriate and for conventional US Navy support operations as required.

"AHEG COMMENT: See AHEG comment number 11n(1).

"(2) That authorization for utilization of US Navy crews on PLOWMAN (C) PTF's be reviewed by higher authority with realistic presentation that their activity in NVN waters can be more appropriately utilized and controlled from the MACSOG command than from another base of operations (COMSEVNTH FLEET or COMNAVFORV) which is currently under proposal and consideration.

"AHEG COMMENT: See AHEG Comment 11n(2).

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"n. Team Recommendation (Page 7, para 3d(5)) COMUSMACV should request confirmation that 14 PTF's, to be manned by indigenous crews, will be assigned for use in PLOWMAN (C). (The OPNAV representative on the Survey Team has placed, in the record, a recommendation that the PLOWMAN (C) PTF force consist of ten PTF's manned by indigenous crews and four PTF's manned by US Crews.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: To support the expansion of the SSPL and maintain the covert aspects of PLOWMAN (C), a force level of 14 PTF's should be manned by indigenous crews.

"AHEG COMMENT: These comments are addressed to team recommendations c, l, and m.

"(1) First, the number of PTF's. The AHEG does not concur that a level of 12-14 PTF's is required. Ten PTF's is considered sufficient to conduct 31 missions per month which AHEG recommends for this program. (See AHEG recommendations numbers 12i and 12p)

"(2) While the AHEG agrees that operation of PTF's by US personnel might enhance the productivity of the PLOWMAN (C) program, such is not certain and it is not considered consistent to recommend greater participation of PLOWMAN (C) in support of SSPL, a covert program, and recommend US personnel participation in support of the same program. If the US personnel participation is to exclude participation in SSPL operations, then the only remaining operations are intelligence collection and the destruction of NVN vessels. The destruction mission is being adequately carried out by SEA DRAGON forces and is not considered a valid mission for PLOWMAN (C). The intelligence collection mission of PTF crews is primarily based on interrogation, under SSPL cover, of NVN fishermen. The presence of US personnel would tend to discredit the SSPL. Therefore, the AHEG does not concur in the use of US personnel in PLOWMAN (C) operations north of 17° North Latitude. While the AHEG is not cognizant of the plan to operate PTF's with US Navy crews in NVN waters the following comments based on information derived during this study are submitted for consideration:

"(a) The AHEG does not concur that if US Navy crews for PTF's are authorized that they should be under MACSOG command.

"(b) Such operations should be separate from PLOWMAN (C) in order to enhance the support of SSPL being recommended for PLOWMAN (C). The AHEG further considers that if the US Navy should be authorized to operate PTF's under US Navy Command, that the lower base and other facilities at DA NANG East, and support personnel should be utilized since these bases and support personnel are more than adequate to support an increased number of PTF's and to construct duplicate facilities and to provide duplicate supporting personnel would not be economical. However, if such is done, there should be one base commander, under US Navy command, responsible for support, including maintenance, and two separate operational staffs, one for PLOWMAN (C) under MACSOG control and one for US Navy operations under US Navy control.

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"o. Team recommendation: (Page 3, para 3a(3)) That COMUSMACV request that the BACKDROP program be continued until determination is made at the Washington level pertaining to inclusion of PRC material support for FOOTBOY (C)/ PRAIRIE FIRE programs under FLAGPOLE; meanwhile MACSOG Logistics screen all BACKDROP support requests with their requisition to Navy constituting authorization for billing procedures to be established by CNO, US Navy through Chief Naval Material (PM-12) as Navy Action Agent.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: The FLAGPOLE system under its charter is not considered to be the proper vehicle to replace BACKDROP. CINCPAC INST 4000.5 of 13 January 1967, which formalizes and establishes the criteria for the FLAGPOLE reporting system pertains.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur with CINCPAC Comment that FLAGPOLE system is not proper vehicle to replace BACKDROP. However, recommend that BACKDROP system be thoroughly examined and purpose redefined, that all requisitions be thoroughly reviewed and screened to ensure items are essential to PLOWMAN (C) needs and that limitations be placed on R and D requirements (See AHEG incl 8).

"(1) Team Recommendation: That US Navy Captain (O-6) be assigned to head the PLOWMAN (C) operations on MACSOG staff and to thus add Navy participation and experience gain in the command/control area uf U.W. afloat operations.

AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur with need to have a Navy Captain in PLOWMAN (C) program. Present and recommended level of operations does not warrant an O-6 in this position. Head of OP-31 is a Navy Commander and the overall program is under supervision of the Operations Officer, MACSOG, O-6, Army which is working satisfactorily.

"12. AHEG Recommendations:

"a. It is recommended that the mission of PLOWMAN (C) be to conduct covert maritime operations with RVN personnel in the coastal waters of NVN in order to

"(1) Support the HUMIDOR (C) and TIMBERWORK (C) programs.

"(2) Collect intelligence.

"(3) Conduct small scale cross the beach operations in NVN in support of (a) and (b) above.

"(4) Train RVN personnel to conduct PLOWMAN (C) operations.

"b. That specific tasks for PLOWMAN (C) be:

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"(1) Distribution of PSYOPS material and capture/return of prisoners in support of the HUMIDOR (C) (SSPL) program.

"(2) Intelligence collection, including photography, by PTF crews as tasked by SOGINTEL.

"(3) Insertion and extraction of detainees, defectors and agents in support of HUMIDOR (C) and TIMBERWORK (C) programs.

"(4) Conduct, on a limited scale, cross beach operations in NVN for the purpose of capturing selective prisoners for SSPL or as specifically tasked through SOGINTEL by higher authority such as MACV, CINCPAC or JCS. Additionally, small scale sabotage in support of SSPL.

"(5) Destroy or capture NVN vessels only in self defense, except targets of opportunity that are definitely identified as directly supporting the NVN war effort may be destroyed, providing such action does not jeopardize the primary mission.

"(6) Train and advise RVN personnel how to conduct the above listed tasks.

"c. That OP-31 be increased by one officer, Navy O-3; that the plans officer be a US Navy officer and that the Marine officer in OP-31 be UDT qualified.

"d. That in regards to the organization of NAD:

"(1) All officers in command, operations, and plans sections be qualified or experienced in either small boats (PTF size) or surface ship tactics and not necessarily UDT qualified and that the operations officer be a US Navy officer.

"(2) The Marine officer assigned be UDT qualified.

"(3) All MST and SEAL (MARRECON) personnel be assigned PCS and under the command of the officer in charge of NAD. Further the OIC should have NJP authority over all personnel in his command.

"(4) That MACSOG formally request STD to increase the number of officers and men assigned to CSS in order that training of CSS to unilaterally conduct and plan PLOWMAN (C) operation can be effectively accomplished. (This recommendation is valid only if policy has been established that RVN will continue to conduct such operations after US withdrawal.)

"e. That the number of VN action Team personnel remain at the present level (three teams - 72 personnel) and that presently assigned personnel be screened to eliminate those unsuited or unproductive.

"f. That an analysis be conducted to ascertain economy measures which can be made and that a financial management system be instituted in the PLOWMAN (C) program. That concerted effort be made to reduce the cost of PLOWMAN (C) operations. Actions that appear feasible are:

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"(1) Reduction in number of vehicles.

"(2) Reduction in number of programmed PTF's.

"(3) Reduction in construction and improvement in present facilities (e.g. paving roads at BLACK ROCK does not appear to be necessary).

"(4) Elimination of per diem by assigning personnel PCS.

"(5) Reduction in NUNG-Guard force.

"(6) Reduction in VN civilian work force.

"(7) Reduction in MST and SEAL Detachment personnel.

"(8) Reduction in Backdrop program.

"g. That 31 missions per month be scheduled and that not more than ten PTF's, 12 PTF crews and three Action Teams be assigned PLOWMAN (C) which is considered adequate to launch 31 missions per month.

"h. That an analysis of operations completed, and results achieved be conducted with the purpose of providing for planning purposes, adequate coverage of the areas of operation, times to conduct operations and objective to be derived from each mission.

"i. That operational planning be on a long-range basis with specific objectives to be accomplished. It should be broken down as to seasons, the objectives to be accomplished, night/day operations and the number of missions required.

"j. That a specific formal training program for PTF and action teams be established which would provide for instruction and practice in tactics, methods of operations, interrogation, intelligence collection (including photography) and PSYOP. Additionally, that PTF crews be trained in damage control procedures, avoidance of gunfire, and tactics on approaching fishing vessels in order to minimize or avoid damage from satchel charges or other explosive devices.

"k. That methods of operating, in order to maintain an element of surprise in PLOWMAN (C) operations, be investigated such as launching missions from a covert site and having tracks to operation areas outside of visual and radar range of the NVN coast.

"l. That COMUSMACV submit to CINCPAC for approval on a monthly basis, a detailed plan (covering a period of one month) so that COMUSMACV could carry out day to day operations at his discretion. Changes, modifications, new or special operations not included in the approval plan would require specific CINCPAC approval. Further, that approval be requested to operate freely in areas North of 20° North Latitude rather than have to adhere to a predetermined track."

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C. (U) NAD DRAFT RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD. At Tab 6 is the recommendation for Presidential Unit Citation prepared for NAD.

TAB 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS ( )
(Intergovernmental Lease of Defense Article)

1. Operation and Use. Except as may be otherwise authorized by the Lessor Government and except during transfer from the United States and return to the place of redelivery, the Lessee Government shall keep the Defense Article in its own possession, custody and control.

2. Initial Condition. The Defense Article is leased to the Lessee Government on an "as is, where is" basis without warranty or representation concerning the condition or state or repair of the Defense Article or any part thereof and without any agreement by the Lessor Government to alter, improve, adapt or repair the Defense Article or any part thereof.

3. Maintenance. The Lessee Government shall maintain the Defense Article in good order, repair and operable condition and shall upon expiration or termination of this Lease return the Defense Article in operable condition and in as good condition as when received, normal wear and tear excepted.

4. Loss of or damage to Defense Article. In the event of loss or of substantial damage to the Defense Article, due to or attributable to causes not the fault of the Lessee Government, the Lessee Government will not be responsible for the loss of or damage to the Defense Article.

5. Indemnification. The Lessee Government renounces all claims against the Lessor Government, its officers, agents, and employees for any such claims of third parties.

6. Place of Redelivery. Upon expiration or termination of this Lease, the Defense Article shall be returned at a place and time to be mutually agreed upon.

7. Title. Title to the Defense Article shall remain in the Lessor Government. The Lessee Government will, however, place the Defense Article under its Flag and mark the Defense Article in accordance with the Lessee Governments' procedures and practices.

8. Covenant Against Contingent Fees. The Lessee Government warrants that it has not employed any person to solicit or secure this Lease upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee.

9. Officials Not to Benefit. No Member of or Delegate to Congress of the United States, or Resident Commissioner of the United States, shall be admitted to any share or part of this Lease or to any benefit that may arise therefrom.

10. Inconsistent Terms. In case of any conflict between these General Provisions and any other terms and conditions of this Lease, such other terms and conditions shall control.

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LEASE OF FAST PATROL BOAT (PTF)

BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

THE LEASE, made as of the 9th day of October 1965, between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter called the "Lessor Government") represented by its Department of the Navy and the GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (hereinafter called the "Lessee Government") represented by the Logistics Command of the Government of Vietnam.

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, The Secretary of the Navy of the Lessor Government (hereinafter called the "Secretary") has determined that the Fast Patrol Boat built by Westermoen, Mandal, Norway in 1965, Hull Number 520, eighty feet four inches overall length, and twenty-four feet seven inches beam width (hereinafter referred to as the defense article) is not excess to the needs of the Department of the Navy of the Lessor Government within the meaning of Section 472 of Title 40 of the United States Code, but is not for the time being required for public use, and

WHEREAS, The Secretary has determined that it will be in the public interest to lease the defense article without cost to the Lessor Government upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, and

WHEREAS, This lease is made under the authority of Section 2667 of Title 10 of the United States Code (70A Stat. 150).

NOW THEREFORE, The parties do mutually agree as follows:

1. In consideration of the maintenance and other obligations assumed by the Lessee Government, the Lessor Government hereby leases to the Lessee Government and the Lessee Government hereby leases from the Lessor Government the defense article for a term of five years from the date of delivery thereof to the Lessee Government and under the terms and conditions set forth in the General Provisions hereto annexed.

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2. The Lessor Government shall deliver the defense article to the Lessee Government at such time and place as may be mutually agreed upon. Such delivery shall be evidenced by a certificate of delivery.

3. By mutual agreement, this lease may be extended for additional terms, not to exceed five years each, if the Secretary determines any such extension will promote the national defense or be in the public interest.

4. This lease may be terminated:

(a) By mutual agreement of the parties;

(b) By the Lessee Government on 30-days' written notice.

(c) By the Lessor Government (i) during any national emergency declared by its President or Congress or (ii) upon immediate written notice to the Lessee Government.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Each of the parties hereto has executed this lease as of the day and year first above written.

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

BY_____
Bui Huu Nhon, General
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
High Command Vietnam Armed Forces

Representative of the
Government of Vietnam

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY_____
J.N.Malnerich, Commander, USNavy
Commanding Officer Acting, Headquarters Support Activity, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Representative of the
Government of the United
States of America

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TAB 2

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO 96222

MACSOG-31 1 April 1969

SUBJECT: Promulgation of PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer Watch Standing Instruction (C)

TO: All OP-31 Staff Section Officers

1. (TS) The PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer Watch Standing Instructions present in detail pertinent instructions to those officers qualified by the Chief, OP-31, to stand PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer watches at SOG Headquarters. This instruction will be maintained in the PARBOIL(C) Duty Officers' Notebook which will be in the custody of Duty Officer at all times during his tour of duty.

2. (TS) This Watch Standing Instruction, in addition to containing guidance for the conduct of the PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer Watch, also contains examples of messages to higher authority to be transmitted to certain addees to insure the safety of all PARBOIL(C) missions. It must be borne in mind by all Duty Officers that all possible contingence cannot be covered by these instructions and nothing in these instructions shall limit the Duty Officer from exercising his own initiative in a timely manner to insure the safety of a PARBOIL(C) mission.

3. (U) These instructions contain information affecting the security of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794. Transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1 Incl
(See List of Effective Pages)

JOHN F. BAUMGARDNER
Commander, U.S. Navy
Chief, OP-31

MORI DocID: 570378

PARBOIL(C) DUTY OFFICER INSTRUCTIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

SUBJECT	EFFECTIVE PAGES	PAGE NUMBER
Letter of Promulgation	ORIGINAL	i
Table of Contents and List of Effective Pages	ORIGINAL	ii
Record of Changes	ORIGINAL	iii
Chapter I	ORIGINAL	I-1 thru I-3
Appendix A	ORIGINAL	I-A-1
Appendix B	ORIGINAL	I-B-1
Appendix C	ORIGINAL	I-C-1 thru I-C-2
Chapter II	ORIGINAL	II-1 thru II-3
Appendix A	ORIGINAL	II-A-1
Appendix B	ORIGINAL	II-B-1
Appendix C	ORIGINAL	II-C-1 thru II-C-4
Appendix D	ORIGINAL	II-D-1
Chapter III	ORIGINAL	III-1 thru III-3
Appendix A	ORIGINAL	III-A-1
Appendix B	ORIGINAL	III-B-1 thru III-B-5
Appendix C	ORIGINAL	III-C-1 thru III-C-2

(All pages typed on one side. Reverse Blank)

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COPY NO
HEADQUARTERS
MACSOG 31
SAIGON VIETNAM
1 April 1969

CHAPTER I

MISSION COMMAND & CONTROL

1. GENERAL.

a. Introduction. MACSOG concepts PARBOIL(C) missions north of 17-OON to CINCPAC/JCS for approval. Upon receipt of approval of these missions MACSOG transmits detailed mission tracks to JCS/CINCPAC and to US Fleet/Air Force addees in order that all who have a need-to-know are aware of an impending PARBOIL(C) mission. Forty-eight hours prior to a mission launch MACSOG will promulgate an Intent to Launch Message to ALCON which schedules the actual launch date of an impending mission. Upon the transmission of this intent all required coordination messages have been sent and the mission is cleared for execution.

b. Mission Sequence of Events. Twenty-four hours prior to launch time, the OIC NAD, Danang will transmit to SOG Headquarters [redacted] a detailed Comm Plan Message (Appendix A). This Comm Plan message will contain: (b)(1) (b)(3)

(1) Mission code to be used.

(2) Mission craft and crews to be embarked.

(3) Check-in times that OTC is to report mission progress to SOG Headquarters.

(4) Pertinent details such as mission OTC and PTF COs.

(5) DTG of mission launch.

The OP-31 Operations Officer will verify the contents of this Comm Plan message, particularly the DTG of launch to insure it is consistent with mission information promulgated previously. After verification of the Comm Plan the Operations Officer will prepare and complete the Mission Check-in Sheet (Appendix B), and the Mission Check-off List (Appendix C). On the day of the mission, the launch message will be prepared by the OP-31 Operations Officer and reviewed by the Chief OP-31 to insure correctiveness .

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USMAD will announce the launch to SOG Headquarters, [redacted] via FLASH message when the PTFs actually depart the base at Danang. The Duty Officer will complete the launch message and deliver it to SOG Communications for transmission. (Refer to Chapter II) The PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer will then monitor the progress of the mission, maintaining a file of check-in reports as received. When the mission recovers at the base in Danang, the Duty Officer will complete the recovery message and deliver it to SOG Communications for transmission. (b)(1) (b)(3)

II. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARBOIL(C) DUTY OFFICER

a. Prior to Mission Launch.

(1) The PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer shall insure that he is completely familiar with the intended mission details as to track and scheduled ETAs along the track.

(2) He shall insure that the effective edition of AKAC 273 and the ADAC 273 Brevity Code are available in the PARBOIL(C) Duty Officers Notebook.

b. During the Mission.

(1) When the launch message is received from USMAD complete MACSOG launch message and insure it is transmitted from SOG Headquarters Communications. Insure that [redacted] SSG have also been notified of the launch. (b)(1) (b)(3)

(2) In the event that the mission OTC fails to send his required check-in messages, the Duty Officer shall query the mission OTC utilizing the applicable AKAC 273 and AKAC 273 Brevity Code (See Chapter II and Appendix A to Chapter I). This message will be sent to the OTC no later than one hour later than the missed scheduled check-in time.

(3) Immediately notify the Chief, OP-31, and Chief, Operations, of any incident affecting the safety of the mission or any event that represents a departure from the mission as planned.

(4) The Duty Officer shall keep himself continuously informed during the period the mission is underway as to the following:

(a) Status of communications necessary for the support of the mission.

(b) Last reported position of the mission craft and current estimated position.

c. Upon Mission Recovery.

(1) Immediately complete and file for transmission the recovery message

(2) Insure that [redacted] SSG are informed of the mission recovery. (b)(1) (b)(3)

d. Other Pertinent Information.

(1) The PARBOIL(C) Duty Officer shall be physically present within SOG Headquarters whenever a mission is underway. The Duty Watch shall be stood in the OP-31 Office or in SSG OP Center.

(2) Liaison shall be maintained with the Seventh Air Force Command Center and the Seventh Fleet LNO whenever there is a departure from the mission as planned. The Seventh Air Force Command Center may be reached by secure phone at drop number 3401. The Seventh Fleet LNO can be reached by secure phone at drop number 3311.

APPENDIXES

A - Sample Comm Plan Message (Annotated)
B - Mission Check-in Sheet
C - Mission Check-off List

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APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER I

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER I

SAMPLE PARBOIL(C) CHECK-IN SHEET

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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER I

PARBOIL(C) MISSION CHECK-OFF LIST

CURRENT MSN: _____ MSN DETAILS MSG: _____

NEXT MSN: _____ MSN DETAILS MSG: _____

The OP-31 Staff Officer, as indicated will ensure that this form is completed for each mission. A copy of this sheet will be included in each mission folder as it is prepared. (OPS)

NO.	REQUIREMENT	COMPLETED	INITIALS
1.	Man concept msg to JCS/CINCPAC and approval received.	_____	_____
2.	Msn details msg to 7th Flt and 7th Air Force Addees (OPS)	_____	_____
	(The following must have taken place at least 48 hours prior to scheduled execution)		
3.	Coordination Papers delivered to 7th Air Force (OPS)	_____	_____
4.	Msn Sequence Msg Promulgated (OPS)	_____	_____
	(At least 24 hours prior to scheduled execution)		
5.	USNAD next Action Comm Plan received OP-31	_____	_____
6.	Launch time of 5 above verified (OPS)	_____	_____
7.	Proper AKAC 273 No. and Page No. Listed in 5 of above	_____	_____
8.	Proper FISH CODE listed in 5 above (OPS)	_____	_____
9.	Man Track (on check-in card) to SSG (OPS)	_____	_____
10.	Launch or Notification of Non-execution to ALCON (Duty Officer)	_____	_____

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NO.	REQUIREMENT	COMPLETED	INITIALS
11.	Spot Report filed if required and apporved by Chief OPS or Chief SOG (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
12.	Recovery msg and intent to launch next man sent after recovery made at USNAD. In the event of a cancellation/abort this msg must contain a statement of completion or intent to reschedule mission (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
13.	Ensure SSG informed of cancellation/abort of msn (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
14.	Ensure Project SSG informed of recovery (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
15.	Ensure [redacted] informed of recovery (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
16.	Ensure [redacted] notified in case of cancellation	_____	_____
17.	USNAD debrief of msn received SOG (maximum delay of six hours after recovery) (OPS)	_____	_____
18.	After Action Report prepared and submitted to Chief, OP-31 (OPS)	_____	_____

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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COPY NO. _____
HEADQUARTERS
MACSOG 31
SAIGON, VIETNAM
1 April 1969

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE C-d-93 Tab 2 to Annex D to Appendix C

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

III. COMMUNICATIONS: SOG HEADQUARTERS/USNAD.

a. General. Communications with the PTF base at NAD is provided through a secure teletype net from SOG Communications to the Command Post at USNAD. All messages concerning the mission in progress are passed to USNAD for information. The Duty Officer, should, from time to time, monitor this circuit to insure it's functioning and that the SOG Communications watch-stander is passing all message traffic in a timely manner. It is particularly important that information on prisoners taken is passed to the USNAD Duty Officer. This information is necessary in order that a SWIFT craft may be sent to rendezvous with mission PTSs for prisoner transfer at BAI BAC.

b. Single Sideband Radio Communications. SSB radio equipment is located in OP-35. This equipment provides a back-up means of communicating with USNAD Danang. KAC-132 crypto procedures will be used whenever passing traffic over this voice radio circuit. NAD will guard this circuit on a continuous basis whenever the secure teletype net from SOG Communications to the Command Post at USNAD is inoperative.

IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL MESSAGES TO HIGHER AUTHORITY AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES.

a. General. Friendly units, both surface and air, will be encountered by PARBOIL(C) craft on every mission. Recognition procedures are in effect to prevent mutual interference of PARBOIL(C) craft and these friendly units. As detailed in the OP-31 SOP, on file in OP-31 staff office, each mission, prior to its launch, is thoroughly coordinated with Seventh Fleet and Seventh Air Force commands having a need-to-know. This coordination is effected through the promulgation of detailed mission tracks, liaison visits to Seventh Air Force Headquarters and the promulgation of intent to launch messages.

b. Launch Procedures. Once the launch of a mission is scheduled, launch message is prepared on the scheduled execution day (AppendixB). This message is completed by the Duty Officer and transmitted by FLASH precedence direct from SOG Headquarters USNAD Duty Officer will transmit the actual launch of the mission when it gets underway from Danang. This message will also indicate the craft going on the mission. The Duty Officer will transfer this information to the launch message, obtain a cite number and deliver the message to SOG Communications Center for transmission (Appendix C).

c. Delays in Launch of Mission. A delay in launch of one hour or less will require no adjustment to the detailed track message previously promulgated. If the delay in launch is in excess of one hour the launch message must so indicate the amount of delay and request addees to adjust ETAs along track. An example of a delay in launch is contained in Appendix C.

d. Cancellation and Abort Procedures. Procedures to be followed by the Duty Officer in the event a mission is cancelled, aborted, or a portion is aborted, are contained in Chapter III to these instructions.

e. Recovery Procedures. Recovery procedures are the same as for launch. When all craft have returned to base at Danang the recovery message is filed. This message will also contain the intent to launch paragraph which schedules the next PARBOIL(C) mission (Appendix C).

f. Mission Deviations. Whenever a mission underway deviates more than ten miles from track, or one hour from planned ETAs of the track, the Duty Officer shall prepare and release a message to all launch message addees setting forth all known details (Appendix C).

V. IMMEDIATE ACTION COMMUNICATIONS. A KY-3 secured telephone is located outside SAS. This phone system has the scrambler capability when in a secure mode and TOP SECRET and below information may be discussed. The Seventh Air Force Command Center (DROP 3401) and the Seventh Fleet LNO (DROP 3311) may be contacted at any hour. Duty Officers at the Air Vorce Command Center and the Seventh Fleet LNO are fully cognizant of the current PARBOIL(C) mission underway and can take immediate action to prevent mutual interference in the event there is an unplanned departure from the published track of the mission.

APPENDIXES

A - Chief SOG ltr of 29 Mar 69, Subj: SOG PTF/SWIFT Communication Procedure and one-time Operations Codes; forwarding of
B - [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
C -
1. Launch Message
2. Delay in launch message
3. Recovery Message
4. Mission Track Deviation Message
D - Amplifying Instructions for use of AKAC 273 Brevity Codes

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER II

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER II

LAUNCH MESSAGE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMEDIATE (INFO ADDEES)

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG (Cite No)

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission _____ Launch (C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Mission Details Message DTG) (NOTAL)(TS)

(S) PARBOIL(C) (No.) (Number spelled out) Consisting of PTFs _____, _____ and _____ launched Danang _____Z. Code Word for this mission is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Ref A.

EXAMPLE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)
IMMEDIATE (INFO ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCO MACSOG (Cite No)

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission 610 Launch (C)

REF: A COMUSMACV MACSOG 2716 DTG 290215Z Aug 66 (NOTAL)(TS)

(S) PARBOIL(C) mission 610 (Six One Zero) consisting of PTFs 5, 7 and 11 launched Danang 270716Z. Code word for this mission is "BIRD MAN" repeat "BIRD MAN". Msn details contained Ref A.

GP-4

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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER II

DELAY IN LAUNCH MESSAGE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG (Cite No)

SUBJ: PARBOIL (C) Mission 610 Launch (C)

Ref: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 2716 DTG 290215Z Aug 66 (NOTAL) (TS)

1. (S) PARBOIL (C) Mission 610 (Six One Sero) consisting of PTFs 5, 7 and 11 launched Danang 230715Z Oct 66. Code word for this mission is "BIRD MAN" repeat "BIRD MAN". Msn details contained Ref A.

2. (S) Mission launched 2 hours and 15 minutes late; request addees adjust ETAs along track contained Ref A accordingly.

GP-4

NOTE Ref A is Details Message

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APPENDIX C. TO CHAPTER II

RECOVERY MESSAGE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCD: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG _____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission 610 Recovery (C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 27116 DTG 290215Z Aug 68 (NOTAL)(TS)

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG 2672 DTG 240734Z Aug 68 (NOTAL)(TS)

1. (S) PARBOIL(C) Mission 610 (Six One Zero) recovered Danang _____Z. Mission details contained RefA.

2. (S) Intend launch PARBOIL(C) Mission 331 (Three Three One) 21 Oct. Code word for this mission is "IRON HAT" repeat "IRON HAT". Mission details contained Ref B.

GP-4

NOTE Paragraph 2 of the Recovery Message is utilized to indicate the upcoming mission to be launched. If another mission is in process this paragraph will state:
(S) PARBOIL(C) Msn (No) (No spelled out) launched IAW Ref B currently in process. Code word for this mission is "_____" repeat "_____". Mission details contained Ref C. (Ref B in this case will be the launch msg of the msn in process and Ref C will be the applicable details msg.

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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER II

MISSION TRACK DEVIATION MSG

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission 610 (S)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 3435 DTG 230716Z Oct 68 (S)

B COMUSMACV MACSOG 2716 DTG 290215Z Aug 68 (NOTAL)(TS)

1. (TS) PARBOIL(C) Mission 610 (Six One Zero) launched IAW Ref A at 16-12N/108-15E at 230715Z Oct 68. Msn craft position at 1015Z 17-30N/107-45E. Msn delayed due (high seas) (engine casualty) (battle damage) (other), enroute base on course _____, speed _____ knots, ETA _____Z.

2. (S) Request addees adjust ETAs along track contained Ref B accordingly.

GP-1

NOTE Ref A is the launch message DTG for this mission. Ref B is the Details Message. It is important to show the current time/position of the mission craft.

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APPENDIX D

AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS FOR AKAC 273 BREVITY CODE

1. The absence, in the AKAC 273 Brevity Code, of specific codes for "Enemy KIA" and "Friendly KIA" necessitates the use of spares.

   a. Spare Number 10 (Code 10) will be used to represent "Enemy KIA".

   b. Spare Number 14 (Code LK) will be used to represent "Friendly KIA".

2. The Latitude Group (EO) has the digits 00 for the minutes of latitude. These digits should be taped over, giving only whole degrees of latitude. This group can then be sent in the same manner as the longitude group (GA) with no donfusion.

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CHAPTER III

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

I. GENERAL.

Procedures contained in this chapter pertain to actions to be taken by the Duty Officer in the event the mission, once launched, is not executed as planned. Such incidents as the abort of one or more mission craft, the abort of the entire mission, enemy attack upon the mission craft, or the operational loss of one or more mission craft are discussed in this chapter. Such happenings are broadly classified as emergency procedures and require a specific IMMEDIATE ACTION to be taken by the Duty Officer. Unusual occurrences such as the loss of a PTF, enemy action, or the loss of an action team, will be immediately reported to higher authority via the "Spot Report" (Appendix A). A "Spot Report" will be a FLASH message to CINCPAC and JCS giving the known details of the incident, what is being done in the way of any required assistance and will also contain guidance concerning future "Spot Reports" or whether the final report of the action will be contained in the "After Action Report", filed after the mission recovers at Danang. "Spot Reports" will be approved for release by either the Chief, Operations and Training or Chief, SOG. Preparation of a "Spot Report" will be under direct supervision of Chief, OP-31. Basically, the "Spot Report" should contain the WHO, WHERE, WHEN and HOW of any incident reported.

II. MISSION ABORTS AND CANCELLATIONS:

a. Mission Abort. Any portion or all of a mission may be aborted. For example one PTF may abort due to engine failure. The OTC has authority to abort any portion or all of a mission.

(1) When information is received from the mission OTC that he is aborting the mission, a message will be prepared and released to all launch addees as shown in Example One of Appendix B. In all cases a reason for abort of the mission will be included. The Duty Officer will also include the estimated position of the PTFs, their course and speed to base and ETA at base.

(2) When information is received that one or more of the PTFs is aborting the mission, a similar message will be prepared and released. In this case the entire mission is not aborted but just one or two boats of the mission. (See Example Two, Appendix B)

(3) When an entire mission is aborted and subsequently recovered at Danang, the recovery mesage must indicate whether or not that

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mission is considered to have been completed or not. A statement to the effect that the mission number is being retained and will be rescheduled at a later date will suffice. (See Example Three, Appendix B)

b. Mission Launch Cancellation:

(1) A mission that has been scheduled may be cancelled completely. This is especially true of a 500 Series mission wherein the selected target has become hardened by a buildup of NVN coastal defense subsequent to its selection as a target for cross-beach operation. Example Four, Appendix B gives a sample message to be prepared and released when an entire mission is cancelled.

(2) A mission launch may be cancelled due to adverse weather or due to lack of mission ready PTFs. In this case, a mission not launched message is transmitted. This message will always contain the phrase that the mission will be rescheduled at a later date. (See Example Five, Appendix B) It is not possible to delay the launch of a PARBOIL(C) mission for twenty-four hours. The required coordination necessary with Seventh Air Force makes it mandatory that 48 hours advance notice be given all intended actions by PARBOIL(C).

III. BATTLE/OPERATIONAL DAMAGE.

a. General. Mission PTFs operate in enemy waters at a level of about fifteen missions per month. Past experience has shown that mission craft are subject to loss or damage from enemy action or miscalculation by one or more PTF commanding officers that result in an operational loss. Enemy action will nearly always result in seriously wounded PTF crewmembers who require immediate medical attention. There are units of TF 77 operating in the Tonkin Gulf who are capable of rendering assistance when requested.

b. Friendly Forces Available. The Yankee Team operating in the Tonkin Gulf consists of two CVAx, screening destroyers, SEA DRAGON destroyers, and SAR destroyers. The SEA DRAGON and SAR destroyers are the primary assistance units to help a PARBOIL(C) mission requiring assistance while deep in NVN waters. The task unit designation of the SAR unit is TU 77.0.1. This SAR unit consists of four destroyers. Two units man a station at 19-52N/106-45E and two units man a station at 18-37N/106-15E. The northern SAR unit will remain on station at all times. The southern SAR unit will patrol a line of 18-37N between 106-15E and 106-31E. Yankee Team CVAs will operate within a circle of 35 nautical miles radius centered about 18-25N/107-30E.

A copy of the current Seventh Fleet Task Organization is maintained in the Duty Officer's Notebook in order that an updated list of units

assigned is always available. Yankee Team operations are under the operational control of CTF 77 and exercised through the Yankee Team Commander (CTG 77.0). All message traffic to Yankee Team units requesting assistance will include both CTF 77 and CTG 77 0 as either action or information addees It is also important to include CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT on all requests for assistance. However, the SAR Unit Commander (CTU 77.0.1) should almost without exception be action addee A recent addition to operating units in the Tonkin Gulf is TU 77.1. This unit operates as Operation SEA DRAGON. It consists of four DDs conducting interdiction operations off the NVN coast from the DMZ north to 20-CON. If mission PTFs require assistance, this force of four destroyers can be called upon to render the needed assistance. In this instance the message would be addressed to CTU 77 1 for action, info CTU 77.1.1 and CTU 77.1.2. The current SEA DRAGON weekly Planning Message is available in the OP31 Duty Officer's Book.

c. Battle Damage. The first information that the Duty Officer will receive concerning an enemy attack will normally come from the mission OTC via Project BUGS. The message will report the enemy attack by air or surface units and may request immediate assistance. If the enemy attack has been repelled without personnel or material casualties the OTC will not request assistance. However, if the enemy attack has inflicted personnel/material casualties the OTC will request assistance. Upon receipt of this request the Duty Officer should immediately prepare a FLASH message (Example One, Appendix C) to Yankee Team units givingbrief details of the attack and requesting their assistance. After message is released notify the mission OTC [redacted] with a suitable FLASH message. Then immediately call Chief, OP-31 requesting his presence in Headquarters. The Duty Officer will then prepare the "Spot Report" for release at a later time. Do not request USN assistance unless the mission OTC has first requested it. (b)(1) (b)(3)

d. Operational Losses/Damage. The Duty Officer may get a message from the mission OTC that he has suffered a collision, grounding, fire or sinking. Again, if the OTC requests assistance, request Yankee Team units to provide. (Example Two, Appendix C) In the case of a grounding in shallow water indlude in the request a request for a visual recce over the grounded PTF and an air strike if necessary to insure complete destruction of the PTF to prevent its capture by the enemy.

e. All message requests for assistance transmitted to Seventh Fleet units should be immediately paralelled on KY-3 to Seventh Fleet Detachment "C", who will retransmit on Fleet Flash Net.

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APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER III

SPOT REPORT

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH

TO: CINCPAC

JCS

INFO: CTF 77/COMSEVENTHFLT/CINCPACAF (elete info addees if msg of no interest to them)

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Spot Report (C)

REF: A. (Mission Details Message)

1. (TS) PARBOIL(C) Mission (No.) (No, Spelled out) position_____N/ _____E at_____Z, under attack by enemy aircraft. Mission OTC reports PTF-16 heavily damaged by enemy fire and has sunk.

2. (TS) Assistance has been requested from TU 77.0.1. Destroyer GURKE has made rendezvous with mission PTFs and has removed all wounded PTF crewmembers FFT to Carrier KITTY HAWK. PTFs 5 and 10 enroute base on course_____, speed_____knots.

3. (TS) Further details of air attack will be contained in the after action report. This is first and final spot report of the incident.

GP-1

MORI DocID: 570378

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE I

MISSION ABORT

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission_____Abort (C)

REF: A. (Mission Details Message)

1. (TS) PARBOIL(C) Mission (No.) (Spell Out) position_____N/ _____E at_____Z aborting due weather/engine failure/ radar failure/enemy contact returning to base on course_____ degrees, speed_____knots, ETA base_____Z.

2. (S) Details of mission contained Ref A.

GP-1

MORI DocID 570378

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE 2

PTF OF MISSION ABORTING MISSION

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDESS)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission_____PTF Abort (C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG_____DTG_____Z (Mission Details Msg)

1. (TS) PARBOIL(C) Mission (No.) (Spell Out) position_____N/ _____E at_____Z. PTF_____aborting due gyro failure/ engine failure/radar failure returning to base on course_____degrees, speed_____knots. ETA base_____Z. PTF_____and_____ continuing on mission.

2. (S) Details of mission contained Ref A

GP-1

MORI DocID. 570378

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE 3

RECOVERY MESSAGE ON AN ABORT MISSION

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCD: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Mission_____Recovery(C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG_____DTG_____Z(Msn Details on current msn)

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG_____DTG_____Z (Msn Details intended msn)

1. (S) PARBOIL(C) Mission_____(Spell Out) recovered Danang_____Z. Mission Details contained Ref A.

2. (S) Intend launch PARBOIL(C) mission_____(Spell Out) (Day/Month). Code word for this msn is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Reg B

3. (S) Msn_____will be/will not be rescheduled/at a later date/and is considered complete.

GP-4

Tab 2 to
Annex D to
Appendix C

MORI DocID: 570378

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE 4

CANCELLATION

(MSN NOT TO BE RESCHEDULED)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Msn_____(C)

REF: A. (Msn Details Msg - Cancelled Msn)

B. (Msn Details Msg - Intended Msn)

1. (S) PARBOIL(C) Msn_____(Spell Out) cancelled due enemy build-up in area/coastal defense batteries in area/non-receipt pre-strike photography will not be rescheduled. Details of msn contained Ref A.

2. (S) Intend launch PARBOIL(C) Msn_____(Spell Out) (Day/Month). Code word for this msn is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Ref B.

GP-4

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

CANCELLATION

(MSN TO BE RESCHEDULED)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDESS)

S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Msn_____Cancellation (C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details - Cancelled Mission)

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details - Intended Mission)

1. (S) PARBOIL(C) Msn_____(Spell Out) launch cancelled due adverse weather/non-availability of PTFs. Msn will be rescheduled at a later date. Msn details contained Ref A.

2. (S) Intend launch msn_____(Spell Out) (day/month). Code word for this msn is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Ref B.

GP-4

MORI DocID: 570378

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

(BATTLE DAMAGE/LOSS)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH

TO: CTU 77.0.1 ----------CDR SAR Unit DDs

CTE 77.0.1.1---------Northern SAR Unit DDs

CTE 77.o.1.2---------Southern SAR Unit DDS

CTG 77.0----------Yankee Team CDR

CTG 77.1----------SEA DRAGON OTC

CTG 77.1.1----------SEA DRAGON DDs

CTG 77.1.2----------SEA DRAGON DDs

INFO: CTF 77/CINCPACFLT/CINCPAC/JCS/CTE 70.2.1.1./COMSEVENTHFLT/CTE 70.2.1.2

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Msn_____Request for assistance (C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details Msg)

1. (TS) PARBOIL(C) Msn_____(Spell Out) under attack by enemy aircraft position_____N/_____E at_____Z. PTFs damaged and crew wounded. Request SAR unit rendezvous with msn craft and render assistance.

2. (S) Msn proceeding on course_____degree, speed_____knots. Msn details contained Ref A.

GP-1

MORI DocID: 570378

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

(OPERATIONAL LOSS)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH

TO: CTG 77.0

CTE 77.0.1

CTU 77.1.1

INFO: CTF 77

COMSEVENTHFLT

CINCPACFLT

CINCPAC

JCS

CTE 70.2.1.1

T O P S E C R E T LEMDIS/TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL(C) Msn_____Request for Assistance (C)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details Msg)

1. (TS) PARBOIL(C) Msn _____(Spell Out) has one PTF aground position_____N/_____E at_____Z. Crew removed to other msn craft. Msn proceeding to base on course_____ speed_____ knots. Msn details contained Ref A.

2. (TS) Request first light visual recce of aground PTF to insure destruction complete. If craft is visible req air strike to insure destruction.

GP-1

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TAB 3

U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT
Drawer 19
APO San Francisco 96337

SECRET

USNADINST 003100.2B
10
19 July 1969

USNAD INSTRUCTION 003100.2B

From: Officer in Charge, U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for USNAD Operations in RVN (USNADOPSRVN) (C)

Encl: (1) USNADOPSRVN - Standard Operating Procedures
(2) USNADOPSRVN - Communications
(3) USNADOPSRVN - Coordination
(4) Special Orders for CPDO FOR USNADOPSRVN

1. Purpose. To promulgate the SOP containing standard guidance and basic policy for the composition, operation and adminstration of USNADOPSRVN.

2. Additions and Changes. Additions and changes to this SOP will be published as required. Recommendations for changes are solicited and will be submitted to the OIC USNAD via Chief of Operations and Training, USNAD.

3. Scope. This SOP provies basic guidance for the conduct of operations in RVN by USNAD. It is a single source reference document for operational personnel whose duties require the information contained herein.

4. Action All USNAD personnel are responsible for carrying out the policies and procedures set forth in this SOP.

C. T. EDSON

Distribution: (2 cys)
MACV (SOG)
OIC SEAL/RECON
CG III MAF

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NAD CONTROL #0099-69

MORI DocID: 570378

SECRET

USNADINST 003100.2B
19 July 1969

USNADOPSRVN - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

MISSION, CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATION

1. Purpose. The purpose of USNAD Operations in the Republic Vietnam under the direction and operational control of OIC USNAD Da Nang and with the full cognizance of Chief, SOG, CG III MAF and CG, I Corps, is to provide training in RVN under actual combat conditions in preparation for subsequent operations.

2. Mission. USNAD Action Teams are capable of performing the following type missions:

a. Capture of adult, male prisoners.

(1) Capture of predesignated prisoners.

b. Combat patrols.

(1) Limited scale raids.

(2) Limited scale ambushes.

c. Intelligence gathering missions.

3. Concept of Employment.

a. Action Teams will be employed based on intelligence gathered from multi-sources which indicate a target of opportunity within the capability of one or more action teams and when the target is approved by OIC NAD.

b. Action teams will generally be employed only in over-beach type operations utilizing the afloat assets of USNAD to insert and extract. Action teams will receive sufficient training to insure they are prepared for alternate methods of insertion, extraction, i.e., helicopter, foot, and parachute should these methods be utilized.

c. When action teams are employed in conjunction with afloat assets, insertion and extraction will generally be accomplished as follows: (Exact method depends of tactical situation.)

(1) PTF/Swift will close the beach to approximately 5000 meters. Teams will be launched in RB-12's (Point ALFA) and radar vectored toward a predesignated landing point. RB-12's will close to 1000 meters using

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outboard motors (Point BRAVO). Outboard motors will be cut off and RB-12's paddled to 500 meters off landing point (Point CHARLIE). Team enters the water and swims toward beach Team will halt in waist deep water and 2 scout swimmers will be sent ashore to check the immediate area for any enemy activity. On receiving an all clear, team will move ashore and accomplish mission.

(2) After team has left RB-12's, RB-12's will remain in the vicinity of Point BRAVO for the purpose of relaying any radio messages to the PTF/Swift and also should emergency extraction be necessary PTF/Swift will remain in the vicinity of Point ALFA prepared to close the beach to assist in emergency extraction and/or provide fire support.

(3) Extraction under normal conditions will be the reverse of insertion procedures. Under emergency conditions RB-12's will approach the beach under power, retrieve teams and depart under power. PTF/Swift will close to minimum safe distance and provide fire support.

4. Organization.

a. Action teams will be composed of 15 men. Specific missions may require the addition of specialized personnel. U.S. Advisors will not accompany action teams unless the complexity of the mission warrants it A minimum of 2 U.S. Advisors will accompany designated missions. OIC NAD or his designated representative will determine which missions will have U.S. Advisory personnel.

b In order to provide a sufficient number of U.S. Advisory to accompany specific missions, the following personnel are authorized to participate in combat operations when directed.

(1) SEAL/RECON Detachment Personnel.

(2) NAD Staff personnel to include:

(a) OIC

(b) Chief Operations and Training

(c) Chief Training

(d) Operations Officer

(e) Training Officer

(f) One RM, ET and EN per craft assigned to mission.

c. U. S. Personnel assigned to accompany combat missions will do so in the capacity of advisor/observer. Enlisted NAD/MST personnel will remain on craft to which assigned and assist as necessary to effect repairs.

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Unless directed otherwise, they will remain clear of all other operations.

d. Intelligence.

(1) The NAD Intelligence staff will provide all necessary briefs pertaining to enemy order of battle, terrain, hydrography and latest enemy activity in designated area of operation. Any specific EEI's shall be prepared compatible with the assigned mission.

(2) In the event prisoners are captured they will be returned to the designated holding/interrogation compound and made available to personnel of the NAD Security Section and the Intelligence Officer. When the above personnel have concluded their interrogations, the prisoners will be turned over to appropriate agencies.

(3) Information derived from NAD interrogations of prisoners will be delivered to Chief, SOG, CG I Corps, Chief of Staff, I Corps via CDR, CSS and CG III MAF as appropriate.

e. Operations Liaison Team. On all missions, a U.S. operations liaison team will be aboard the OTC craft. The team will assist as necessary in planning and coordinating available U. S. supporting arms. On arrival in the objective area, the team will establish contact with U. S. fire support units in the area and establish on call fire support missions. The team will also obtain as nedessary, CAS and MEDEVAC support. The team will normally consist of an officer from the Operations Section and an ET to man the radio. If necessary, an officer may constitute the "team" and maintain communications with the supporting units.

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USNADINST C03100.2B
19 July 1969

USNADOPSRVN COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communications for USNADOPSRVN in RVN is required as follows:

a. From USNAD Base to PTF/Swift.

b. From PTF/Swift to RB-12's

c. PTF/Swift to RB-12 to action team.

d. From Operations Section Liaison Team aboard PTF/Swift to U.S. Supporting Units.

2. Communications equipment to accomplish the communications tasks is as follows:

a PTF's and Swift's.

(1) AN/URC-46 for communication with USNAD Base (PCF).

(2) AN/GRC-94 for communication with USNAD base (PTF).

(3) TR-20 inter boat communications and secondary communications with action platoons.

(4) PRC-25 for communications to RB-12/Action Team.

b. RB-12's/Action Teams.

(1) PRC-25 for communication between RB-12 and teams.

(2) PP-11 for communication between team and RB-12 if team does not take PRC-25 ashore.

c. Operations Section Liaison Team.

(1) PRC-25 for communications to U. S. supporting arms.

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Enclosure (2)

3. Call Signs.

a. Assigned as follows

Unit	Call Sign	CW Call Sign
Ops Section Liaison Team	HALSEY	
PTF's	MOONSHINE	
SWIFTS		
ACTION TEAMS	TEAM NAMES	
S/W BASE		
DODO		

b If more thatn one PTF is used, the others will be designated numerically, i.e., MOONSHINE ONE, etc. Additional CW Call Signs will be promulgated as necessary.

4. Frequencies.

a. The following frequencies are designated for use by RS-1.

Transmit	Receive
(1) 4069.3 KC Primary	8217 KC
(2) 4258 KC	4632 KC Primary
(3) 6220 KC	3493 KC

b NAD Base and boat guard singleside band (SSB) voice.

(1) 4517 KC Primary.

(2) 5405 KC Secondary.

(3) DODO provide relay if necessary.

c. Frequencies for AN/ARC-27, TR-20, PP-11 and PRC-25 will be designated for each mission.

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5. Mission Preparation.

a. One hour prior to departure from base all communications equipment will be tested and tuned to peak performance, and this condition reported to the senior mission officer, and NAD Communications Officer.

b. Communications between boats will be conducted on the AN/ARC-27 and TR-20 and will be minimum required for tactical requirements.

c. Communications with base will be conducted on RS-1 or HE-107 according to the following schedule:

(1) One hour after departing base.

(2) Team launch.

(3) Team recovery to include number of casualties/prisoners.

(4) Any unusual occurrence.

d. NAD Base will guard mission frequency continually from departure to return of mission.

6. Challange/Reply signals and shackle codes for dates of mission will be obtained from base prior to departure.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

MORI DocID: 570378

COORDINATION

1. Coordination

a. Area Clearance. To assure clearance of the proposed objective area, a written request for clearance must be submitted to G-3 (Ground Ops) III MAF a minimum of 72 hours prior to the requested date as well as a parallel request through VN Channels to I Corps G-3 (Ground Ops). There is no policy concerning maximum time a request for clearance may be submitted. However, in most instances, 7 to 10 days prior to the requested date is more than sufficient. This procedure may vary in areas other than I Corps.

b. Intent Message. A minimum of 72 hours is required by Chief SOG before execution of an NAD operation in RVN Notification will be by message and in the following format.

(1) Launch/Recovery Time PTF.
Launch/Recovery Action Team.

(2) Unit.

(3) Objective area and mission.

(4) Requesting agency.

(5) Enemy activity.

If clearance for the objective area has not been secured prior to the intent message an additional paragraph "6" will be added stating area clearance by III MAF and I Corps pending. A subsequent message is necessary to inform Chief SOG when area clearance is secured.

c. Supporting Arms. A representative from the Operations Section will make liaison with the III MAF Artillery Officer on a weekly basis in order to remain current concerning disposition of batteries in I Corps. Once an objective area has been chosen, every attempt will be made by the Operations Section to establish personal contact with the nearest artillery batteries to the objective area in order to secure the fire

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Enclosure (3)

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE C-d-120 Appendix C

MORI DocID: 570378

support necessary to support the operation. In addition to providing artillery support, the artillery unit FSCC should be aware of the possible requirement for [redacted] MEDEVAC aircraft. In operating areas other than I Corps the same procedures will be followed to insure the necessary fire support. (b)(1) (b)(3)

d. Debrief. Action Team and Operations Liaison Team will be debriefed by the Intelligence Officer immediately on return to NAD Base. The Intelligence Officer will prepare a complete debrief for transmission to Chief, SOG within 6 hours of the action team/s return to NAD Base.

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SECRET

USNADINST C03100.2B
19 July 1969

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR CP DUTY OFFICER DURING NADGPSRVN

1. The orders contained herein are in addition to those contained in USNAD Instruction 1601.1D of 16 June 1969.

2. During the conduct of operations in RVN, the CPDO will insure that he has been thoroughly briefed prior to launch, further, he will insure that he is available to communications personnel from the launch craft in accordance with paragraph 5 of enclosure (2).

3. The CPDO will, in the event of receipt of an OPSRVN message containing notification of unusual occurrences, notify Chief Operations and Training or OIC immediately and in that specific sequence. The above action procedure will also be accomplished in the event any of the mandatory reports as described in the PTF COMPLAN for the particular mission are more than one-half (1/2) hour late.

4. The CPDO will insure that a Hospital Corpsman is available at all times, either at Camp Fay or lower base when OPSRVN are being conducted.

5. The CPDO will, upon notification from the mission craft that they have prisoners, will immediately notify one of the USNAD Security Officers, giving number of "POTATOES" and their ETA.

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
Enclosure (4)

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

TAB 4

RECRUITMENT CONTRACT FOR CIVILIAN TEAM AGENTS IN THE SERVICE OF CSS

This contract is made between the Commander, CSS, and

Mr. _____ born on _____

at _____ IDC _____ issued on _____

at _____, son of Mr. _____ and Mrs. _____

_____, family status _____

wife's name _____, present address _____

_____ WHO VOLUNTEERED FOR SERVICE with the CSS as a

_____.

The two parties have agreed on the following points:

a) That upon execution of this contract the enlisted is entitled to a monthly salary and allowance:

Monthly Salary	(During training	2,600$00
	(During operation	4,500$00
Allowance	(Legal wife	455$00
	(Each child (under 16 years old)	325$00

b) That after six (6) months of satisfactory service after the execution of this contract, the enlistee is entitled to a 500$00 piasters inducement bonus.

c) That the enlistee or the officially designated beneficiary is entitled to a prorated share of the inducement bonus based on the number of months service since the last award, should the enlistee be separated from the service of the CSS for reasons of:

- KIA
- Death in the line of duty
- POW
- MIA
- Disability incurred in the line of duty

d) That the enlistee is entitled to receive the recruitment and inducement bonuses either in a lump sum or in a prorated monthly allowance over the period of the term of enlistment.

e) That the first term of enlistment must be for a minimum of 24 (twenty-four) months, not including the duration of the training period, while the second and subsequent enlistments may be for a period of twenty (20) months (it approved by the Commander, CSS).

f) That the enlistee agrees to serve in the CSS for a period of from _____ to _____.

g) That upon each penetration of a hostile area, the enlistee is entitled to a hazardous duty of 3,000$00 piasters. If fired upon in case of engagement with the enemy (when on mission or training exercise), the enlistee is entitled to an engagement allowance of 100 piasters and to a hostile area penetration allowance of 150 piasters per day.

h) That the enlistee is authorized a ration allowance in accordance with the following schedule:

Daily	Mission	Holidays
80 piasters	100 piasters	160 piasters

If issued with C-rations, the enlistee will not be entitled to the ration allowance.
(Note: Following 5 holidays are recognized: NEW YEAR, TET, XMAS, BUDCHA BIRTH DAY, NATIONAL DAY.)

i) That a disability gratuity is authorized in accordance with the following schedule:

Disability	Category	Gratuity
- Loss of one limb	50 o/o	Pay and allowance for 1 year
- Loss of two limbs	100 o/o	Pay and allowance for 1 year
- Loss of sight, one eye	25 o/o	Pay and allowance for 1 year
- Loss of sight, both eyes	100 o/o	Pay and allowance for 1 year
- Loss of hearing, one ear	25 o/o	Pay and allowance for 1 year
- Loss of hearing, both ears	100 o/o	Pay and allowance for 1 year

(Miscellaneous disability payments to be determined by Headquarters, SAIGON)

j) That a death gratuity consisting of pays, and allowances for a period of one year, including family allowances, jump allowances, diving allowances, and of two (2) awards of the inducement bonus is authorized for payment to the officially designated beneficiary, or next-of-kin (in the following order of closeness: wife, children, parents or godfather, brothers-sisters, paternal grandparents) if death in action, or in the line of duty occurs while in the service of the CSS.

Should the party to this contract be reported missing in action, his monthly pay and allowance will continue to be paid to the officially designated beneficiary, or next-of-kin for a period of three (3) months. After this 3-month period, if he remains missing in action, he will be presumed dead, and his beneficiary, or next-of-kin will be allowed to draw the death benefit as stated above.

k) That a funeral gratuity not to exceed 6,000$00 piasters will be authorized for payment to his family if the enlistee is killed in action, or dies in the line of duty and if his family takes care of all funeral expenses.

l) That appropriate recommendation, and award will be made by the CSS in case of outstanding performance of duty.

m) That the enlistee agrees to serve anywhere in VN territory (North, South, or Central).

n) That the enlistee will support the government of VN against its enemies, and obey all rules, regulations and orders of his superiors in the service of the CSS.

o) That the enlistee agrees not to disclose any information relative to the activities of the CSS and not to seek information in matters which are not absolutely essential to the tasks assigned.

p) That the enlistee remains subject to military law and discipline during the period of his service with the CSS, and may be prosecuted under such law for any violations on the terms of this contract.

q) This contract terminates _____

Date _____
(Signature of the Enlistee)

_____
(Signature of Witnessing Officer)

CERTIFIED COPY

APPROVED
A.P.O., 35.50, date
(Commander of CSS, Signed)

TAB 5

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX

(Prepared by MACSOG J-31 - 1 May 1969 as revised 15 July 1969)

"The attached personnel breakdown for NAD and CSS, Maritime Studies Group of MACSOG, was conducted on 1 May 1969.

References.

"a. MACSOG LOI of 23 Nov 67 - Civilian TD for NAD/CSS
"b. MACSOG JTD dtd March 1969 - Approved on 21 May 1969 US Military Allowance for SOG.
"c. Strategic Technical Directorate/JGS 40-201C TO&E for UN Army Personnel STD/CSS
"d. Strategic Technical Directorate/JGS TO&E for VN Navy Personnel STD/CSS Approved in March 1969

"The tables are made up of three columns. The allowance is current as of 1 May 1969. The proposed change is the recommended level to maintain operational status as of the standdown on 1 November 1968. The on-board count is the actual personnel attached to SOG-NAD/CSS as of 1 May 1969.

"SOG-31 (Maritime Studies Branch) has proposed the reduction of PTFs from 13 to 7 and reducing the action teams to 2 40-man teams vice 4 15-man teams. This is pending JCS approval. When approved, it is intended to change the proposal as follows:

"(1) Reduce boat crews to 7 from 12.

"(2) Reduce action teams to 40 from 60.

"(3) Close BLACK ROCK and move teams into UPPER BASE.

"(4) Completely eliminate the VN Army attached to CSS.

"These proposed changes are in parentheses and will be submitted when the JCS approve reducing the boats to 7.

"This will reduce actual people assigned by 166 as follows: 89 VN Army; 13 VN Navy; 64 VN Civilians.

"NAD/CSS STRUCTURE

As of 1 May 1969



-------- Coordination
_____ Command

a/ PSYOPS Radio Stations Security Force Only"

"NAD US MILITARY

(Per MACSOG JTD)

	Old Allowance	New JTD	On-Board
Commander	1	1	1
Admin	3	4	3
Ops/Train	16	12	19
Sgal/Recon	8	3	10
Support	10	8	9
Public Works	3	2	3
Security	7	4	6
MST	39	39	39
	87	73	90

As of 1 May 1969

New JTD approved in June 1969 and NAD now reducing to new figure of 73."

"NAD CIVILIAN STRENGTH BREAKOUT

	Allowance	Proposed Allowance	On-Board
Admin	6	5	5
Supply	8	7	7
Public Works	18	14	13
Building/Grounds	86	58	54
Utilities	41	27	20
Construction	47	27	24
Transportation/Maintenance	68	46	40
Black Rock Maintenance	42	(16)a/	(14)a/
Security	48	48	46
MST	31	22	20
	395	270	243
As of 1 May 1969		(254)b/	(Reduce 14)b/

a/ Delete: Proposed closure CAMP BLACK ROCK
b/ Proposed change if reduce to 7 PTFs."

"CSS VN NAVY STRENGTH BREAKOUT

	Allowance	Proposed Change	On-Board
Headquarters	4	4	2
Personnel	4	4	2
Intelligence	2	2(5)a/	4
Ops/Training	7	7(10)a/	4
Logistics	5	5	2
Maritime Ops	4	4	3
Boat Support	68	68	57
Maritime Patrol	17	17	17
Boat Crews (PTF)	259	259(153)a/	219
CADO Teams	42	40	13
	412	410	323

As of 1 May 1969 (310)a/(Reduce 13)a/

a/ Proposed change if JCS authorized reduction to 7 PTFs."

"CSS VN ARMY STRENGTH BREAKOUT

	Allowance	Proposed Change	On-Board
Headquarters	2	2	2
Personnel	3	3	3
Intelligence	15	15	14
Ops/Training	3	3	2
PSYOPS	3	3	2
Communications	6	6	6
Logistics	13	13	11
CADO Teams	127	40	37
Security	12	12	12
	184	97	89

As of 1 May 1969 (0)a/ (Reduce 89)a/

a/ Delete all Army if reduced to 7 PTFs."

CSS CIVILIAN STRENGTH BREAKOUT

	Allowance	Proposed Change	On-Board
CDR's Office	2	2	2
Admin	4	4	2
Intelligence	1	1	1
Ops/Training	2	2	1
Logistics	11	11	9
Social Welfare	9	9	5
Communications	4	0	4
Navy Base	36	36	29
Black Rock	34	34 (Delete)a/	26
CIDG Bn.	350	250 (150)a/	185
CADO Team	200	40b/	32
Boat Crew (PTF/PCF)	249	25b/(12)a/	22
	902	414	317
As of 1 May 1969		(267)a/ (Reduce 50)a/	

a/ Proposed change if reduced to 7 PTFs.
b/ Normally a military billet. Civilians used to fill teams to authorized levels."

"NAD/CSS PERSONNEL SUMMARY

Civilian	Allowances	Proposed Change	On Board
NAD	395	270(254)a/	243
CSS	902	414(267)a/	314
	1297	684(521)a/	557
Military			
US (Navy/MC)	87	73(73)a/	90
CSS (VNN)	412	410(310)a/	323
CSS (VNA)	184	97(0)a/	89
	683	580(383)a/	502
Totals	1980	1264	1059
As of 1 May 1969		(904)a/	

a/Proposed change if reduced to 7 PFT."

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TAB 6

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION - PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

Ref. (a) SECNAVINST 1650.1D (U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Award Manual)

1. In accordance with reference (a), it is recommended that the officers and men who served with the U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment and the Coastal Security, Vietnamese Navy during the period 1 January 1968 to 31 May 1969, be awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for heroic and outstanding performance of duty.

2. Recommendation for this award is based on the following achievements of the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment, Danang and the Coastal Security Service, Vietnamese Navy:

a. The U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment advised, supplied, and provided maintenance for the Coastal Security Service, Vietnamese Navy during the cited time period. These forces conducted clandestine operations in South East Asia at the behest of the highest United States and Vietnamese civilian and military authorities. The operations were conducted by small units in widely divergent hostile areas. Operational missions involved the interdiction of water craft, taking of prisoners, conduct of psychological warfare and intelligence gathering. In the conduct of these missions the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service have performed with uncommon valor and dedication to duty not normally found in a joint unit of this size.

b. In one classified operational area assigned to the combined units over 140 comoat missions were conducted in a relatively short time period. That was the largest number of operations ever conducted in that particular area of South East Asia by U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service units. The missions accounted for the destruction of 41 enemy craft ranging in size from small armed junks to a trawler An estimated 80 combatant crewmembers of these vessels were killed. 185 prisoners of varying types were also taken. Costs to the combined units of U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment and the Coastal Security Service was four killed in action, four missing in action and 10 wounded.

c. In January 1968, the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and the Coastal Security Service, Vietnamese Navy commenced cross beach night operations in another area long denied access to friendly forces. The direct result of these operations will have far reaching effects on the overall Free World Force effort in South East Asia. Utilizing high speed sophisticated patrol craft, the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and the Vietnamese Coastal Security Service operated both overtly during daylight hours, and clandestinely at night disguised as a VC Military Patrol, under

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varying degrees of adverse weather, including heavy seas and reduced visibility. In this area, the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service have been directly responsible for 92 hard-core VC/VCI captives, over 90 VC/NVA killed, and seven (7) known wounded at a cost of seven (7) friendly killed in action and 16 wounded in action. The killed and captured VC and VCI represented the nucleus of their respective village VC Infrastructures. By the elimination of these individuals, years of preparation were destroyed, and planning for eventual VC/NVA takeover in that area was disrupted. The harm inflicted by their loss is immeasurable in terms of body count, and must be viewed in terms of the people under enemy control and in view of the various areas long considered VC sanctuaries being denied to the enemy. The psychological impact upon the VC/VCI fo not knowing where or when to expect attack has, in many cases, destroyed their morale and desire to fight, and has caused distrust and suspension to be sown amongst their own ranks.

d. The Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service Intelligence and Counterintelligence sections, operating in conjunction with the action teams of the command, have collected, correlated and exploited various VC/VCI targets with the following results:

(1) 417 VCI (Confirmed) apprehended.

(2) 689 VC/VCI black listed as a result of interrogations.

(3) Two (2) VC Sapper cells successfully penetrated and subsequently neutralized.

(4) Two (2) Province Level CVI Cadre apprehended.

(5) The entire family (7 members) of a Hoi Chanh being extracted from a VC controlled area.

e. Based on intelligence collected by this combined unit, part of which is contained in sub-paragraph d. above, Operation Daring Rebel/ Vu-Minh 03 was conducted by Free World Forces, resulting in over 400 VC killed in action, 200 VC captives, approximately 40 VC suspects being apprehended, a great number of individual and crew served weapons being captured, and numerous weapons and food caches being destroyed.

f. On 21 November 1968, a team of six Vietnamese and several Naval Advisory Detachment personnel penetrated 14 kilometers into a Vietcong Secret Zone known as the Le Hong Phong Forest in search of a Vietcong hamlet. The existence of this particular hamlet was not known by

Vietnamese authorities until a Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service prisoner revealed the fact. Inasmuch as the area was completely outside the support of any friendly artillery, friendly forces did not penetrate the area. After moving through the forest all night the team found the hamlet guerrillas was killed, eight hamlet inhabitants were returned to South Vietnamese control, and the complete files of the Assistant Vietcong Village Chief were confiscated with no casualties to the team

g. The night of 14 January 1969 found one of the Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service teams looking for the squad leader of an NVA squad and the Village Security Chief in a VC hamlet. Both men, as well as two other NVA soldiers, were killed. As a result, three remaining North Vietnamese soldiers left the hamlet where they had been involved in a Vietcong version of the American Combined Action Program.

h. A daylight raid conducted by Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service teams on 7 April 1969 resulted in the liberation of the family of a Hoi Chanh, destruction of approximately weven tons of cached rice, and the deaths of forty of the members of the two Vietcong platoons encountered. The detailed planning and execution of this raid was complicated in that artillery, air, and host support came from diverse units outside the realm of this comoined US/VNN unit. The professional manner in which the raid was conducted enabled Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service personnel to overcome enemy odds that exceeded a two-to-one ratio.

i Functioning under the Naval Advisory Detachment, the Mobile Support Team, Danang, operated an advance support base for highly sophisticated, high speed patrol craft, performing major repairs and maintenance under austere conditions. At no time were fewer than 60% of assigned craft ready for service, and for the greater portion of the period under consideration material readiness was in excess of 85% On two occasions, a total of four boats with severs battle damage were returned to service within 36 hours. One of these incidents involved two boats which had taken heavy weapons hits, causing not only major structural damage, but in one case resulting in the destruction of a main engine transmission and severe damage to the engine itself. Comparable repair had hitherto been accomplished only at a major repair facility. On another occasion a boat which had suffered extensive hull damage as a result of a collision was brought back to base in a sinking condition Within ten days, Mobile Support Team, utilizing existing manpower, had the craft back in service after completion of extensive repairs that would normally be accomplished by a major repair facility. This included the

first night dry docking and undocking and the first complete replacement and alignment of struts and shafts ever accomplished on site. In spite of a 40% reduction in on site manpower, achievements of this sort have become a matter of routine, not only to Mobile Support Team, but also to the Vietnamese Navy Maintenance Training Team, whose high level of performance and technical know how is directly attributable to the skill and energy demonstrated by Mobile Support Team During this same period, four patrol craft were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy for maintenance, using Vietnamese Maintenance Training Team crews which had been trained on the job by Mobile Support Team personnel. As a result of consistently outstanding performance of the Mobile Support Team, the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and Coastal Security Service was able to meet every single operational commitment.

3. The Naval Advisory Detachment/Coastal Security Service performance of duty throughout this period have been consistently outstanding and directly attributable to the ingenuity, devotion to duty, and superior ability of the officers and men assigned. The overall aggressiveness and courage displayed has resulted in a significant contribution to the efforts of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States in their combined efforts against the North Vietnamese/Vietcong aggression. They have earned distinction for themselves, their unit, and the United States Navy.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and the Vietnamese Coastal Security Service, Danang, Republic of Vietnam, for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces in the Repuolic of Vietnam from 1 January 1968 to 31 May 1969. Throughout this period, the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment and the Vietnamese Coastal Security Service, (tasked with the mission of interdicting water craft, capturing prisoners, conducting psychological operations and conducting cross beach operations throughout the I, II and III Corps areas in the Republic of Vietnam) performed their assigned mission with uncommon valor and with a dedication to duty not normally found in a unit of their size. Besides being tasked with other operations in another portion of Southeast Asia, in January 1968 the combined unit commenced cross beach night operations in areas long denied access to friendly forces. The combined unit operated with high speed, sophisticated patrol craft, and conducted operations both overtly during daylight hours, and clandestinely at night under varying degrees of adverse weather. The combined unit was directly responsible for the destruction of enemy craft, capture of many hardcore VC/VCI, over 170 VC/NVA killed at a cost of only 11 friendly forces killed in action, 16 wounded in action and 4 missing in action. The direct kills attributed to the combined unit represented the nucleus of their respective village Viet Cong Infrastructures and defense forces. By their elimination, years of preparation were destroyed, and planning for the eventual VC/NVA takeover of the area were effectively disrupted. The combined Intelligence and Counterintelligence branches of NAD/CSS were in a large part responsible for the successful operation known as Daring Rebel/VuMinh 03, conducted by Free World Forces, which resulted in over 500 Viet Cong kills, 200 Viet Cong captives, approximately 40 Viet Cong suspects apprehended, a great number of individual and crew served weapons captured and numerous weapons and food caches destroyed. In November 1968, Naval Advisory Detachment/Coastal Security Service personnel, penetrated 14 kilometers into a Viet Cong secret zone known as the Le Hong Phong Forest in search of a Viet Cong Hamlet. The existence of this particular hamlet was not known by Vietnamese authorities until a NAD/CSS prisoner revealed the fact. Without the benefit of friendly artillery support and after moving through the forest all night, the group found that hamlet at first light. The result of the ensuing firefight was one of five hamlet guerrillas killed, eight hamlet inhabitants returned to Republic of Vietnam control, and the complete files of the Assistant Viet Cong Village Chief confiscated. This was at

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a cost of no lives to the group On 7 April 1969, Naval Advisory Detachment/Coastal Security Service Teams conducted a daylight raid which resulted in the liberation of the family of a Hoi Chanh, destruction of approximately seven tons of cached rice, and the deaths of forty members of two Viet Cong Platoons encountered. The detailed planning and execution of this raid was complicated in that artillery, air and boat support came from diverse units outside the NAD/CSS. The professional manner in which the raid was conducted enabled the combined unit personnel to overcome enemy odds that exceeded a two-toone ratio. The maintenance effort involved in ensuring readiness of the sophisticated weapons systems available to the combined unit has been never-endingly innovative and professionaly sound. The Naval Advisory Detachment/ Coastal Security Service performance of duty throughout this period was consistently outstanding and was directly attributable to the ingenuity, devotion to duty, and superior ability of the officers and men assigned. The overall aggressiveness and courage displayed has resulted in a significant contribution to the efforts of the joint United States/ Republic of Vietnam Forces against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong aggression. They have earned distinction for themselves, their unit, and the United States Navy.

All persons attached to and serving with the U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment/Coastal Security Service, Danang, Republic of Vietnam, during the above designated period, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the Presidential Unit Citation.