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14 September 1961

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on:

GENERAL DISARMAMENT - LINKAGE ISSUE (U)

The attached memorandum by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM-359-61, dated 12 September 1961, memoranda by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 28 August and 30 August 1961; two memoranda by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated 29 August 1961, and US Disarmament Proposals dated 18 August 1961 are circulated for information.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

CM-359-61  
12 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: General Disarmament -- Linkage Issue  
Reference: Memo for Secretary of Defense and CJCS from  
Deputy Secretary of Defense Dated 31 August 1961

1. I agree with the suggestion in the referenced memorandum that the "linkage" issue should not be reopened with the President at this time.

2. My understanding of the President's action at the Principals' meeting on 17 August 1961 is in accord with that expressed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy in his memorandum of 29 August 1961 and with paragraph one of the minute approved by the President on that date.

/s/ L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Re SAACM-110-61

cc: Director, JS  
SAAC  
Director, J-5  
Secretary, JCS

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington 25, D. C.

31 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: General Disarmament--Linkage Issue

From Mr. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum to me of August 29 regarding the discussion on the above subject at the meeting with the President on August 17, you will note that the "linkage" issue has been left open for reargument later without prejudice to either side of the case. In the light of developments since the August 17 meeting, I am willing to leave the linkage issue in its present posture and not ask Mr. Bundy to reopen the matter with the President. If either of you have a different view, will you let me know.

/s/ ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington

August 29, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. ROSWELL GILPATRIC

The attached minute being issued on the decisions reached at the President's August 17 meeting with his principal disarmament advisers should clear up the matter referred to in your note to me of August 28.

As our informal notes indicate, the discussion did at one point go in the direction you mention. Subsequently, however, it was argued we should leave the "linkage" issue open for re-argument, without prejudice to either side of the case. The President confirmed this understanding in approving the minute, which I believe fully protects the Defense position. If you would like me to re-open the issue with him, however, I will be glad to do so.

/s/ McGEORGE BUNDY

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington

August 29, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT ON DISARMAMENT  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

At his meeting on August 17, 1961 with the Committee of Principals on disarmament matters, the President:

1. Noted that the omission of any language linking Stage 1 measures on strategic delivery vehicles or fissionable materials with measures on conventional arms and force reductions in the proposed US disarmament program was without prejudice to the merits of this issue. If the US actually became engaged in serious negotiations about such measures, the question of linking them would be examined at that time.

2. Approved the new proposals for Ambassador Dean to present in the Test Ban Conference at Geneva, with the amendment that instead of proposing total elimination of any threshold, the US would propose putting this threshold as low as scientifically possible. However, the US delegation could point out that the US would in practice be willing to reduce the threshold as far as Soviet acceptance of controls would permit. Thus, if there were sufficient controls the treaty threshold could in effect be removed for all practical purposes.

3. Directed that the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC, recommend the appropriate time for the AEC to make an announcement about the resumption of contingent preparations for nuclear testing and for the President

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to issue a statement that this did not mean we were resuming tests at any given time. The above group should also consider whether there should be any announcement at the time of actual resumption of tests.

The President later indicated his belief that it would probably not be appropriate to have public announcement on these matters before the UN General Assembly.

/s/ McGEORGE BUNDY

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28 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: General Disarmament-Linkage Issue

After the meeting of Principals with the President on August 17, 1961, I dictated the following note:

"At this afternoon's meeting with the President on disarmament Mr. McCloy's August 11, 1961, paper on that subject was approved by the President with the understanding (which will be recorded in the minutes) that reductions in force levels and reductions in nuclear capabilities will be done concurrently. In other words, the President has made a determination that the term, "balanced", as in the present paper, means concurrent. On the basis of that interpretation Defense accepted Mr. McCloy's paper."

Now I am told that those in Mr. McCloy's office do not share Mr. McNamara's and my recollection of what occurred at the meeting. In order to avoid misunderstanding, will you circulate a minute covering the outcome of the discussion on the linkage issue.

Mr. McNamara and I understand that, if the Foster Panel comes up with proposals differing from those reflected in Mr. McCloy's paper, then of course there will be further discussion among the Principals and presumably with the President.

/s/ ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

cc: Mr. McNaughton (ISA)

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UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

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DISARMAMENT DOCUMENT SERIES  
MEMO #145  
August 18, 1961

U.S. Disarmament Proposals  
August 18, 1961

There is attached hereto the draft of the United States disarmament proposals as approved by the President at a meeting with the Principals on August 17, following the discussion at that meeting.

Beatrice R. Puckett  
Staff Assistant for Communications  
Room 5672-B NS  
Ext. 6783

Attachment:

August 18 U.S. Proposal.

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State-RD

August 18, 1961

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The following is submitted by the United States of America as a proposed Joint Declaration on Disarmament, for approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a guide for the negotiation of a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

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JOINT DECLARATION

ON DISARMAMENT:

A PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE  
DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of

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- 2 -

justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

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(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Propose to the negotiating states that:

(a) Their task shall be the development of a program of general and complete disarmament; their efforts shall continue without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;

(b) To this end they shall seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) They shall -- without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program -- also seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be

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- 4 -

carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

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- 5 -

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress

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- 6 -

of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and USSR and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

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- 7 -

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons undertake to retain in their own hands such control over the weapons as is required effectively to prevent their use by states not now owning nuclear weapons. States not now owning nuclear weapons undertake not to develop or manufacture them or to obtain control of the use of those belonging to other states. States possessing technology or materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such technology or materials for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons to states not now possessing such technology or materials. States not possessing such technology or materials undertake

not to seek or receive such technology or materials for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified period during the State I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be halted.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

E. To Ensure Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce counter-measures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations



STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the US, USSR, and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps to agreed levels.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities located on national territory or abroad shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted,

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existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The U.N. peace force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

(d) The parties will agree to specific measures which have the purpose of building that community of values without which substantial progress toward common international institutions cannot be achieved.

### STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 14 -

(a) The forces, armaments, and military establishments of states would be reduced to the lowest levels required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing contributions to the U.N. Peace Force.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force and remaining national forces would be armed with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities, to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

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29 June 1961

Pages 3964 - 3968, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES  
to the  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
on


RECOMMENDED US DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

- References: a. JCS 1731/461
- b. JCS 1731/462-3050 (6 June 61)

The enclosed memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I-14723/61, dated 14 June 1961, on the above subject, is circulated for information.

F. J. BLOUIN  
M. J. INGELIDO  
Joint Secretariat

3050 (6 June 61)  
1731/461



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ENCLOSURE

14 June 1961

Honorable John J. McCloy  
Adviser to the President on Disarmament  
Department of State

Dear Jack:

As requested in your letter\* of June 1, we are forwarding initial Defense comments on the 31 May draft negotiating proposal by 15 June. Additional comments on the subject of multi-national disarmament negotiations will be forwarded prior to the Principals meeting to be held at the end of June.

A number of important changes recommended\*\* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set forth in an attachment hereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the draft working paper\*\*\* may have been framed for possible use as a propaganda and psychological vehicle aimed at our Allies and neutral nations, and also for possible use in the UN General Assembly should this become necessary. It appears that efforts have been made to include elements of the British, French, Canadian and Italian positions with some considerable deviation from former US positions. In so doing, adverse alterations in US military posture and strategy have been proposed. While this may well be effective as a propaganda vehicle, the review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflected in the following comments, has not addressed the propaganda potential but has dealt solely with the military features included in the draft document. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel very strongly that military policy matters are of such importance to our national security that they must express

\* See Enclosure to JCS 1731/461

\*\* Appendix A to JCS 1731/462

\*\*\* Attachment to Enclosure to JCS 1731/461

JCS 1731/468

3965

Enclosure

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reservations whenever adverse alterations in US military posture and strategy have been proposed for propaganda purposes in dealing with disarmament.

In the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the proposals contained in the draft paper would, if implemented, confer significant military advantage on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In a situation of Sino-Soviet aggressiveness and expansionism such as exists today, significant relative military advantages for the Sino-Soviet Bloc would jeopardize the national security of the United States.

The draft working paper\* would constitute an acquiescence to Soviet efforts to secure significant military advantage over the United States through disarmament measures. The Soviets have consistently sought to gain US acceptance of disarmament measures which would bring about the early reduction and elimination of US nuclear weapons and delivery systems, create demuclearized zones in the non-Bloc territory along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, reduce US armed forces personnel levels sufficiently to cause major reductions in US forces overseas, eliminate US overseas bases and restrict the use of international waters and air space by US combat forces. The fulfillment of these Soviet desires, impairing US military capabilities and improving Sino-Soviet capabilities, is militarily unacceptable.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned about those elements of the draft working paper pertaining to force levels, nuclear weapons, and strategic delivery vehicles. The interdependence of measures for force levels, armaments, nuclear weapons stockpiles, and means for delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with previous US proposals must be preserved throughout the various stages of disarmament. However, the draft working paper treats such measures as being separable and thereby could result in unacceptable imbalances in military posture.

\* Attachment to Enclosure to JCS 1731/461

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As independent separable measures in the first stage, the draft working paper deals with force levels of 2.1 million, cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, un-inspected ban on transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technological data, establishment of denuclearized zones, reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, zonal restrictions on armed forces and armaments, and transfers of fissionable materials to non-weapons uses. Such proposals constitute a serious erosion of the established US Government position on arms control. The general conclusions contained in the reports made by the Consultative Groups organized to advise the Adviser to the President on Disarmament regarding US disarmament negotiating proposals appear to support this opinion. Three examples of several which might be cited are:

a. The Consultative Group on Regional Disarmament Measures recommended against specific proposals for demilitarizing or denuclearizing areas in the coming disarmament conference.

b. The Consultative Group on Conventional Forces and Arms urged that the initial numerical figure for armed forces be 2.5 million, a figure long adhered to by the United States and its Allies.

c. The Consultative Group on Nuclear Armaments expressed reservations on isolating or making separable either the cut-off of production or a reduction of stockpiles, and recognized fully the requirements that these and other nuclear measures must go hand-in-hand with other measures within stages.

The Department of Defense has supported, as in the case of the 29 August 1957 and 27 June 1960 proposals, programs for balanced, phased and safeguarded limitation and reduction of national military capability, under effective verification and

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inspection, which would not offer significant military advantage to the Soviet Bloc at the expense of the United States. Defense continues to support such programs, but believes the draft working paper contains serious shortcomings requiring correction in order to develop a US position consistent with national security interests.

In view of the pressing time limitations, the scope of the work yet to be accomplished, and the direct bearing the draft proposals have on the primary responsibilities of the Department of Defense, we request that during the two weeks remaining preceding the Principals meeting there be regular meetings of inter-agency representatives to discuss redrafting the paper. Paul Nitze will arrange for Defense representation at these meetings and he or I would appreciate a telephone call from you concerning your thoughts on the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

1 Enclosure  
Recommended US Disarmament  
Negotiating Proposal