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J.C.S. 1620/248

~~(DISTRIBUTION A)~~

27 April 1959

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REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR
THE POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM (U)

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 1620/209 - 4720
 - b. J.C.S. 1620/223 - 4720
 - c. J.C.S. 1620/242 - 4720
 - d. J.C.S. 2261/10 - 7R-51

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CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR
THE POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a request* by the Acting Secretary of Defense, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish their concept for the employment of the POLARIS Weapon System, including their recommendations as to how this system should fit into the unified and specified command structure; and, in order to insure that there is no unnecessary duplication of control and coordinating facilities, such as communications, the recommendations should cover specifically the matter of provision of such supporting facilities for the POLARIS System.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In his memorandum* the Acting Secretary of Defense, in commenting on the present program for the production of the POLARIS Weapon System, stated: "The present program for production of the POLARIS Weapon System indicates that the first submarine will have an emergency capability in April 1960 and become operational in October 1960. The present production schedule includes five submarines, and plans are being made for the production of four additional submarines. Should this system continue to develop favorably, there will undoubtedly be additional submarines authorized in subsequent years."

3. For additional facts, see Enclosure "B".

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Enclosure "C".

CONCLUSIONS

5. The concept of employment for the POLARIS Weapon System, outlined in Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A" hereto, should be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* Enclosure to JCS 1620/209

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6. ~~The POLARIS Weapon System~~ should be assigned to commanders of unified commands exercising operational command of major naval forces, and command should be exercised through their respective naval component commanders.

7. The initial assignment of the POLARIS Weapon System to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, should be approved for planning purposes, by the Secretary of Defense.

8. Close coordination of all nuclear targeting should be exercised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders concerned to prevent compounding of the existing duplication and conflicts in nuclear strike plans.

9. The views*of CINCSAC concerning the POLARIS Weapon System should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to review the POLARIS and other missile weapons systems as they attain significant operational capabilities in order to determine whether changes are required in the concept of command and employment of these weapons.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" hereto, together with its Appendices, which reflect the conclusions in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 above, to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Note the conclusion in paragraph 8 above.

12. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1620/242

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COORDINATION

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Concurs or Non-Concurs</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Reference</u>
J-3	Concurs	RADM O'Beirne	
J-4	Concurs	MGEN Lodoen	
J-6	Concurs	MGEN Dreyfus	
Army	Non-concurs	BGEN Woolnough	Enclosure "D"
Navy	Concurs	RADM Ricketts	
Air Force	*		
Marine Corps	No direct concern	BGEN VanRyzin	

* Unknown

ORIGINATOR'S CONSIDERATION OF NON-CONCURRENCE

a. The basic issues underlying the Army non-concurrence are:

(1) Assigning the POLARIS Weapon System to commanders of unified commands exercising operational command of major naval forces, and the exercise of such command through their respective naval component commanders does not reflect both the initial and final concept of assignment.

(2) That the POLARIS Weapons System is still unknown and therefore the initial assignment should be based on the functioning of the vehicle until such time as a reliable operating status has been obtained.

(3) Coordination of the operational mission of the POLARIS system is not related to the operational mission of other naval forces.

b. The reasons why the position of the Army, as indicated in Enclosure "D", are not supported are:

(1) There is nothing in either wording to indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the present assignment irrevocable should experience indicate desirability thereof.

(2) As indicated in the recommended Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,* the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to review the POLARIS and other missile weapons systems as they attain significant operational capabilities in order to determine whether changes are required in the concept of command and employment of these weapons.

* Enclosure "A" hereto

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(3) ~~Because operations of POLARIS~~ forces must be clearly coordinated and integrated with all other naval operations in the same general sea areas it seems reasonable to coordinate all of their operational missions through the same command.

ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Concept of Employment and Command Structure
for the POLARIS Weapon System (U)

- 1. Reference is made to a memorandum* by the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated 24 December 1958, subject as above. 1 2
- 2. As requested in the referenced memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have outlined, in Appendix "A" hereto, their concept of employment for the POLARIS Weapon System. 3 4 5
- 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the POLARIS Weapon System should be assigned to commanders of unified commands exercising operational command of major naval forces, and command should be exercised through their respective naval component commanders. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve, for planning purposes, the initial assignment of the POLARIS Weapon System to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
- 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to review the POLARIS and other missile weapons systems as they attain significant operational capabilities in order to determine whether changes are required in the concept of command and employment of these weapons. 14 15 16 17 18
- 5. The views of the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, in Appendix "B" hereto, were considered in the preparation of the POLARIS concept. 19 20 21

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1620/209


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APPENDIX "A" TO ENCLOSURE "A"

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
FOR THE POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM (U)

POLARIS WEAPON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

Range	300 - 1500 NM (Initially 300-1200NM)	1
System CEP	2 NM	2
Yield		3
Rate of Fire		4
Launch		5
Time to Shift Targets		6

AREA OF EMPLOYMENT

1. POLARIS submarines will conduct patrols in pre-selected launch areas in the seas around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in order to: (1) support the U.S. deterrent posture, and (2) launch retaliatory attacks when specifically directed, against designated targets in accordance with approved atomic strike plans.

2. Current operational, targeting and logistics considerations indicate that the most effective operations can be conducted in the deep water areas of (1) Norwegian/North Seas, (2) Mediterranean Sea, and (3) Western Pacific Ocean. Operations need not be limited to these areas, and future developments may make it more desirable to use other sea areas, including the Arctic Ocean.

LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

3. Logistic and administrative support will be provided by deployed U.S. sea-going submarine tenders in order to maintain the maximum number of submarines on patrol. In this manner, it is planned to maintain about 55 per cent of all POLARIS submarines submerged in patrol areas ready to fire. There will be an additional missile potential-represented by those submarines in transit, undergoing tender up-keep, and in training. With strategic warning, this potential

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will constitute a significant addition to the retaliatory capability of those POLARIS submarines actually on station.

4. Support other than that provided by the deployed tenders will, of necessity, be closely integrated with normal naval afloat and shore facilities.

5. If necessary or desirable, POLARIS submarines will be operated directly from the United States.

COMMAND STRUCTURE

6. The POLARIS Weapon System should be assigned to unified commanders exercising operational command of major naval forces, and command should be exercised through their respective naval component commanders.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL

7. Operations of POLARIS forces must be closely coordinated and integrated with naval strike, antisubmarine, submarine, mining and barrier operations in the same general sea areas to insure safety, to avoid mutual interference, to compound the enemy's intelligence problem, and to get the maximum effectiveness from the POLARIS system. This control and coordination of both offensive and defensive operations in the same general area will be exercised by the unified commanders through their naval component commanders.

8. The POLARIS Weapon System will operate in mutual support of other offensive systems under the targeting and coordinating concepts established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COMMUNICATIONS

9. Communications must be reliable, secure and rapid, in that order of importance to this system.

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Appendix "A" to
Enclosure "A"

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10. ~~Direct communications will be provided from the Joint~~ 1
 Chiefs of Staff at their regular or alternate headquarters 2
 to commanders of unified commands to whom the forces have 3
 been assigned. The Naval Component Commanders of these unified 4
 commands will be provided with facilities for communicating 5
 with the submarines. 6

11. The programmed communication system includes the use of, 7
 and adaptation of, existing naval communication facilities and 8
 techniques. The primary method of communicating will be by 9
 utilizing the very low frequency, VLF, band. A chain of VLF 10
 stations is in being. Others are planned, and programmed. 11

12. To enhance reliability through multiplicity, other 12
 techniques utilizing standard high frequencies will be in use 13
 simultaneously. Additionally, further developments in the 14
 naval communication system have been planned to increase the 15
 sensitivity to reception, increase speed of transmission and 16
 enhance the security. 17

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APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "A"

Same as Enclosure to J.C.S. 1620/242, not reproduced
herewith.

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Appendix "B"
to Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. By memorandum* dated 22 January 1959, the Chief of Naval Operations submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a study titled, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the POLARIS Weapon System", and recommended that it be used as a basis of the reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. On 26 January 1959, the memorandum* by the Chief of Naval Operations was referred to the Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, for consideration in connection with subject report.

2. By memorandum** dated 6 March 1959, CINCSAC submitted to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a request that the Secretary of Defense be apprised of his views concerning the POLARIS Weapon System, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend necessary action on the part of the Secretary of Defense to assign control of the POLARIS Weapon System to the Strategic Air Command in view of its strategic capabilities.

3. On 3 April 1959, the memorandum** by CINCSAC was referred to the Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, for consideration in connection with subject report.

* Enclosure to JCS 1620/223
 ** Enclosure to JCS 1620/242

ENCLOSURE "G"

DISCUSSION

1. The functions* assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff include:

a. To prepare strategic plans and provide for strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands, and

b. To review the plans and programs of commanders of unified and specified commands to determine their adequacy, feasibility, and suitability for the performance of assigned missions.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the overall coordination, on a world-wide basis, of all strategic delivery systems. Target and strike coordination for these systems is accomplished through the annual planning cycle for atomic operations conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A "World-Wide Conference for the Coordination of Commanders' Plans for Initial Atomic Operations" is included in this planning cycle. The objective of this conference is to effect operational coordination of the commanders' strike plans. This coordination includes designation of targets, priority and weight of effort on each target, route areas to targets, and time over target. In addition, certain other aspects related to the implementation of these strike plans, such as communications and electronic countermeasures, are examined and coordinated as required.

3. The recent WWCC** highlighted the following points:

a. Operational coordination of atomic strikes has been deficient with respect to: priority of targets, time over targets, route areas to targets, forces available, force capabilities and ECM activities.

* DOD Directive 5000.1, dated 31 December 1958

** JCS 2261/10

b. There are [] worldwide that are targeted by ~~three different Joint Chiefs of Staff commanders.~~

c. There are [] worldwide that are targeted by two different Joint Chiefs of Staff commanders.

d. Representatives of the unified and specified commanders agreed that additional coordination of atomic strikes was desirable.

4. The conflicts in targeting as highlighted at the recent WWCC may be increased with the introduction of the POLARIS Weapon System as an operational weapon. In order to avoid duplication and triplication of atomic targeting and mutual interference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, when approving commanders' atomic annexes, assign targets where unnecessary duplication and triplication exists. Procedures for the coordination of all nuclear targeting might be improved by including in future guidance, promulgated to commanders, a more specific delineation of the respective responsibilities of the commanders in order to provide for more effective coordination of nuclear strikes, to enhance mutual support among commanders, to avoid unwarranted duplications, and to minimize conflicts.

5. Operations of POLARIS forces must be closely coordinated and integrated with naval strike, antisubmarine, submarine, mining and barrier operations in the same general sea areas to insure safety, to avoid mutual interference, and to compound the enemy's intelligence problem.

6. The POLARIS submarine will not operate in an exclusive environment. It will be the object of intensive enemy ASW efforts. It will operate in the same ocean areas as other friendly naval forces, and the operations of either must not be restricted by those of the other. Ships and aircraft must know

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where friendly submarines are operating. Otherwise, we either risk attacking one of our own, or miss an opportunity to attack one of the enemy's. Safety havens and transit routes for our submarines must be established, and frequently changed, with due consideration being given to shipping routes, shifting areas of concentration of enemy submarines, the location and operations of our own surveillance and killer submarines and other naval operations. The intermixing and calculated confusion of POLARIS submarine movements with other submarine operations is a major factor in complicating the enemy's intelligence problem.

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Enclosure "C"

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ARMY STATEMENT OF NON-CONCURRENCE

1. I have reviewed J.C.S. 1620/248 and recommend the following changes:

a. Page 1835. Delete paragraph 6 and substitute the following:

"a. Initially, the POLARIS Weapons System should be assigned to unified commanders exercising operational command of major naval forces.

"b. When POLARIS, and other new weapons systems, have attained a reliable operating status, their assignment should be based upon the principle that unified and specified commands should be furnished the weapons systems best suited for the accomplishment of their assigned missions."

REASON: This conclusion does not reflect both the initial and final concept of assignment. Further, it is felt that each commander should be given all weapons necessary to accomplish his mission. This principle does not preclude a change in the currently assigned missions of unified and specified commanders if desirable.

b. Page 1835. Delete paragraph 10.

REASON: This conclusion is not necessary to the paper.

c. Page 1838. Rewrite paragraph 3 as follows:

"3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, until this system attains a reliable capability to make a significant contribution to the deterrent-retaliatory mission, the POLARIS Weapon System should be assigned to commanders of unified commands now exercising operational "command of major naval forces, ~~and command should be exercised through their respective naval component commanders.~~ Accordingly, ~~the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve, for planning purposes, the initial assignment of the POLARIS Weapon System to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic.~~"

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REASON: The POLARIS weapon system is still an unknown.

Therefore, initial assignment should be based upon functioning of the vehicle until such time as a reliable operating status has been attained.

d. Page 1838. Delete paragraph 4 and substitute the following:

"4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that when the POLARIS and other missile weapons systems have attained reliable operational status their assignment to commands established by the Secretary of Defense should be reviewed in light of the situation existing at that time and based upon the principle that these commanders should be furnished the weapons systems best suited for the accomplishment of their assigned mission."

REASON: Each commander should be given the weapon systems necessary to the accomplishment of this mission. The situation, command structure, and even missions of unified commanders in the time frame 1963-65 cannot be visualized at this time.

e. Page 1840. Delete paragraph 6 and substitute the same paragraph indicated in a above.

REASON: Same as a above.

f. Page 1840. Delete paragraphs 7 and 8 and substitute the following:

"7. Operations of POLARIS submarines must be closely coordinated with other naval operations such as, anti-submarine, submarine, mining and barrier operations to insure safety, to avoid mutual interference, and to compound the enemy's intelligence problem. On the other hand, coordination of the operational mission of the POLARIS system is not related to the operational mission of other naval forces."

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Enclosure "D"

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REASON: To outline clearly the problem without prejudging the effectiveness of the solution.

g. Page 1841, paragraph 10, line 4. Delete the last sentence.

REASON: Not necessary to the paper.

h. Page 1845, paragraph 5. Delete and substitute the following:

"5. Operations of POLARIS submarines must be closely coordinated with other naval operations such as, anti-submarine, submarine, mining and barrier operations to insure safety, to avoid mutual interference, and to compound the enemy's intelligence problem."

REASON: To outline clearly the problem without prejudging the effectiveness of the solution and for clarity.

i. Page 1845, paragraph 6. Change paragraph 6 to subparagraph 6a and add subparagraph b as follows:

"b. On the other hand, coordination of the operational mission of the POLARIS system is not related to the operational mission of other naval forces."

REASON: Same as h above.

2. Subject to the changes indicated above, I concur in J.C.S. 1620/248.

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Enclosure "D"

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11 May 1959

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~~NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES~~

to the

HOLDERS OF J.C.S. 1620/248

(Concept of Employment and Command Structure
for the POLARIS Weapon System (U))

The action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on J.C.S.
1620/248 is set forth in J.C.S. 1620/257.

H. L. HILLYARD,

J. O. COBB,

Joint Secretariat.

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