


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
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# PROUD PROPHET - 83

13-24 JUNE 1983

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
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SUBJECT: PROUD PROPHET - 83 After Action Report

1. Attached is the after-action report on the PROUD PROPHET - 83 global war game run at the National Defense University in June of this year. This was a large-scale effort involving the Department of State, CIA, teams from many of the CINCs, and an officer nominated by each of the Service Chiefs. Selected issues of interest to Secretary Weinberger were folded into the scenario and game design via inputs from the University's Strategic Concepts Development Center.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

2. Many aspects of PROUD PROPHET game play were unique and provided valuable



Findings on the issues addressed in the game are provided in the Executive Summary of the attached report.


3. PROUD PROPHET - 83 provided another important contribution by presenting a type of scenario not usually used in major DoD exercises. The PROUD PROPHET




JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

  
RICHARD D. LAWRENCE  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
President

Attachment



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CIA 3.5(c)+3.3(b)(1)

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
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(U) REPORT ON PROUD PROPHET - 83

(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- II. (U) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: GAME OBJECTIVES, PARTICIPATING COMMANDS, EVENT SEQUENCES AND SCENARIO SUMMARY
- III. (U) SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC ISSUES RAISED
- IV. (U) MOBILIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS ISSUES  
APPENDIX: (U) SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAM SUMMARY
- V. (U) RED STRATEGY  
APPENDIX A: (U) MAJOR ELEMENTS OF RED DECEPTION PLAN  
APPENDIX B: (U) MAPS OF RED OFFENSIVE PLAN
- VI. (U) COURSE OF PLAY  
APPENDIX: CINC ACTIONS (LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
- VII. (U) SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
APPENDIX A: (U) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN PROUD  
PROPHET - 83  
APPENDIX B: (U) CHRONOLOGY OF PROUD PROPHET - 83 SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- VIII. (U) LOGISTICS  
APPENDIX A: (U) GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR LOGISTICS  
APPENDIX B: (U) NAVAL AND NAVAL AIR LOGISTICS

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This document is classified SECRET/NOFORN. The classification is the result of the cumulative effect of sensitive information reflected throughout this report in the play and interaction of senior officers and officials.

DISCLAIMER

The observations presented in this report offer insights gained from analysis of PROUD PROPHET - 83 game play. The game events and player behavior noted represent only a few of many possible responses to the developing scenario. The players did not have recourse to the full assistance and expertise available from the permanent staffs of real-world agencies and crisis management organizations. This report, then, presents tentative observations and conclusions appropriate for further investigation and testing in other exercises conducted within the defense community, before firm lessons are drawn from the material included herein.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

PROUD PROPHET - 83

(May 2 & 16, June 13-24, 1983)

(U) MILITARY AND STRATEGIC  
ISSUES RAISED

Date of Report: September 2, 1983

  
Fort Lesley J. McNair  
Washington, D.C. 20319  
Declassify by: OADR

Report Prepared by Staffs of the:  
War Gaming and Simulation Center  
Strategic Concepts Development  
Center  
Mobilization Concepts Development  
Center

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I. (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. (U) PROUD PROPHET - 83 was a large scale, interactive, politico-military game which involved more than 200 people for 12 days of actual game play stretched over seven weeks. One of the most important features of this game was its sheer size, which allowed it to simulate organizational behavior. It offered insights into the performance of our own National Command Authority (NCA) decision process under stress and conditions of uncertainty. The game format was designed to provide senior officials with an unofficial forum to brainstorm new approaches to counter destabilizing global conditions and to develop new strategic concepts.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(8)

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

D. ~~(S)~~ The game approximately reflected our real world states of preparedness and contingency planning, including shortfalls. Thirty-five


H. (U) The following is a summary of significant strategic issues raised during game play and tentative conclusions. This material is treated in greater depth in Chapters III, IV, and VII.

1. RED may be capable of launching a short-warning attack on NATO which has been prepared over a long period of months (perhaps as long as 12-14 months). Conventional wisdom holds that a long RED preparation for war will inevitably trigger Western warning indicators and be recognized. In PROUD PROPHET - 83, however, a small group of Sovietologists developed a plausible plan of long range strategic deception which might well have drawn BLUE forces into Southwest Asia, divided NATO, and delayed a timely response to a buildup of Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe (See Chapter V: RED Strategy).


2. The RED game play highlights a need for greater efforts by the intelligence community to correlate analysis efforts across theaters. The BLUE assessment of RED posturing in one theater may well change when BLUE is suddenly faced with a decision on deployment of significant forces to other theaters.

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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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
**NATO**

**YEAR**

**WARSAW PACT**

1983

- GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS



U.S. ELECTION •


1985

MOBILIZATION/ •  
PREPAREDNESS

- CARIBBEAN CRISIS
- BERLIN CRISIS

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

- PAKISTAN CRISIS
- YUGOSLAVIA CRISIS



S-I

[REDACTED]

# PROUD PROPHET 83 COMPOSITE EVENTS

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U.S.	MONTH	USSR
------	-------	------

[REDACTED]		
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AIR DEPLOYMENT TO PAK • CVBG/SSN DEPLOYMENT •		• EXERCISE POSTURE
--	--	--------------------

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

U.S. BEGINS REFORGER •	AUGUST	• MULTI ARMY EXERCISE
------------------------	--------	-----------------------

NATO OBJECTS TO "PROVOCATIVE" U.S. REINF. •		
--	--	--

[REDACTED]		
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9-I

[REDACTED]

II. (U) BACKGROUND INFORMATION:  
GAME OBJECTIVES, PARTICIPATING COMMANDS,  
EVENTS SEQUENCE AND SCENARIO SUMMARY

A. (U) OBJECTIVES

1. (U) Educational

- a. (U) Expose players to the difficult industrial and manpower mobilization decisions required during a period of developing--but still ambiguous--threat.
- b. (U) Gain insights into the potential impact of selected Allied actions during a developing crisis.
- c. (U) Familiarize players with possible war triggers.
- d. (U) Involve players in the war fighting decisions required during the early stages of a global conflict.
- e. (U) Explore the risks and benefits of an escalation strategy which focuses on conventional options applied against the enemy at points where he is most vulnerable.
- f. (U) Examine the strategic impact of unconventional warfare.
- g. (U) Consider the implications of early decisions on the prospects for successful conduct of hostilities which may continue over an extended period.
- h. (U) Determine opportunities for responsible war termination initiatives.

2. [REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5),(8)

**B. (U) PARTICIPATING COMMANDS AND AGENCIES**

Department of Defense  
Department of State  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Department of the Army  
Department of the Navy  
Department of the Air Force  
Department of Transportation, Coast Guard  
U.S. Atlantic Command  
U.S. European Command  
U.S. Central Command  
U.S. Pacific Command  
U.S. Readiness Command  
U.S. Southern Command  
Strategic Air Command  
Military Airlift Command  
Military Traffic Management Command  
Military Sealift Command  
Defense Nuclear Agency  
National Defense University  
Army War College  
Air War College  
Naval War College  
Army National Guard  
Air National Guard  
Army Reserve  
Naval Reserve  
Marine Corps Reserve  
Air Force Reserve  
Coast Guard Reserve  
Army Intelligence and Security Command  
5th Psychological Operations Group, United States Army Reserve (USAR)

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**C. EVENTS SEQUENCE**

March 16-17 CINC Conference to solicit views and key assumptions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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D. (U) SCENARIO SUMMARY

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
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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)




JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)


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III. (U) STRATEGIC ISSUES RAISED

A. (U) BLUE'S STRATEGIC PLAN






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B. (U) UNEASY PEACE

1. (U) Summary



[REDACTED]

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2. (U) Game Findings


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
JIS 3.3(b)(5),(6), (8)

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III-3



3. (U) Real World Implications




JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

III-4

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4. (U) Strategy Questions Raised



C. (U) CRISIS

1. (U) Summary



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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
2. (U) Game Findings



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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
f. [REDACTED] During the early stages of European conflict in PROUD  
PROPHET - 83, RED attacked BLUE's low-altitude intelligence  
satellites, thereby sharply reducing the flow of imagery and other

[REDACTED]

h. [REDACTED] What one side believes are simple and clear signals  
are hard for the other side to understand, even in a game. Something

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)




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
3. (U) Real World Implications



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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
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III-11

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)



4. (U) Strategic Questions Raised



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)


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D. (U) MAJOR CONFLICT


1. (U) Summary



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J9 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)

[REDACTED]




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OSD 3.3(b)(5), (6)

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
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2. (U) Game Findings



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
JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)



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
III-16

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)



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
JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)



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OSD 3.3(b)(5),(6) JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)(8)


III-18



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OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)(8)




OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)(8)

III-20

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


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**[REDACTED]**  
III-21

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)

 JS 3.3(b)(5),(8)



OSD 3.3(b)(5)

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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[REDACTED]

#### IV. (U) MOBILIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS ISSUES

##### A. (U) OBJECTIVES

###### 1. (U) Educational

One of the game's overall educational objectives was to expose players to the difficult industrial and manpower mobilization decisions required during a period of gradually developing -- but still ambiguous -- threat. Note: Secretary of Defense Weinberger has repeatedly cautioned that the US and its allies must be prepared to respond to warning indicators that are highly ambiguous. In his Annual Report to the Congress (1983) the Secretary of Defense stated that "These responses must be such that they can be decided upon quickly, sustained -- if necessary, for a prolonged period -- until the ambiguity is resolved, and repeated every time the warning indications demand it."


###### 2. (U) Research

There were, in addition, the following research issues identified for consideration during the game:

- a. (U) The problems of securing supplemental funding for an Emergency Defense Program when the threat is still ambiguous.
- b. (U) Reallocations within the current Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) to better prepare the U.S. for approaching hostilities.
- c. (U) Allocation of supplemental funding, with threat ambiguous, between long term improvements in industrial preparedness and surge capacity, versus short term increases in war stocks and sustainability.

##### B. (U) INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS/MOBILIZATION IN THE SEQUENCE OF GAME PLAY


1. (U) The PROUD PROPHET - 83 game design was structured to permit a progression of player decisions at the National Command Authority level, moving from long-term decisions on increased defense spending through crisis play to conduct of a global war effort. The sequence of game play began on May 2, 1983, with a day of game play at the National Defense University which focused on industrial preparedness and mobilization planning. Alternatives considered were developed by the National Defense University's Mobilization Concepts Development Center (MCDC), and participants included representatives of the Services, the Joint Staff, UnderSecretary of Defense Research and Engineering (USDR&E), Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (ASD/MRA&L), Programs Analysis & Evaluation Directorate (PA&E), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).



JS 3.3(b)(5)(8)

d. (U) The final set of increased budget allocations agreed to by the players, and incorporated into later stages of PROUD PROPHET - 83, is attached as an appendix to this chapter.

5. (U) Issues Raised



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IV-4

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)




D. (U) ENHANCEMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR FUTURE PROUD PROPHET GAMES

1. (U) On 26 May 1983, a joint working group (JWG) composed of Joint Staff and Service representatives compiled a list of seventy-four (74) critical items/weapon systems (I/WS). This listing consisted primarily of those I/WS the CINCs consider most critical to their immediate war fighting capability. In future PROUD PROPHETs, CINC-generated I/WS could be played as critical items to be moved or swung from one theater to another. In this regard, the concept of swinging forces has been gamed repeatedly. However, less consideration has been given to the concept of swinging critical logistics along with or instead of the combat forces.



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

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


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


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JS 3.3(b)(5)

PROUD PROPHET 83  
Supplemental program Summary

DRB Markup



IV-A-1

\_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ means FY86/FY88/FY90


IV-A-2

means FY86/FY88/FY90

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2

JS 3.3(b)(5)



IV-A-3

means FY86/FY88/FY90

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JS 3.3(b)(5)

DRB Markup

IV-A-4

\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ means FY86/FY88/FY90

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4

JS 3.3(b)(5)


Baseline

Small

Moderate

DRB Markup

Large




IV-A-5

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JS 3.3(b)(5)

DRB Markup




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JS 3.3(b)(5)

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[REDACTED]

V. (U) RED STRATEGIC PLAN



C. (U) SCIENTIFIC STRATEGY AND LAWS OF WAR

JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)(7)(8)

1. Being a science, Marxism-Leninism must provide the basis for discovering objective laws of war. Soviet expressions of the "laws of war" change as new material forces appear to affect warfare. Four laws currently expressed in Soviet theoretical literature are the following:

- The course and outcome of war waged with unlimited employment of all means of conflict depend primarily on the correlation of available, strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning of the war.
- The course and outcome of a war depend on the correlation of military potentials of the combatants.
- The course and outcome of a war depend on its political context.

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-- The course and outcome of a war depend on the correlation of moral-political and psychological capabilities of the peoples and armies of the combatants.

2. ██████ The first law derives from Soviet study of the importance of the initial period of war, especially World Wars I and II. The advent of nuclear weapons, the use of which at the outset could profoundly affect the entire course of a war, makes this law especially important. Analysis of the correlation of forces in accordance with this law indicates that if nuclear weapons are included, the correlation is unfavorable. Hence, according to this law, use of "all means" should be avoided.

3. ██████ The second law is based on the Soviet definition of "military potentials." This includes far more than military forces. It includes the industrial base, the work force, scientific and research base, technical and educational level of population, and the organizational and administrative capacity of the state to mobilize these resources for military purposes. Analysis of the correlation of forces considered in this law indicates that the Soviet state has the superior position in the medium term. That is, while the US has a higher level of science and education, its administrative mechanism for mobilization does not equal that of the USSR for the initial period of the war. Hence, a war should be kept short. Soviet pre-war preparation of the homeland will insure superiority in this sphere during the early stages of a conflict.

4. ██████ The third law focuses on the role of "progressive" and "reactionary" forces; that is, population elements, which will have a major impact on the conduct and outcome of a war. In order to insure that the correlation of these forces maximally favors the USSR, extensive political, ideological and psychological preparation is made prior to the war. It is especially important to structure the outbreak of war in a way suitable for maximal propaganda advantage. During the war, special attention is devoted to insuring all military operations enhance the correlation of political forces.

5. ██████ The fourth law dictates the proper psychological preparation of one's own forces and population to include things as divergent as propaganda about the "unjust" character of one's opponent, and technical knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons so they will seem less frightening. Exploitation of national feelings, traditional hostilities, and cultural preoccupations are all part of the plan to adhere to this law. Soviet analysis of this law indicates a strongly favorable correlation of forces. The strategic plan and military operational plans take this favorable position into account, but also seek to enhance it whenever possible.

D. ██████ RED NATIONAL GOALS

The national goals, articulated by the RED team for this game were:

██████████

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- [REDACTED]
1. [REDACTED] Preserve the power of the ruling Communist Party.
  2. [REDACTED] Defend the homeland and insure progress toward communism.
  3. [REDACTED] Defend acquired territories (Warsaw Pact countries) and further assimilate them.
  4. [REDACTED] Exploit every opportunity to expand RED control and disrupt capitalist control in order to shift the correlation of forces in favor of RED.

E. (U) SOVIET BASIC STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES


1. [REDACTED] Foment dissension in enemy camp by supporting one or more internal dissident movements.
2. [REDACTED] Do not support an ally if, in doing so, you will make him too strong.
3. [REDACTED] Use the forces of allies, or even better one's enemy, to defeat the primary opponent.
4. [REDACTED] Do not let your enemy grow too weak too soon if a third party will be the primary beneficiary rather than yourself.
5. [REDACTED] Use propoganda and demands for concessions incessantly on the principle that familiarity with uncongenial subjects eventually breeds readiness to take them for granted.
6. [REDACTED] Use terror on prospective areas to be conquered so the population will greet your conquest with relief.
7. [REDACTED] Be flexible in approach and accept compromises as the basis for new demands.
8. [REDACTED] Use peace talks and truces as a time for regrouping, employing deception, and taking whatever advantage the opponent will tolerate.
9. [REDACTED] Avoid two front wars.
10. [REDACTED] Be patient, do not ask for everything at once. Insure thorough consolidation of previous position before advancing.
11. [REDACTED] Build such overwhelming military power that an opponent will realize he must accommodate.
12. [REDACTED] Combine offensive and defensive methods, tools and weapons in a coordinated manner designed to insure retention of the initiative.

[REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED] Use psychological techniques known as "reflexive control" to lead an opponent into unwittingly doing what you want.

14. [REDACTED] Remember the critical importance of time as a key factor in warfare. Establish time-phased goals based on thorough testing to determine minimum realistic and feasible times required to accomplish missions.


F. (U) STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES



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JS 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)



G.  DECEPTION AND REFLEXIVE CONTROL



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JS 3.3(b)(5)

H. (U) NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR

The greatest Soviet strength in the overall correlation of forces lies in its understanding of the non-military nature of war, while Western minds, in general, do not appreciate its importance. In accordance with the second, third and fourth laws of war, the Soviets maximize use of non-military forms of war. These forms include the following:


1. (U) Economic - Use Western weaknesses in financial structure and energy resources as levers to create unemployment, panic and clashes between peoples and governments.
2. (U) Cultural - Use cultural concerns as psychological levers to prevent Western use of nuclear weapons.
3. (U) Political - Manipulate local political interests, groups and individuals.

I. (U) SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN PRIOR TO D-DAY

The following is a list of specific actions taken prior to D-day to implement the RED strategic plan:

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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)




3. (U) Yugoslavia



JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)

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


JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

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JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)



7. (U) Preparing the combat forces

a. [redacted] Navy. Naval forces could execute their primarily defensive assigned missions for the early war period from an essentially peacetime posture. Special measures needed to be taken

[REDACTED]

to position forces near as many BLUE carrier task forces as possible and to prepare to mine key areas. A limited number of submarines were deployed to protect RED SSBN operating areas and start the anti-SSBN campaign against BLUE.


[REDACTED]

c. (U) Ground Rear Services

[REDACTED]


d. (U) Ground Combat Units


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**JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)**






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**[REDACTED]**  
V-12

**JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)**




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
JS 3.3(b)(7)(G), (8)

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APPENDIX A (U) MAJOR ELEMENTS OF RED DECEPTION PLAN

1.




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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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


JS 3.3(b)(5)(6),(8)

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**RED OFFENSIVE PLAN  
AXES OF ARMY ADVANCES**



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CIA 3.5(c)+3.3(b)(1)

APPENDIX B  
V-B-2

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

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
VI. (U) COURSE OF PLAY

A. [REDACTED] D-DAY (REAL TIME - 13 JUNE 1983/GAME TIME - 31 AUGUST 1986)

[REDACTED]

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
JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)



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**JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)**






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**VI-3**


**JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)**



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JS 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)






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**VI-5**


**JS 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)**



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
**[REDACTED]**  
VI-6


**JS 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)**



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JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)(8)






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
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**JS 3.3(b)(5), (6), (8)**

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


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VI-11

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)



JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

<sup>1</sup> Ecclesiastical censure barring a people of a region from the Sacraments, religious services, and Christian burial.


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VI-12

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**JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)**


H.  D + 7 (REAL TIME - 22 JUNE 1983/GAME TIME - 7 SEPTEMBER 1986)



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VI-14


JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)



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VI-15

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)



JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)(8)

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VII. (U) SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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A. (U) OBJECTIVES

1. (U) Educational

One of the PROUD PROPHET - 83 game educational objectives was to afford players an opportunity to examine the impact of Special Operations on national strategy in a global war context.

[REDACTED]

B. (U) CONCEPT

JS 3.3(b)(5)

Special Operations play consists of forces conducting Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations, and Security Operations in a global context. A computer-assisted model is used to assess unconventional operations and the impact of reactive security measures on such operations. Psychological operations are being incorporated in the model.

C. (U) METHOD

1. (U) Model

The play of Unconventional Warfare missions in PROUD PROPHET - 83 was assessed by means of the Strategic Unconventional Warfare Assessment Model (SUWAM) developed by the National Defense University's War Gaming and Simulation Center (WGSC). Special Operations planners were provided by several of the participating CINCs, and their expertise was supplemented by members of CENTCOM's and U.S. Atlantic Command's (LANTCOM) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forces who also assisted in operation and evaluation of SUWAM. The present, initial version of the model, SUWAM I, assesses only Unconventional Warfare (UW) missions involving direct action against enemy targets. Results assessed by the model are manually integrated into other assessment models employed in the PROUD PROPHET game system. UW

[REDACTED]

mission results in Europe were, for example, judgmentally injected into play of the Army War College's McClintic Model, which was employed for ground and tactical air assessments on the NATO Central Front. Controllers operating the McClintic Theater Model degraded unit movement through map locations at which UW missions had damaged transportation facilities such as bridges and key rail transfer nodes. Reports of other UW missions directed at logistic targets allowed the game's logistic controllers to modify the logistic reports they provided daily to the RED and BLUE player teams.

## 2. (U) Psychological Operations Methodology

A planned future version of the WGSC model, to be designated Special Operations Assessment Model (SOAM), will incorporate methodology for assessment of psychological operations (PSYOP) results in global war games. With this new version still in development, an attempt was made to introduce PSYOP into game play on a judgmental basis. A country team from the Fifth Psychological Operations Group participated in the preparations for, and play of PROUD PROPHET - 83. Using the detailed PROUD PROPHET scenario, this team developed an actual PSYOP campaign directed at a member of the Warsaw Pact. The country team periodically briefed the Diplomatic Table in Control on its activity in implementing the PSYOP campaign. The Diplomatic Table in Control was staffed by nine area specialists tasked to play the political responses of all allies and Third World States other than RED and BLUE. Thus, Control was informed and kept current on the PSYOP effort underway and governed its rulings on the behavior of the target country according to the Controllers collective judgment of the impact of the campaign.

## 3. (U) Counterintelligence Methodology

Another important facet of Special Operations is the Counterintelligence effort directed against UW missions. In fact, Counterintelligence play is another future enhancement planned for SOAM to allow global wargamers to deploy security forces against anticipated unconventional warfare attacks. In PROUD PROPHET - 83, however, counterintelligence play was off-line and on a judgment basis as was the play of PSYOP. Members of the 226 Military Intelligence Detachment (Counterintelligence) were present throughout PROUD PROPHET - 83 and attempted to identify the UW target patterns selected by the RED Team UW planners on the basis of the scenario, of reports of game events including UW raids, and of the daily INTSUMS.

## 4. (U) Integration Requirements

The SUWAM methodology for assessing direct action UW missions has been developed and tested. While the detail of the model's assessment tables will be further refined, this first increment of what will ultimately be a complete Special Operations simulation is now essentially operational. There remains a major requirement for development of a systematic methodology for integration

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
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of SUWAM results into other assessment models employed in global wargaming systems. Readers should recall, in considering the conclusions of the balance of this chapter, that the impacts of Special Operations identified in PROUD PROPHET were integrated into the broader game play on the basis of informed judgment, and that any conclusions about the strategic impact of Special Operations are therefore tentative and must be drawn with care.

D. (U) OUTLINE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGNS IN PROUD PROPHET

1. [REDACTED] The Red UW Campaign Against NATO



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3. Blue PSYOP Campaign

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E. (U) RESULTS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLAY IN PROUD PROPHET - 83

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
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APPENDIX A (U) - STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF

PROUD PROPHET - 83 SPECIAL OPERATIONS


1. RED EVENTS

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2.

BLUE EVENTS



JS 3.3(b)(5)(8)

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APPENDIX B (U) - CHRONOLOGY OF  
PROUD PROPHET - 83 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) RED SPECIAL OPERATIONS EVENTS

a. (U) 30 AUGUST


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
b. (U) 31 AUGUST

[REDACTED]

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c. (U) 01 SEPTEMBER




OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)


JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(8)

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VII-B-2



d. (U) 02 SEPTEMBER



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VII-B-3

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)




e. (U) 03 SEPTEMBER



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VII-B-4

JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)



f. (U) 04 SEPTEMBER




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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

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
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
JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

VII-B-6

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)



g. (U) 05 SEPTEMBER



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h. (U) 06 SEPTEMBER



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i. (U) 07 SEPTEMBER

[REDACTED]

j. (U) 08 SEPTEMBER

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. (U) BLUE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EVENTS

a. (U) 30 AUGUST

[REDACTED]

b. (U) 31 AUGUST

[REDACTED]

c. (U) 01 SEPTEMBER

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d. (U) 02 SEPTEMBER

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e. (U) 03 SEPTEMBER

[REDACTED]

f. (U) 04 SEPTEMBER

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VII-B-10

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g. (U) 05 SEPTEMBER

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h. (U) 06 SEPTEMBER

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i. (U) 07 SEPTEMBER


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j. (U) 08 SEPTEMBER

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VII-B-14

VIII. (U) LOGISTICS

A. (U) OBJECTIVES

1. (U) Educational

The National Defense University's overall, long term educational objective for logistics play in its PROUD PROPHET global game series is to provide enough logistical data to demonstrate to participants the decisive impact of logistics. Logistics play will be developed to the point at which logistic considerations exert a major impact on game decisions.

2. (U) Research

The following logistics issues were identified for special consideration during the game:

- a. (U) The adequacy of stocks of specific munitions identified by participating commands as being of critical importance.
- b. (U) The potential strategic impact of unconventional warfare on theater sustainability.

B. (U) CONCEPT

Logistics play for the PROUD PROPHET global war game series is conceived as a methodology based on use of actual stockage and consumption data wherever available. For PROUD PROPHET - 83 our intent was to play with real data for U.S. forces, and notional data for RED. Future games in the PROUD PROPHET series will include play of BLUE Allied logistics using the best classified data and estimates available, and play of RED logistics using U.S. government estimates where available instead of notional data.

C. (U) METHOD

1. (U) Ground and Tactical Air Logistics

- a. (U) Logistics for U.S. ground and tactical air forces were monitored at two levels in PROUD PROPHET - 83: by gross categories of supply and by specific critical munitions and weapons systems of special interest to the CINCs. This dual-track approach is based on the fact that logistical accountability is handled in different ways depending on the needs of users. At the theater level the most common measure is in short tons. Logistic stocks are frequently reported by weight and by days of supply, and both measures were used in PROUD

██████████

PROPHET. In addition, it is common for field commanders to exercise intensive management of selected items that are in short supply or critical to the mission. Consumption data on such items were also reported.

b. (U) Supply/Categories/Items

(1) (U) Based on data provided by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency the following ten categories of supply were measured in short tons:

- (a) (U) Class I Subsistence
- (b) (U) Class II Clothing, individual equipment
- (c) (U) Class III Packaged petroleum
- (d) (U) Class III Bulk petroleum
- (e) (U) Class IV Engineer Equipment
- (f) (U) Class V Ammunition
- (g) (U) Class VII Major end items
- (h) (U) Class VIII Medical
- (i) (U) Class IX Repair parts air transportable
- (j) (U) Class IX Repair parts not air transportable

(2) (U) The following items (selected by the CINCs) were chosen for intensive management:

(a) (U) Air

- 1 (U) AIM 7 Sparrow
- 2 (U) AIM 9 Sidewinder
- 3 (U) AGM 65 Maverick
- 4 (U) Cluster Bomb Units

(b) (U) Ground

- 1 (U) Armored Personnel Carriers  
M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV)  
M113A1
- 2 (U) Tanks  
M1  
M60/M60A1  
M60A3

(c) (U) Ammunition

1 (U) Artillery

- a (U) 155 mm  
M107 High Explosive (HE)  
Dual Purpose, Improved Conventional Munitions  
(DP ICM)

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b (U) 8 inch  
M650 Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP)  
Dual Purpose, Improved Conventional Munitions

2 (U) M105 Tank  
Armor Piercing (APF DS)  
High Explosive Antitank (HEAT)

c. (U) Sources

(1) (U) The on-hand supplies of selected items forecast in 1986 for ground forces in central Europe were provided by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). The on-hand supplies by class forecast in 1986 for ground forces in central Europe were provided by the U.S. Army Logistics Center from data gathered by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency.

(2) (U) Consumption data for ground forces were provided by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). Consumption data for air forces were provided by a model developed by Colonel Richard Doneen.

d. (U) Interface

The Army War College's McClintic Theater Model (MTM), used for analysis of the war in central Europe allows for the depletion of unit's combat power as a result of battle. It does not take account of the loss of specific items. As a result, it was necessary to determine the number of U.S. units in contact, the length of the contact in hours, the type of contact (level of battle intensity) and assess losses based on the expected consumption. This information was translated into a percentage of combat power loss for units in contact which was entered manually into the McClintic model. The same factors were used in the Logistics model to calculate consumption.

e.   


JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)(8)

f. (U) Model

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(7)

Logistics for ground and tactical air forces were accounted for by a microcomputer model developed by COL Star Carey and LTC Terrance Ryan of the National Defense University's War Gaming and Simulation Center. Sample BLUE and RED outputs, and explanatory pages from the PROUD PROPHET - 83 BLUE PLAYER LOGISTICS HANDBOOK are attached as Appendix A to this chapter.

2. (U) Naval/Naval Air Logistics

a. (U) A set of naval logistics programs run on the KAYPRO II microcomputer system was used to track expenditures and losses for certain important naval weapon systems during PROUD PROPHET - 83. The reports provided by the model list weapon expenditures and weapon system losses for different theaters of operations. The losses were entered into the logistics system in one of three ways. First, the naval logistics system was updated by the appropriate naval assessment programs. Second, for those assessment programs that were not automatically tied to the logistics system, the updates to the logistics data base were made manually. The third way was through a statistical reduction of munition stocks based on assumption of use by class of ship and by the level of combat activity in the theater. The reports, for a 24 or 48 hour period, accumulated losses and expenditures for the entire game. Full play of naval logistics with the set of models employed requires attention to initial naval orders of battle, initial positions, and initial stock of fuel and munitions as inputs for the various data bases.

b. (U) Expenditures of the following BLUE Weapons were recorded:

- (1) (U) Surface Weapons:  
Large Caliber (5" & 8")  
CWS 3 (#330 round Salvos)  
BPDMS(#2 round Salvos)  
DECOY (Chaff)

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(2) (U) Surface to Air Missiles (SAM):

SM-1 (MR)  
SM-1 (ER)  
SM-2 (MR)  
SM-2 (ER)  
Sea-Sparrow  
Sea-Dart  
Sea-Wolf

(3) (U) Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM):

Harpoon  
Exocet  
Gabriel  
Tomahawk

(4) (U) Anti-Sub Weapons (ASW):

ASROC  
SUBROC

(5) (U) Anti-Ship Torpedo

MK-46  
MK-48  
Tigerfish

(6) (U) Anti-Sub Torpedo

MK-46  
MK-48  
Tigerfish

(7) (U) Air to Surface Missiles (ASM):

Harpoon  
Tomahawk  
Harm  
Shrike  
Martel  
Exocet

(8) (U) Air to Air Missiles:

Sidewinder  
Sidewinder L/M  
Sparrow  
Phoenix

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c. (U) The following RED weapon system expenditures were recorded:

(1) (U) Surface to Air Missiles (SAS):

Large Caliber  
CIWS  
BPDMS  
DECOY

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) Surface to Air Missiles (SAM):

SA-N-1  
SA-N-3  
SA-N-4  
SA-N-5  
SA-N-6  
SA-N-7  
UDALOY-SAM

(3) (U) Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM):

SSN-1  
SSN-2  
SSN-3  
SSN-7  
SSN-9  
SSN-12  
SSN-19  
SSN-21  
SSN-22

(4) (U) Anti-Sub Weapons (ASW):

SS-N-14  
SS-M-15  
SS-NX-16  
SUW-N-1

(5) (U) Anti-Ship Torpedo:

SAET-40  
53-51  
53-56  
53-56-2  
SAET-60  
53-65  
53-65-2  
53-65-W  
ET-80  
65W

(6) (U) Anti-Sub Torpedo:

SET-40  
E-40-68A  
E-40-75A  
AT-1  
E45-75A  
E45-75A-M  
ET-80A  
SET-53-M  
SET-65  
ET-8-80-(76)

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
(7) (U) Air to Surface Missiles

AS-2  
AS-3  
AS-4  
AS-5  
AS-6  
AS-7  
AS-9  
AS-11  
AS-14

(8) (U) Air to Air Missiles:

AA-1  
AA-2  
AA-3  
AA-5  
AA-6  
AA-7  
AA-8  
AA-9

d. (U) The Kinematics Model monitored naval fuel consumption and automatically refueled task groups at sea when in the company of fleet tankers.



f. (U) The set of naval models employed in PROUD PROPHET - 83 were developed by Mr. John Corsey of Wakefield Data. Sample pages of model output are attached as Appendix B to this chapter.

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VIII-8

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APPENDIX A

(HANDBOOK PROVIDED LOGISTICS PLAYERS IN PROUD PROPHET - 83)

THE CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS PLAY

One of the major changes from last year's global exercise (GLOBEX) is the addition of logistics as an element of the exercise. In most war games, sufficient logistics are assumed and therefore not included. In an actual situation, sufficient logistics may well not be available. We have attempted to design this part of PROUD PROPHET in a manner similar to what would be faced in a real conflict.

Logisticians use various units of measurement. The most common is short tons. As a general rule, tons are the best measurement to plan requirements, transportation and storage. (Non-logisticians often prefer to work with days of supply or dollar value.) In addition, commanders usually select a few critical items in the theater and ask to have them placed under intensive management. Therefore, the two standard methods of operation are to keep track of supplies by tonnages and critical items by actual count. This has been duplicated in the game. Data will be provided on the supply classes and current inventory on selected items.

Every number you will be given has a confirmed source. We are using the actual data of logistics on hand in 1986. The services have provided the numbers; we have not made them up for game play. Estimates will be made when damage or losses occur as a result of enemy action. These will be based on the thoughts of a panel of experts who will analyze the events and use their judgment to make adjustments.

It is the responsibility of the players to determine if tactical operation can be supported.

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SUPPLY CLASSES

Supplies are broken into ten classes. Water is treated separately and is not a part of one of the classes. For Europe and Korea you will be given the amount of stock on hand as of D-Day. For SWA we will use the amount brought in. You will receive a daily printout showing the amount of consumption, damaged, and resupplied. In a short exercise only the amount of resupply previously scheduled can be played. Consumption rates are based on one of two possibilities: intense fighting or not fighting. The Concept Analysis Agency has computed the consumption and resupply rates for intense fighting and the consumption for not fighting (called "reserve"). The resupply amount for reserve will equal consumption as that is what normally occurs.

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CLASS V SELECTED ITEMS

We will be accounting for the following ammunition: M107 HE and DP ICM for the 155mm, M65ORAP and DP ICM for the 8 inch and APFDS and HEAT for the 105mm tank. We begin with the amount which DCSLOG said would be on hand in 1986 in Europe and Korea. For SWA we will use the amount brought in. DCSOPS has provided consumption data based on the type of combat action. The initial report will show the amount on hand. Daily reports will be given to show consumption.

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CLASS VII SELECTED ITEMS

We will be accounting for the following equipment: M1 tanks, M60/M60A1 tanks, M60A3 tanks, M2/M2 APCs, M113A1 APCs, 155mm howitzers and 8 inch howitzers. We begin with the amount which DCSLOG said would be on hand in 1986 in Europe and Korea. For SWA we will use rates of consumption: Attack, Defense Intense, Defense Delay and Static. From the beginning balance we will deduct the daily percentage lost according to the applicable rate of consumption. The initial report will show the number of each item available. The daily reports will show the previous day's consumption and the number available for the current day.

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WATER

Water is a special topic. It will be played in SWA only. The consumption figures are from the U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) Manual. Players will be challenged to provide the equipment and people needed to supply water to their force. The doctrine used will be based on conditions as they are expected to be in 1986. In the part of the theater used for this exercise, the amount of available water is not as critical as the treatment and distribution of it.

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AIR INTERCEPT MISSILES (AIM) CLUSTER BOMB UNITS  
AND AIR GROUND MISSILE (AGM) 65 MAVERICKS

We will be accounting for four types of AIMS: 7E, 7F/M, 9L/M and 9p for the Air Force by theater. We begin with the amount which the Air Force logistics office said would be on hand in 1986 in each theater. A separate report will be given for each theater. From the beginning theater balance will be subtracted the number needed for self defense and the number lost to ground attrition. The result will be the beginning balance for the day. The initial report will include all the AIMS. Cluster bomb units (CBUs), and AGMs available during the time of the exercise. At the conclusion of the tactical operations for the day we will calculate the number used in combat and the number lost to attrition. These will be deducted from the beginning balance to give the end of day balance. That report will be available to the players at the beginning of the next day so you know the current status of your supplies.

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NORWAY

The USMC has primary responsibility for Norway. In conjunction with the Marines' logistics office we have selected four important items which will be tracked. They are: Class V in tons, and the actual number of 5 ton trucks, 155mm howitzers and tube-launched optically tracked, wire-guided missiles (TOWs). It is assumed that half of the ammunition will have been moved north before the game begins. Players should plan the move of the remaining ammunition and plan tactical operations within the limits of the number of Class VII items on hand.

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TEN CLASSES OF SUPPLY

- CLASS I Subsistence including gratuitous health and welfare items.
- CLASS II Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets and tool kits, hand-tools, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment. Includes items of equipment, other than principal items prescribed in authorization/allowance tables and items of supply (not including repair parts.)
- CLASS III POL: Petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquid and compressed gases, chemical products, coolants, deicing and antifreeze compounds, together with components and additives of such products and coal.
- CLASS IV Construction: Construction materials to include installed equipment and all fortification/barrier materials.
- CLASS V Ammunition: Ammunition of all types (including special ammunition, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items.
- CLASS VI Personal demand items.
- CLASS VII Major End Items: A final combination of end products which is ready for its intended use (principal items), for example, launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.
- CLASS VIII Medical material including medical peculiar repair parts.
- CLASS IX Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies and subassemblies, reparable and nonreparable required for maintenance support of all equipment.
- CLASS X Material to support nonmilitary programs, for example, agricultural and economic development not included in classes I through IX.

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


Sample Blue output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: EUROPE NORTH AND CENTRAL \*\*\* LOGISTICS STATUS \*\*\*

AS OF: 060001Z SEPTEMBER 1986

CONSUMPTION: TONS CONSUMED YESTERDAY  
RESUPPLY: TONS RESUPPLIED YESTERDAY  
DAMAGES/LOSS: TONS DAMAGED/LOST  
ON HAND: TODAY'S AVAILABLE SUPPLY  
DAYS REMAINING: AT YESTERDAY'S RATE



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
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Sample Blue output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: EUROPE SOUTH AND REAR \*\*\* LOGISTICS STATUS \*\*\*

AS OF: 060001Z SEPTEMBER 1986

CONSUMPTION: TONS CONSUMED YESTERDAY  
RESUPPLY: TONS RESUPPLIED YESTERDAY  
DAMAGES/LOSS: TONS DAMAGED/LOST  
ON HAND: TODAY'S AVAILABLE SUPPLY  
DAYS REMAINING: AT YESTERDAY'S RATE



VIII-A-10

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[REDACTED]

Sample Blue output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: EUROPE

SELECTED ITEMS (CLASS V)

CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

AS OF: 060001Z SEPTEMBER 1986

HE: HIGH EXPLOSIVE  
RAP: ROCKET ASSISTED PROJECTILE  
DP ICM: DUAL PURPOSE, IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL  
MUNITIONS  
APFSDS: ARMOR PIERCING FIN STABILIZED SABOT  
HEAT: HIGH EXPLOSIVE ANTI-TANK

[REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

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Sample Blue output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: EUROPE                      SELECTED ITEMS (CLASS VII)

CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

AS OF: 060001Z SEPTEMBER 1996

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CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

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
Sample Blue output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: EUROPE

SELECTED ITEMS (AIR FORCE MUNITIONS)

CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

AS OF: 090001Z SEPTEMBER 1966



CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

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Sample Blue output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: SOUTHWEST ASIA      SELECTED ITEMS (CLASS V)

CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

AS OF: 000001Z SEPTEMBER 1986

HE: HIGH EXPLOSIVE  
RAP: ROCKET ASSISTED PROJECTILE  
DP ICH: DUAL PURPOSE, IMPROVED  
CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS  
APFDS: ARMOR PIERCING FIN STABILIZE SABOT  
HEAT: HIGH EXPLOSIVE ANTI-TANK

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*

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CLASSIFICATION: \*\*\*\*\* [REDACTED] \*\*\*\*\*


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PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS  
CONTROL MODEL


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Sample Red Output, PROUD PROPHET - 83 LOGISTICS CONTROL MODEL

THEATER: EUROPE & PAKISTAN

\*\*\* LOGISTICS STATUS \*\*\*


CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]

AS OF: 060001Z SEPTEMBER 1986

QUANTITIES OF POL/MUNITIONS  
IN METRIC TONS

N/A = NOT APPLICABLE

THIS REPORT REFLECTS UNIT TRANSFERS/  
ATTACHMENTS AND ARRIVALS TO FIRST AND  
SECOND ECHELONS AT THE VARIOUS FRONTS  
DURING D+3 THRU D+5



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
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JUNE, 1983

PROUD PROPHET




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
JUNE, 1983

PROUD PROPHET



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Appendix H-3: Sample Output, PROPHET-83  
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