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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 5, 1972

Memo For DR. TUCKER

Attached for your review is the latest draft of the NSRAP Review Panel Report. Dr. Foster is planning to send this version and the draft of the Tentative Guidance to Mr. Laird and ADM Moorer today.

Foster did not want to discuss in his forwarding memorandum the detailed procedures for implementing the SecDef guidance and for subsequent annual review of that guidance. The final paragraph of the forwarding memorandum has been changed to state that the guidance document could be ready for transmittal to the JCS by September, 1972, that the JCS could then begin a phased modification of SIOP and other plans, and that a method will be needed to resolve any ambiguities in the guidance or further issues which emerge during that modification.

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JAN 17 2013


J. J. Martin
Director,
Strategic Retaliatory Division

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5050-552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 17 Jan 2013 Authority: EO 13526
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Reason: 3.3(b)(5),(6)
MDR: 12-M-2600

Enclosure

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May 4, 1972

Review of U. S. Policy for the
Employment of Nuclear Weapons

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Revised Authority On: 30 Dec 2013~~

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Review of U.S. Policy for the
Employment of Nuclear Weapons

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1. General

On January 19, 1972 the Secretary of Defense appointed a panel to initiate an annual review of the U.S. policy pertaining to the employment of nuclear weapons, to identify and illuminate national policy on other issues requiring resolution, and to prepare for his consideration proposed Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons. ^{1/}

This panel consisted of the following individuals:

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (Panel Chairman)

Dr. Albert C. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence)

Mr. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Dr. Gardiner L. Tucker, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis)

LGen John W. Vogt, USAF, Director, Joint Staff ^{2/}

VADM J. P. Weinel, USN, Director J-5 (Plans and
Policy) ^{2/}

In order to carry out the tasks assigned by the Secretary of Defense, the panel decided to scope the review as follows:

a. Because the employment of nuclear weapons at any level has the potential for escalation to strategic nuclear war and because

^{1/} SecDef memo dtd 19 Jan 1972, subj: Review of U.S. Policies for Employment of Strategic Nuclear Weapons (C), SecDef Control No. X-0277.

^{2/} On April , 1972, VADM Weinel replaced LGen Vogt as the representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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theater nuclear weapons can provide options for flexible nuclear responses below the level of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the policy for employment of theater nuclear weapons was included within the scope of the panel's review.

b. The panel considered employment policies which will be feasible with U.S. nuclear forces programmed for 1974.

In reviewing U.S. policy for employment of nuclear weapons, the panel examined:

- Analysis of the consequences of SIOP execution under various conditions.
- Issue papers prepared for the Review Panel by its staff.
- Views of SACEUR and CINGCSAC as expressed in informal meetings with the Review Panel.
- Technical aspects of the war planning process as reported by several members of the Review Panel's staff on the basis of several visits to the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Staff at Omaha.
- Current U.S. policy pertaining to employment of nuclear weapons, including, but not limited to, the current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP) and its implementation in the SIOP.
- A revised NSTAP prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration by the panel.


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The findings of the panel regarding these are summarized in section 2 through 5 of this report. Section 6 contains a review of issues identified by the panel and a summary of the approach to these issues taken in the proposed Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons.




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
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
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aggression -- Western Europe -- is likely to be destroyed during such an all-out exchange.

(3) Less is known about the PRC nuclear doctrine than about Soviet nuclear doctrine, in part because of the comparatively recent emergence of a PRC nuclear weapon capability.

d. Conclusions

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Although we do not know what deters the Soviet Union and PRC from initiating nuclear warfare, and differing judgments could be made by others on these matters, the following conclusions were arrived at by the Panel:

- The United States should continue to attempt to deter nuclear war by having a high confidence capability to threaten unambiguously the destruction of targets highly valued by the enemy
- If some nuclear conflict nevertheless occurs, the United States should attempt to control escalation (through selective employment of U. S. forces and coercion of the enemy to constrain his further use of nuclear weapons by continuing to threaten enemy targets) to the lowest level consistent with preserving vital U. S. interests.




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
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1/ The panel is in agreement on this priority but, because of the departure from past policy,⁷ believes that this matter requires careful consideration by the SECDEF.

3. Current National Policy for Employment of Nuclear Weapons


The Panel reviewed U.S. national policy documents, including National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), the President's annual foreign policy reports, the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), and the NSTAP. NATO policy documents were also reviewed. As discussed in the next section, the NSTAP is the only source of definitive policy for the employment of nuclear weapons. Other policy documents either do not address nuclear weapon employment or they add little to the NSTAP guidance. The President's foreign policy reports and the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance do, however, stress in general terms the need for flexibility in nuclear weapon employment plans in order to have attack options appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation.

4. The Current NSTAP and Its Implementation in the SIOP

The NSTAP, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, provides guidance to subordinate U.S. commanders in preparing the SIOP. Since this guidance was prepared from the viewpoint of the planner who must target nuclear weapons, it does not provide full and explicit coverage of all aspects of national policy for the employment of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the policy on which the current NSTAP was based was established in the early 1960s and does not adequately reflect present world conditions.

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
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5. JCS Revision of the NSTAP

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved a revision of the NSTAP for consideration by the panel. ^{2/} The revision has the same objectives as the current NSTAP, but there are several major changes:




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- 2/ Chairman, JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM-66-72), dated 22 Feb 1972. This revision has not yet replaced the NSTAP described in Section 4.
- 3/ The third NSDM 16 criterion states that the United States "should maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer."

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


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6. The Need for Expanded Policy Guidance

The Panel considers the revised NSTAP to be a major step forward in defining national nuclear targeting and attack policy. In the course of the review, there were identified additional issues of importance to the Panel which were not within the intended scope of the revised NSTAP. Furthermore, the Panel found that no other policy document covered these issues. Accordingly, the Panel prepared a new "Tentative Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons." This new document incorporates most new features of the revised NSTAP and is consistent with the limited policy guidance for employment of nuclear weapons that exists elsewhere. This "Tentative Guidance" takes a different perspective than the NSTAP, broadens the scope of the policy guidance, and introduces some new strategic concepts.

In developing this guidance, a number of major issues were identified and studied. The following Section summarizes Panel resolution of these issues as they appear in the "Tentative Guidance."

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
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7. Issues Addressed in Formulating Nuclear Employment Policy...

In addressing the problem of employment of nuclear weapons, numerous issues were identified and studied. The more important of these issues developed during the NSTAP review are outlined below in order to give some insight into the rationale behind the "Tentative Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons", which is attached to this report. For each of these issues, the position taken in the "Tentative Guidance" is outlined, alternatives considered are reviewed and the rationale for the position that was taken is outlined.



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
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
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selves and allies. Targeting priorities to pursue this objective are discussed in paragraph 7b.

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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