

#27

ROUTINE
R 111014Z OCT 91
FM USMISSION USMATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5115
INFO SECDEF WASHDC

ZYUW RUFYMAA4659 2841614
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA//
USINR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
ZEN//USDELNC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH

EXERCISES (WEAPONS USED).

- HOW ARE GROUND-LAUNCHED AND AIR-DELIVERED WEAPONS CONTROLLED?

- LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
- USE CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- RELEASE AUTHORITY.
- SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES.

- HOW ARE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MISSILES CONTROLLED?

- LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
- USE CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- RELEASE AUTHORITY.
- SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES.

- WHAT PRECAUTIONS ARE TAKEN TO ENSURE AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT RELEASE/LAUNCH?

- MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL DEVICES (KEYS, PERMISSIVE ACTION LINKS).
- SECURE AND DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS.
- COMMAND CODES AT APPROPRIATE DECISION LEVEL.
- HUMAN RELIABILITY PERSONNEL SELECTION CRITERIA.
- ACCESS CONTROL (SECURITY, 2-MAN RULE, PROCEDURES).
- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- METHODS USED FOR EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF WARHEADS.

- WHAT ORGANIZATIONS ARE CHARGED WITH PHYSICAL

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SECTION 02 OF 02 USMATO 04659

VIENNA FOR USEDEL CSBM; USVIENNA FOR USEDEL CFE; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

BT
TAGS: NATO, MAC, PREL, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: LIST OF QUESTIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CONTROL

PROTECTION AND HOW DO THEY PERFORM THIS FUNCTION?

- COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT.
- CUSTODY CONTROL IN PEACETIME.
- ON-SITE SECURITY FORCES AND TRAINING.
- HUMAN RELIABILITY PERSONNEL SELECTION CRITERIA.
- SECURITY PROCEDURES DURING TRANSPORT, METHOD OF TRANSPORT.
- UPLOAD/OUTLOAD PROCEDURES AND PRECAUTIONS.
- WEAPON PROTECTION PLANS, REGULATIONS, RECOVERY PROCEDURES, ETC.

- WHAT SAFETY FEATURES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE WEAPON DESIGN?

- ELECTRICAL/SRAY VOLTAGE ISOLATION.
- SINGLE-POINT SAFETY DESIGN.
- SEPARATION OF CORE AND DETONATOR.
- FIRE RESISTANCE OR USE OF INSENSITIVE EXPLOSIVES.
- SHOCK RESISTANCE.
- WEAPONS WITH PAL DEVICES (MISSILES, AFAP, BOMBS).

- WHAT EQUIPMENT IS USED FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF STORAGE SITES?

- STAND-OFF AND VERTICAL THREAT.
- TERRORIST ATTACK.
- PROTECTION AGAINST TAKE-OVER BY TERRITORIAL FORCES.
- CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE AND TRANSPORT.
- BERMS, PROTECTED FIGHTING POSITIONS.
- UNDERGROUND STORAGE.
- ACCESS DELAY SYSTEMS.

- WHAT PROVISIONS ARE MADE FOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RESPONSE?

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SECTION 01 OF 02 USMATO 04659

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TAGS: NATO, MAC, PREL, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: LIST OF QUESTIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CONTROL

REF: USMATO 4383

1. BELOW FOLLOWS A LIST OF QUESTION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CONTROL PREPARED BY THE I.S. IN RESPONSE TO DISCUSSION AT THE SEPTEMBER 26 MAC (SEE REFTEL). THE ORIGINAL BELGIAN SUGGESTION WAS FOR A COMMON ALLIED LIST OF QUESTIONS TO PUT TO THE SOVIETS AT ANY FOUR-POWER MEETING, BUT THE BRIEF TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM SYG WOERNER SAYS ONLY THAT THE LIST HAS BEEN PREPARED "FOR USE BY ALLIES AT THEIR DISCRETION."

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT.

POINT PAPER ON SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMAND, CONTROL AND SECURITY

- HOW DOES THE SOVIET COMMAND AUTHORITY FUNCTION REGARDING NUCLEAR FORCES?

- RESPONSIBILITY FOR ULTIMATE DECISION ON USE OF WEAPONS (CHARTER).
- ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN.
- CONSULTATION PROCESS, IF ANY.
- ROLE OF SUBORDINATE AUTHORITIES.
- NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT OF SEPARATE REPUBLICS, IF ANY.
- EMERGENCY OR FALL-BACK CONTROL PROCEDURES (BREAK IN COMMAND CHAIN).

- HOW ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA CONTROLLED?

- LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
- USE CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
- RELEASE AUTHORITY.
- SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES.
- PROCEDURES USED DURING SIMULATED NUCLEAR TRAINING

ACTION INFO (U,6,7,8,F)

CJCS(1) J3(4) J5(2) QUAL CONTROL(1)
USRMCLO(1) SECDEF-N(1) DARPA(1) SDIO(8) USDP:FILE(1)
ASD:RA(2) USDA:P&L(1) USDA:ADMIN(1) USDA:AE(1)
USDA:TWP(1) USDA:IP(2) USDA:STWF(1) ASD:PA(1) GC(1)
ASD:PA&E/EPF(1) ASD:PA&E/LF(1) ASD:PA&E/FS(1)
ASD:PA&E/DAMIS(1) ASD:PA&E/DCL(1) OASD:C3I-INT(1)
USDP:DASDEUR(2) USDP:DSAA(1) USDP:NSP(1)
USDP:FMRA(1) USDP:TSPD(1) USDP:SDRS(1) USDP:ESM(1)
USDP:START(1) USDP:VP(1) USDP:SFP(1) USDP:LOS(1)
USDP:IGA(1) USDP:TWF(1) USDP:NPP(1) USDP:MH(1)
USDP:CFBACP(2) USDP:EW ECON(1) USDP:EUR POL(1)
USDP:SEE(1) USDP:NATOPOL(1) USDP:DSOS&VP(1)
DIO-WE(1)
+OSIA WASHINGTON DC
+DNA WASHINGTON DC//OPAC/DPMA//
+SAFE

MCN=91284/05762

TOR=91284/1621Z

TAD=91284/1629Z

CDSN=MAU596

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 27 2013

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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

- ON-SCENE COMMAND AUTHORITY/LEVEL.
- PUBLIC NOTIFICATION POLICY/PROCEDURES.
- RESPONSE UNITS (MEDICAL, CONTAMINATION CONTROL, SECURITY, ETC.).
- WHAT METHODS/PROCEDURES WILL BE USED FOR DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS AS DRAW DOWN CONTINUES?
 - SAFETY PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS (NUCLEAR WASTE).
 - CAPACITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CAPABILITIES FOR MASS DESTRUCTION OF WARHEADS.
- WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED OR ARE ANTICIPATED IN NUCLEAR COMMAND CONTROL AS A RESULT OF RECENT EVENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION?
 - RESPONSIBILITY FOR WEAPONS WITHIN NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS.
 - REMOVAL OR RETROGRADE OF WEAPONS TO RUSSIAN REPUBLIC.
 - CENTRAL AUTHORITY CONTROLS.

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5480 542*
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: *29 AUG 2013* Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: *17-M-3426*

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