

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 01 2014

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24 Jan 02

MEMO FOR DepSecDef

FROM DSD SMA

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Proposal

Office of the Secretary of Defense JS 5052
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 01 DEC 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 1.4(a) + JS 5052(b)(6)
MDR: 14 -M- 1226

Sir, I have reviewed the proposal and offer the following per your request.

JS 5052(b)(6)

1. I like it. [REDACTED] has it about right--we hit Saddam's regime with surprise from multiple directions with a bold, aggressive, and violently executed plan. We can do it with a much smaller force than was used in 1991, leveraging current capabilities (C4ISR), the massing of joint fires (direct and indirect), air-ground integration, and the common operational picture that our joint force is moving towards. The element of surprise will be important, with a synchronized information campaign. This time, the interagency post-conflict plan will need to be sorted out before the first shot is fired. The Iraqi opposition will need to be considered. All of this will need to be war-gamed in detail, with a carefully selected group of planners under the direction of the CINC. At the end of this paper, I offer additional names of planners capable of this undertaking.

2. With respect to [REDACTED] concept, the following responds to his points in the order presented. JS 5052(b)(6)

a. The task organization needs to be sorted out with a detailed war-game based on "true" Iraqi capabilities and a CINC approved concept for maneuver and fires. [REDACTED]

Again,
all of this needs to be determined by a war-game and troops to task analysis. Planners need the mission, commander's guidance, and a course of action to complete the work.

JS 1.4 (a)

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- b. Agree that we need to equip the joint force with reliable combat identification--a cobra wave type transmitter for every combat system. What we really need is a common operational picture for the joint force to facilitate rapid massing of effects (fires and maneuver) and reduce fratricide. Funding does need to be released to make this happen now to equip the force as soon as the task organization is determined. C3I should be involved as considerable work has been done on this within OSD and the Joint Staff.
- c. OPSEC will be important. We should go to school on how this was done for Overlord.
- JS 5 U.S.L. § 552 (b)(6)
- d. I disagree with [REDACTED] on the employment of Paladin self-propelled artillery. Each heavy brigade needs its direct support artillery battalion for the counter-battery mission and there may be a requirement for additional artillery based on the war-game. Close air support (CAS) is great, but we need the immediate responsiveness of artillery to fight the enemy's artillery under any condition. As an aside, the precursor to Paladin (M109 howitzer) did the job in the Gulf War in the 24th Infantry Division--recall the rapid, "hail-Mary" advance (I was an operations officer for one of McCaffrey's three maneuver brigades). In this case, our rate of advance was limited to some extent by the artillery, but it was then and remains a crucial part of the team. I would never leave it behind. Crusader would be better, but Paladin is what we have. The CAS effort needs to be our heaviest "surge" to date. Fixed and rotary winged CAS must be on station at all times and we must be ready to integrate its fires with armor and artillery (in both good weather and bad, day and night).
- e. Agree that we do not need a prolonged air campaign, but rather a short duration (24-48 hour) surge effort to attack Iraqi air defenses, then command and control, WMD, and symbols of the regime. The air component can then be used concurrently with our ground assault for both CAS and interdiction of Saddam's forces as he reacts to our maneuver, to screen our flanks, and to recon our axis of advance.
- f. [REDACTED] We must make Saddam fight from multiple directions at the same time and leverage the air-ground integration to mass effects at the place and time of our choosing.

JS 1.4 (a)

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- g. Regarding using the Marines as a deception to draw off Iraqi forces towards Basra, I think we need to be a bit more original. We used an afloat MEB for just such a purpose in the Gulf War. Saddam will not go for the same ruse again. Instead, the Iraqis are probably looking at our concept in Afghanistan and will expect some of the same. Rather, we should use armed Predators and Global Hawk to shape the battlefield, then insert special forces to arm and empower the anti-regime groups, followed by Ranger and MEU raids in advance of the main effort aimed directly at Baghdad. We need to shape the fight and deceive Saddam as to our true intentions based on the initial set of our forces, an unexpected timeline, and a coordinated interagency effort.

JS 5U.S.L. 5152(b)(6)

JS 1.4 (a)

- h. [REDACTED] ideas to synchronize the staging of forces to facilitate surprise are good. We need to do this. The pre-positioned stocks [REDACTED] need to be pre-positioned to facilitate the concept of maneuver. I fully support the notion that deploying heavy brigades should fall in on equipment and cross the line of departure within days of arriving in theater. Saddam will expect a reception and staging effort measured in months.
- i. Agree with a fall or winter campaign. My experience in the Gulf War is that low ground is wet in the spring and summer, which slows the heavy force advance. Tanks literally sink up to the turret. We need to pick our axes of advance carefully.
- j. Agree that one of Saddam's best divisions is no match for one of our heavy brigades. We have the air-ground integration, we own the night, and our direct fire systems out-range the enemy. Saddam's worst nightmare is to take us on in the open desert. We need to remember that we are not re-fighting the Gulf War. Iraq has been severely weakened by ten years of continuous economic, political, and military pressure. In comparing the Iraqi military from 1990 to 2001, force structure has shrunk from 1.2 million to 350,000; combat aircraft from 669 to 260 (39%); tanks from 5800 to 2588 (45%); and artillery from 3850 to 2694 (70%)--the threat is considerably reduced. In terms of our own capability, in 1991 we had only 116 PGM capable aircraft and today the majority of our fighter aircraft are PGM capable (6000+). In 1991, we had no JDAM or JSOW and limited CALCM.

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In 1991, the B-52 was the only bomber we used. Today, the B-2 and B-1 are also available in addition to the B-52. On top of all this is our newly demonstrated capability with unmanned platforms such as the Predator (armed and unarmed) and Global Hawk. GPS for the entire force is greatly improved. Patriot systems are improved. The tank and Bradley force have been upgraded. Today, intelligence transformation and information dominance has completely changed the way we fight. Bottom line, the calculus has changed significantly since 1991 and our wargaming must take all of this into account.

k. I agree with [REDACTED] timeline. OPSEC will be a challenge to keep this under wraps for the next eight months. 35 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

3. With respect to the names that [REDACTED] recommends for the planning team, I know and can vouch for [REDACTED] can vouch for [REDACTED] I would add eight names for the CINC's consideration. BG(P) Dave Huntoon, USA; BG Jason Kamiya, USA; Col [REDACTED] USMC; and Col [REDACTED] USA; Col [REDACTED] USA; LTC [REDACTED] USA; LTC [REDACTED] USAF; and CDR [REDACTED] USN.

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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